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Abstract
Side-channel attacks are a prominent threat to the security of cryptographic implementa-
tions. Differently from the traditional black-box attacks, which exploit the inputs and
outputs of cryptographic schemes, side-channel attacks partially access the inner working
of the scheme as well, by observing the physical leakage emitted by the device executing
cryptographic algorithms. A notable example is the class of power-analysis attacks, which
exploits the power consumption of the underlying device to recover the secret keys of the
implemented cryptosystem.
Since their first presentation in the late 1990s, the problem of securing cryptographic
systems in the presence of side-channel leakages received significant attention by the
cryptographic community. In particular, the theory community has concentrated its
research efforts on formally modeling the side-channel leakages and on designing crypto-
graphic schemes provably secure in such leakage models. However, conceiving a formal
model that realistically captures possible physical leakages and constructing primitives
sufficiently efficient to be deployed in practice are still challenging research objectives.
This research area is usually referred to as leakage-resilient cryptography.
In this dissertation, we examine three main research directions. The first one focuses on
the technique of masking, which is the most popular approach to counteract power-analysis
attacks. In this context, our work analyzes possible methods to improve the efficiency of
masked implementations, with the goal of overcoming the decrease in performance, which
is a common drawback of masking. In particular, we provide new and more efficient
algorithms for the computation of basic operations in two kinds of masking schemes: the
Boolean masking and the Inner Product masking.
The second research direction of this work addresses the problem of formalizing security
requirements for hardware implementations. While provable security of software-oriented
masking has been studied since the origin of leakage resilient cryptography, the more
complex task of formally proving the security of hardware-oriented masking is receiving
attention by the community only recently. We discuss the different challenges of this
field, and we introduce a new theoretical model, the robust probing model, capturing the
conditions required for securely implementing complex algorithms in practice, providing
a guide to practical implementers.
Finally, the last part of this work is concerned with the protection of algorithms
employed in lattice-based constructions, which are studied in the field of post-quantum
cryptography. While several works investigate the application of masking schemes to
xi
standard cryptosystems, for most post-quantum schemes this is still an ongoing research.
We contribute to this research area, by applying the masking countermeasure to a
binomial sampler which is at the base of many lattice-based cryptosystems.
xii
Zusammenfassung
Seitenkanalangriffe sind eine erhebliche Bedrohung für die Sicherheit von kryptographis-
chen Implementierungen. Anders als bei den traditionellen Black-Box-Angriffen, die
nur die Eingaben und Ausgaben von kryptographischen Verfahren betrachten, greifen
Seitenkanalangriffe auch auf die inneren Abläufe zu, indem sie physikalisches Leakage
beobachten, das von dem Gerät ausgegeben wird, während es kryptografische Algorith-
men ausführt. Ein bekanntes Beispiel ist die Klasse der Power-Analyse-Angriffe, bei
der der Stromverbrauch des zugrundeliegenden Geräts gemessen wird, um die geheimen
Schlüssel des implementierten Kryptosystems wiederherzustellen. Seit der Einführung
in den späten 90er Jahren, erfährt das Problem der Absicherung kryptografischer Sys-
teme gegenüber Seitenkanalanalysen erhebliche Aufmerksamkeit in der kryptografischen
Forschungsgemeinschaft. Insbesondere im Forschungszweig der theoretischen Kryptogra-
phie sind Anstrengungen unternommen worden, Leakage durch Seitenkanäle formal
zu modellieren und beweisbar sichere kryptografische Schemata zu entwickeln. Die
Konzeption eines formalen Modells, das mögliches Leakage realistisch erfasst sowie die
Konstruktion von sicheren Primitiven, die ausreichend effizient für den praktischen Ein-
satz sind, sind nach wie vor anspruchsvolle Forschungsziele. Dieser Forschungsbereich
wird üblicherweise als Leakage-Resiliente Kryptographie bezeichnet. In dieser Disser-
tation werden drei Hauptforschungsrichtungen untersucht. Die erste konzentriert sich
auf die Technik des „Masking“, welche der beliebteste Ansatz ist, um Power-Analyse-
Angriffen entgegenzuwirken. In diesem Zusammenhang analysiert diese Arbeit mögliche
Methoden zur Verbesserung der Effizienz von Masking-Implementierungen, mit dem
Ziel, den Leistungsabfall zu überwinden, der ein häufiger Nachteil solcher Verfahren
ist. Insbesondere bieten wir neue und effizientere Algorithmen für die Berechnung
von grundlegenden Operationen in zwei Arten von Masking-Verfahren: das „Boolesche
Masking“ und das Skalarprodukt-Masking. Die zweite Forschungsrichtung dieser Ar-
beit befasst sich mit dem Problem der Formalisierung von Sicherheitsanforderungen für
Hardware-Implementierungen. Die beweisbare Sicherheit von software-orientiertem Mask-
ing wird seit der Einführung der Leakage-Resilienten Kryptographie betrachtet, jedoch
wurde der komplexeren Aufgabe der beweisbaren Sicherheit von hardware-orientiertem
Masking erst in jüngster Zeit Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt. Wir diskutieren die verschiede-
nen Herausforderungen in diesem Bereich und stellen ein neues theoretisches Modell
vor, das sogenannte „robuste Probing-Modell", welches die Bedingungen für sichere
Implementierung komplexer Algorithmen in der Praxis erfasst und einen Leitfaden für
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Programmierer darstellt. Der letzte Teil dieser Arbeit befasst sich schließlich mit dem
Schutz von Algorithmen, die in Gitter-basierten Konstruktionen eingesetzt werden, welche
im Bereich der Post-Quantum-Kryptographie untersucht werden. Obwohl mehrere Ar-
beiten die Anwendung von Masking-Verfahren auf Standard-Kryptosysteme untersuchen,
zählt dies für die meisten Post-Quantum- Schemata noch zur laufenden Forschung. In
dieser Dissertation untersuchen wir die Maskierung eines Algorithmus zur Erzeugung der
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AES Advanced Encryption Standard.
B2A Boolean to Arithmetic.
B2Aq Boolean to Arithmetic modulo q.
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CCA Chosen Ciphertext Attack.
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DES Data Encryption Standard.
DPA Differential Power Analysis.
FPGA Field-Programmable Gate Array.
HW Hamming Weight.
ID Identification.
KEM Key Encapsulation Mechanism.
LSB Least Significant Bit.
LWE (decisional) Learning With Errors (problem).
MAC Message Authentication Code.
MIA Mutual Information Analysis.
NI Non Interference.
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology (United States).
PPT Probabilistic Polynomial-Time.
PRF Pseudo-Random Function.
PRNG Pseudorandom Number Generator.
RAM Random-Access Memory.




SCR Security with Common Randomness.
SIM Subscriber Identity Module.
SNI Strong Non Interference.
SPA Simple Power Analysis.
TI Threshold Implementation.
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Securing information has been a need since the start of civilization. Today, with the
advent of digital communication, more and more sensitive data circulates every day
through the network. On top of that, the systems for processing and storing information
are constantly evolving. The digital devices that are increasingly becoming part of our
daily life are countless. Prominent examples are smart cards, that have applications in
various fields, like identification systems (ID badges), financial exchange (credit cards),
mobile phones (SIM), health-care (insurance cards), etc. Consequently, protecting data
from unauthorized access is becoming an increasingly complex task, as it concerns both
the digitalization of the information and the physical devices which process it.
Cryptography is a discipline that designs methodologies and techniques to protect
secrets. It is at the heart of today’s communication and technology, and its development
started in ancient times, presumably in 1900 BC, when Egyptian scribes used a non-
standard fashion to write hieroglyphs in an inscription on the wall of a tomb [Kah96].
As the history of cryptography is long, its objectives and techniques significantly evolved
with time. Classical cryptography was characterized by heuristic approaches and it
manipulated alphabetic characters. It was the method of choice until late in the 20th
century and, as pointed out by [KL14], it was more appropriately “an art than a science”.
With the beginning of the digital era, cryptography evolved into a proper science, after
called modern cryptography, where algorithms operate on a sequence of binary bits and
the security analysis is characterized by the use of formal methods and mathematical
algorithms, commonly called primitives. The following properties can summarize its
fundamental objectives: confidentiality, i.e., protecting information from the access
of unauthorized parties; data integrity, i.e., protecting information from unauthorized
modifications; and authentication, i.e., correctly identifying communicating parties and
data origin.
In modern cryptography, we define a cryptosystem as a set of cryptographic algo-
rithms needed in order to fulfill a particular security goal. A typical example is the
cryptosystem for encryption. The scheme consists of three probabilistic polynomial-time
(PPT) algorithms: a key-generation algorithm, which on input 1κ, where κ is the security
parameter, outputs a key; an encryption algorithm, which transforms a plaintext, i.e.,
the information to protect, into a ciphertext; and a deterministic decryption algorithm,
which, using the key, recovers the plaintext from the ciphertext (or outputs an error).
1
1. Introduction
The different way in which the keys are used in the algorithms divides modern cryp-
tography into two main branches: symmetric cryptography and asymmetric cryptography.
In symmetric cryptography, the parties involved share a common secret key, which they
use to communicate securely. These kinds of cryptographic algorithms are the ones that
have been in use since historic times. Asymmetric cryptography is instead a more recent
branch, which has increased in popularity after the seminal work of Diffie-Hellman [DH76].
In asymmetric cryptography, no common secret is needed, and the exchange of sensitive
information between two entities relies on algorithms that make use of key pairs, one for
each party. The first key is public, and it is available to anyone who wants to use the
algorithm securely. The second key is, instead, kept private by each party, and it is used
to read the piece of information secretly received. Examples of primitives in symmetric
cryptography are the message authentication codes (MACs), and the private-key encryp-
tion schemes. Relevant kinds of private-key encryption schemes are block ciphers, which
process the plaintext in groups of bits, also called blocks. Most influential block ciphers
have been DES [Des] and AES [RD01]. While the former one is considered insecure due to
its small key size, the latter one is one of the most popular cryptosystems. In asymmetric
cryptography, on the other hand, the related primitives are public-key encryption schemes
and digital signatures. In both symmetric and asymmetric cryptography, private keys
play a central role in guaranteeing security. Any entity who wants to defeat the goals
of a cryptosystem, commonly called an attacker, would not be able to reach his intent
without the knowledge of the secret key.
In the next section, we focus on the models that formalize the possible strategies that
an attacker can use to defeat a cryptosystem, and we take into particular consideration
the attacks on cryptographic implementations.
1.1. Attacking a cryptosystem
An essential aspect of modern cryptography is that cryptographic schemes are considered
secure only after their security requirements are well defined and formally proven. This
concept is called provable security and provides high confidence in the security of modern
cryptography. At the base of provable security there is the definition of a security model,
which consists of two components: the adversarial model, i.e., the kind of abilities the
adversary has in order to attack, and the security requirements, i.e., the properties that
an implementation needs to fulfill in order to be defined secure.
More precisely, when an adversary targets a cryptosystem, he assumes various ap-
proaches according to the different weaknesses of the algorithm that he decides to exploit
and the different goals he wants to achieve. Therefore, to show that a cryptographic
scheme is secure, the cryptographer first has to define an adversarial model, which
formally describes the goals, assumptions, and capabilities of a particular attacker. Some
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common adversarial models are the chosen-plaintext attack (CPA), and the chosen-
ciphertext attack (CCA), where the adversary targets the encryption scheme with the
goal of distinguishing the encryption of two messages of the same length. In particular,
in a CPA, a PPT adversary has the ability to choose two messages of the same length
and learn the encryption of one of them arbitrarily. His goal is to guess which message
corresponds to the encryption received. In a CCA, a PPT adversary can additionally
obtain the decryption of ciphertexts of its choice, except for the one previously received as
challenge. Other usual adversarial models are the ones on digital signature schemes, like
the known-message attack, chosen-message attack, and adaptive chosen-message attack
where the adversary’s goal is to make a forgery of the signature.
Once an adversarial model is specified, a formal proof demonstrates that a scheme is
secure against the attacker defined in the model. All the adversarial models listed above
are generally denoted as black-box attacks, and most cryptosystems have been proven
secure against these kinds of attacks. Shafi Goldwasser and Silvio Micali pioneered this
area with a large amount of work, demonstrating for several classes of primitives that
they can be formally proven secure in different adversarial models. Examples are their
analysis in the fields of encryption [GM82; GM84] and signatures [GMR84; GMR88].
Many security proofs are based on the fact that an attacker can break the cryptosystem
only by solving a computationally infeasible problem. For example, the hardness of
factoring a large integer is at the base of the security proof of the famous RSA encryption
scheme, or the discrete logarithm problem is at the core of several schemes, like the
ElGamal encryption scheme and the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. In this case,
the proof of security is called a reduction and, according to the adversarial model, shows
that the cryptosystem meets the security requirements when the hypotheses about the
adversary’s abilities are satisfied, and determined assumptions about the hardness of
specific computational tasks hold. We underline that, if an attacker has a significant
amount of time and computational power, he can always perform a straightforward type
of attack, the brute force attack, which works by exhaustively trying to decrypt the
encrypted message with all possible secret keys.
Quantum attacks
From the 1990s, the introduction of the concepts of quantum computing and quantum
computers showed that certain computational complexity assumptions used in security
proofs can be broken. In particular, Peter Shor published in 1997 an algorithm which solves
the integer factorization problem in polynomial time using quantum computation [Sho97].
As a consequence, some of the cryptographic schemes considered secure nowadays might
be unreliable when quantum computers will be available. At the moment, the examples
of existing quantum computers are few [IBM17; Kel18]. However some researchers and
governance have predicted that quantum computers capable of breaking currently used
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cryptosystems could be developed by the 2030s [Mos15; Tou+16].
In order to guarantee a secure transition towards quantum computing, the branch of
post-quantum cryptography has emerged, with the promise of developing cryptographic
alternatives to today’s schemes provable secure against attackers with quantum comput-
ing power. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has recently
run a standardization process for post-quantum cryptography [ST17], which received
significant attention. Multivariate-, code-, hash-, isogeny-, and lattice-based cryptographic
schemes [BBD09; FJP14] are the most prominent examples of solutions that guarantee
the black box security and additionally provide post-quantum protection. They base
their approaches on hardness assumptions that are supposedly unbreakable by quantum
computers in polynomial time.
Attacks on cryptographic implementations
In this thesis, we mainly focus on less classical attacks, namely the attacks on the
implementation of a cryptographic system. Modern cryptography is suited to work
on binary fields, and it is implemented on devices that process binary representations.
Implementations can be performed in software or hardware. An attacker on cryptographic
implementations, instead of exploiting the functionality of a cryptosystem, profits from
weaknesses in its implementation, e.g., in the software code or in the physical device.
More generally, following the classification from [MOP08], two types of attackers
can be distinguished. First, we can have active attacks and passive ones, depending
on whether the attacker interacts with its target or not. The active attacks alter the
information of the cryptosystem by, for example, modifying some data unauthorizedly.
On the other hand, a passive attacker adopts techniques that allow him to access sensitive
information via observing the execution of the protocol only and without influencing it.
A second criterion of classification is based on the level of intrusion into the target and
distinguishes non-invasive, semi-invasive, and invasive attacks. In a non-invasive attack,
an attacker exploits directly accessible interfaces of the target device and accesses only
the environmental parameters, without altering the device itself. On the contrary, in an
invasive attack, the attacker reaches full control of the target device by using specialized
equipment, which allows, for instance, to establish electrical contact with the chip surface.
Semi-invasive attacks present a more moderate level of intrusion in the target device, like
removing the packaging of a microchip in order to facilitate access to inner components
of the device.
Non-invasive attacks are the most common implementation attacks, since they are
cheaper to perform. In this context, a typical active attacker aims at influencing the
execution of the cryptosystem by modifying some wires of the circuit where the protocol
is implemented, as in the so-called fault attacks [BDL97; BS97; Ish+06; KJJ99]. On the
other hand, a passive attacker can, for instance, learn sensitive information by analyzing
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physical properties of the hardware implementation, like the device’s emanations or power
consumption during an encryption operation [Agr+03; KJJ99], or the time needed to
perform it [Ald+19; Koc96]. The attacks that make use of the physical leakages of a
cryptographic implementation are called side-channel attacks (SCA in short) and they
are the focus of our work.
The implementation of a cryptographic scheme can be formally proven secure against
physical attacks as well. As these attacks are outside of the mathematical models, it is
necessary to extend the standard adversarial models and to define new security models,
which formalize the physical attack in such a way that it can be formally analyzed. In
the context of side-channel attacks, a security model is called leakage model, and its main
challenge is specifying realistically the physical leakages that can affect an implementation.
A cryptographic implementation secure in such a model is said to be leakage resilient.
1.2. Goals of the thesis
In this thesis, we intend to address the problem of securing cryptographic algorithms
when implemented in practice, and in particular against the so-called power analysis
attacks. Our work focuses on analyzing one of the main countermeasures against such
attacks, the so-called technique of masking. A cryptographic algorithm protected under
such a technique is said a private circuit [ISW03]. Our analysis investigates some of the
main challenges of masking.
The first challenge is finding a good trade-off between efficiency and security. The latter
one, indeed, often comes at the cost of reduced performances, and it is the main obstacle
in the adoption of cryptography in practice. We decided to tackle one of the major
drawbacks of masking schemes, which is the blow-up in the complexity of the masked
version of a circuit, compared to the unmasked one. The process of masking causes an
increase in the number of operations to perform. Additionally, it makes extensive use
of random elements, which are usually outputs of devices or algorithms, like TRNGs
or PRNGs. The generation of randomness and the shipment to the place where it is
needed is very costly, and one of the main challenges of practical implementation of
masking. To give an example, the masked implementation of the AES block cipher
using Boolean masking, at the minimum security level, makes use of 1,200 calls to the
TRNG, and this number increases with the security level. We noticed that this amount of
randomness can be reduced. While other works are trying to reach this goal by reducing
the use of random bits within the computations of the primary circuit operations [Bel+16;
Bel+17], we investigated a different approach, which consists of recycling some of the
randomness used by the circuit. Additionally, we analyzed a type of masking scheme
which shows a high-security level, the so-called Inner Product masking [Bal+12; BFG15;
DF12; GR12]. In this context, we consolidated the works of Balasch et al. [Bal+12;
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BFG15]. In particular, on a conceptual level, we improved the existing algorithms,
by simplifying the schemes in order to reduce their use of randomness. We provided
algorithms that are more efficient and easy to implement. The algorithmic results are
enriched by new implementation results, the information theoretic and the experimental
evaluations, that have been conducted in [Bal+17]and that complete the theoretical and
practical understanding of this masking scheme.
Another relevant aspect for applying private circuits in practice is the development
of security models that are closer to reality. The literature abounds of leakage models
that formalize the power analysis attacks and the conditions under which a circuit is
secure. They differ from each other by how close they match reality and ease of usage in
proofs. We formalized our works mainly in the so-called probing model [ISW03], which
is one of the most popular leakage models, thanks to its highly simplified structure,
which allows the development of intuitive proofs and algorithms. Unfortunately, the
probing model lacks security guarantees against further physical effects that can occur
in hardware implementations. In this setting, the leakage can recombine, for instance,
during consecutive use of registers or due to differences in timing signals, causing a
reduction of the security level. Therefore we studied the problem of tweaking the popular
probing model with the intent of capturing a broad class of physical effects, and present
the robust probing model.
Lastly, we contributed to the protection of post-quantum cryptography against power
analysis attacks, by applying the masking countermeasure to lattice-based cryptography.
While for common symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic schemes the application of
masking schemes has been largely analyzed and achieves a reasonable level of security
and efficiency, this is still ongoing research for most post-quantum schemes. Among the
69 complete submissions to the NIST competition, lattice-based cryptography represents
the biggest share of them, with a total of 29 submissions. Lattice-based constructions,
indeed, stand out for several advantages, as their reasonable parameter sizes and simple
implementation make them versatile and efficient while ensuring strong security properties.
They have at their core the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem. Since many LWE-
based schemes require sampling from a discrete Gaussian distribution, we study methods
for masking samplers and provide the first binomial sampler secure at high-order, which
can be possibly adopted by several schemes submitted to the NIST standardization,
like NewHope [Alk+16], Saber [D’A+18], and Kyber [Bos+18]. Additionally, since
lattice-based cryptography employs both Boolean masking and Arithmetic masking,
we introduced new conversion algorithms from Boolean to Arithmetic masking, which
improve the previous works and specifically fit the parameters employed in lattice-
based constructions.
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1.3. Organization of the thesis
The content of this thesis is organized as follows.
Preliminaries. Chapter 2 sets the necessary background for the comprehension of
the thesis. It introduces different types of power analysis attacks, then moves to the
description of diverse security models. It introduces the concepts of masking schemes
and threshold probing model. Finally, it focuses on some cryptographic building blocks
which are studied in the thesis.
Efficiency improvement in masking schemes. Chapter 3 presents the results related
to the research conducted in [FPS17] at the scope of improving the randomness cost
in Boolean masking. It proposes a strategy for reusing randomness among masked
operations and it analyzes the application of such a method to the AES S-box.
Chapter 4 considers the Inner Product masking. It proposes improvements to the
previous multiplication schemes in terms of randomness cost and discusses the potential
of this masking scheme as an alternative to the more popular Boolean masking. The
contribution of this chapter is part of [Bal+17].
Developing practical-oriented security models. Chapter 5 investigates the problem
of formalizing security in the presence of physical defaults, proposing the so-called
Robust probing model. In this context, it discusses the issues of providing composability
guarantees while ensuring protection against glitches. The content of this chapter was
published in [Fau+18].
Applying the masking countermeasure to lattice-based primitives. Chapter 6 treats
the problem of protecting lattice-based primitives against power analysis attacks, as
discussed in [Sch+19]. It proposes the first binomial sampler masked at generic security





This section aims at introducing the concept of provably security against side-channel
attacks and providing the reader with the basic notions useful at the comprehension of
this thesis.
We start by describing one of the most common types of side-channel attacks, i.e.,
the power analysis attack. We explain how such a practical attack is formalized in a
leakage model and we present the major models proposed in the last 20 years. Then
we introduce the concept of masking schemes, which constitute one of the most popular
countermeasure against power analysis attacks, and we explain how to prove security of
masked implementation within the framework of the threshold probing model. We end
the chapter by recalling the main cryptographic building blocks used in this thesis.
2.1. Notation
In this dissertation, we denote a random sampling of an element x from a setX with x $←X.
Unless otherwise specified, any random sampling is from a uniform independent distri-
bution. We use the bold font to define vectors, e.g., x = (x1, . . . ,xn). The notation x|X
denotes (xi)i∈X and the cardinality of a set X is |X|. The symbol ⊕ indicates the binary
sum, while the + the arithmetic sum. The symbol · is used to indicate both binary and
arithmetic multiplication, according to the different context.
Notations relevant for specific chapters are defined in the respective chapters.
2.2. Recovering secrets: Power Analysis attacks
The first side-channel attack against a cryptographic implementation was described in the
work of Kocher from 1996 [Koc96], where the author presented a technique which allows
an adversary to recover the secret keys of famous public-key cryptosystems, such as Diffie-
Hellman and RSA. A few years later, Kocher, Jaffe, and Jun presented in [KJJ99] the first
power analysis attack, i.e., a side-channel attack which exploits the power consumption of
the device, breaking the DES block cipher. From this moment on, power analysis attacks
have grown in popularity and attracted the interest of the cryptographic community.
In order to perform a power analysis attack, an adversary makes use of two main







Figure 2.1.: Set-up of a power analysis attack
collects the measurements of the consumption in the form of traces. From the analysis of
the patterns of such traces, the attacker obtains the information needed for recovering
the secret key stored in the device. Figure 2.1 depicts the set-up just described when the
targeted device is a smart card. Figure 2.2 represents an example of power consumption
traces of the AES block cipher taken from the DPA attacks of [Bal+15] on an ARM
Cortex-A8 processor running at 1 GHz. The trace presents some regularities, which
correspond to the ten rounds of the AES-1281.
Power analysis attacks can vary according to different parameters, like the strategy
adopted, the requirements, the adversarial power, and they are generally classified into
three categories: simple power analysis attacks, differential power analysis attacks, and
profiled attacks.
2.2.1. Simple Power Analysis attack
In Simple Power Analysis (SPA in short) attacks, an adversary analyzes a single con-
sumption trace, or multiple of them individually, over several cycle sequences [KJJ99].
The patterns observed can reveal information about the manipulated data and instruc-
tions, since the power consumption of the device, in general, is strictly related to the
changes of the state. For instance, in symmetric cryptosystems the traces can show the
1See Section 2.8.1 for more details on the AES-128 structure
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Figure 2.2.: Power consumption traces of an implementation of AES-128 [Bal+15]
number of rounds, as in Figure 2.2, the key length or sometimes memory accesses. In an
extreme, but possible, scenario the traces can reveal the exact operand values, therefore
if the computation depends on the secret key, the entire key-value can be successfully
recovered. Assuming that the process of each bit affects the instantaneous dynamic power
consumption, i.e., the power consumed while the operations are in process, higher power
consumption peaks could, for instance, reveal a 1 bit and the lower ones could reveal
a 0 bit.
A straightforward way to limit the effect of SPA attacks consists in avoiding depen-
dencies between computation and secret key. As they are easy to counteract, the SPA
attacks are less used in practice, compared to the Differential Power Analysis attack,
described in the next section.
2.2.2. Differential Power Analysis attack
During a Differential Power Analysis (DPA in short) attack, an adversary first collects a
number of power consumption traces corresponding to repeated executions of the targeted
algorithm, using different inputs but the same fixed secret key and then analyzes the
combination of them. Introduced in [KJJ99], we can nowadays distinguish between first-
order and high-order attacks. In a first-order attack, an adversary exploits a single point
of a power consumption trace, which corresponds to a targeted variable. In high-order
attacks, instead, multiple points are exploited. In particular, we say that a DPA attack
has order d when it combines the information of at most d points in the power traces.
High-order DPA attacks are the most challenging to protect [Mes00].
The core idea of DPA attacks, as the authors explained in [KJJ99], is key testing. In
this kind of strategy, the adversary performs DPA in order to confirm or reject hypothesis
about an intermediate state of an implementation. In more detail, first, the attacker
collects a set of N traces, as described above. Then he decides on a variable in the
implementation to target, which depends on the input and a number of bits b of the
11
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Figure 2.3.: Example of differential curve for the incorrect hypothesis of kb [KJJ99]
Figure 2.4.: Example of differential curve for the correct hypothesis of kb [KJJ99]
key. We define this point Y := f(X,kb), with X being the input, f a function and kb a
b-bits portion of the key. All the possible 2b b -bit-keys k∗b are tested in the following way.
First, they are used to compute the targeted value Yi := f(Xi,k∗b ), for all the different
inputs Xi, with i= 1, . . . ,N . Then, the plaintexts are divided into two groups for each
key k∗b and according to the value Yi computed (for instance, if LSB(Yi) = 1, its input Xi
is in the first group, and if LSB(Yi) = 0, then Xi is in the second group). At this point,
the attacker computes the mean curve for both groups and calculates the difference
between both means, so-called differential curve. The key hypothesis matching to the
correct b-bits key corresponds to the highest difference of means, which appears on the
differential curve as a peak. When the hypothesis of k∗b is incorrect, indeed, the two
groups created do not have significant differences, because the LSB(Yi) are random.
Examples of differential curves with a correct and incorrect hypothesis of the key for the
DES block cipher are depicted in Figures 2.3 and 2.4.
After the work of Kocher, Jaffe and Jun, new techniques have been developed in order
to perform a DPA attack, in particular the prediction model has taken major interests.
This consists in building a function of prediction, parametrized by the hypotheses of k∗,
which predicts the power consumption. A distinguisher, i.e., a function which compares
the predicted and real trace values, reveals the correct guess of the key. This corresponds
to the value of k∗ which shows the highest dependency between the real and predicted
12
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Prediction model
Set of traces
Correct guess of k
Wrong guess of k
Distinguisher
Figure 2.5.: DPA principle using a prediction model (Inspired by [Bel15])
traces. Several distinguishers are discussed in the literature, and a typical example is the
Mutual Information Analysis (MIA), which we introduce below. A diagram of the DPA
principle in modern applications is shown in Figure 2.5.
Mutual Information Analysis
The Mutual Information Analysis is a distinguisher introduced by Gierlichs, Batina,
Tuyls, and Preneel in [Gie+08], which consists in measuring the dependence between two
random variables, specifically the leakage at some point of interest and the prediction for
each key hypothesis. In the case of continuous leakage L and the discrete predictions P,






Pr[P = p,L= l] log Pr[P = p,L= l]Pr[P = p] ·Pr[L= l]
The mutual information between two variables is always equal or greater than zero. Since
it gives an estimation of the level of dependence between two random variables, it is equal
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to zero in the case of a wrong hypothesis of the key. However, even a wrong prediction of
the key can show dependencies with the leakage. The adversary exploits this property
by selecting the key corresponding to the highest distinguisher value.
2.2.3. Profiling attacks
In profiling attacks the adversary improves the precision of SPA and DPA attacks, by
employing techniques that involve a profiling phase. Among the various attacks in this
category, the template attacks are the most powerful ones. Introduced by Chari, Rao
and Rohatgi in [CRR03], they consist of collecting, during the initial profiling phase, a
set of templates corresponding to known values of a targeted intermediate variable. A
template is a collection of probability distributions that represents the aspect of power
traces according to different keys used. This information helps to find detailed differences
between power traces, and to make perfect key guesses for a single power trace. More
precisely, after having recorded some leakage traces, the attacker makes use of statistical
tests in order to perform a comparison of the traces against the template collection and
to detect which value is most suitable to be the correct subkey.
2.3. Leakage models
The task of designing a security model that realistically captures the effect of side-channel
attacks is not easy to achieve, and in the last 20 years many leakage models have been
proposed. We use in the following the classification from [KR19], which distinguishes
between memory leakage models and computation leakage models. In the former ones,
the adversary is able to receive an arbitrary bounded-length leakage on the secret key,
which is polynomial-time computable. In the latter ones, the leakage also comes from the
intermediate values, computed during the execution of the cryptographic algorithm. On
top of these basic distinctions, there are many other important differences. For instance,
the two models usually have a different level of restrictions on the leakage provided to
the attacker. On the one hand, in memory leakage models, the leakage does not have
many constraints, and we generally represent it as an arbitrary bounded function of the
whole secret. On the other hand, computation leakage models consider a higher level
of restrictions. They are often based on assumptions, such as that whenever parts of
the computation are separated in space or time, the respective leakage functions are
independent from each other, or sometimes that some memory is leak-free. Moreover, the
computation leakage models take often into account continuous leakage over several uses
of the secret key, which results in the fundamental need to update the secret memory in
order not to break security in this model. On the contrary, the memory leakage models




In the field of memory leakage models, the first influential works are from Dziem-
bowski [Dzi06], and Di Crescenzo, Lipton and Walfish [DLW06], who introduced the
so-called bounded retrieval model, which assumes that there is a natural bound on the
overall amount of information the attacker can retrieve, and, based on such an assumption,
it expresses the leakage as an arbitrary and independent parameter of the system. The
adversary has access to a polynomial-time computable leakage function f(K), with K
being the secret key, with bounded output size. A common protection against such an
attack consists in making the secret key large, at the cost of increasing the running times
by a factor at most polylogarithmic in K. Afterwards, in [AGV09] the authors defined
the bounded memory leakage model, which was successively generalized in [DKL09] to the
so-called auxiliary input leakage model and to the continual setting in [Bra+10; Dod+10].
This line of works defines the leakage not anymore as a parameter but as a function of
the secret key length. This thesis has not the intention of deepening more the theories
on memory leakage models. It instead focuses more on the computation leakage models.
The scientific literature abounds of several computation leakage models, differing mostly
for their levels of realism and ease of usage in security proofs. One of the first models
introduced has been the t− threshold probing model, which Ishai et al. presented in
their seminal work [ISW03]. The probing model interprets the physical leakage captured
by the power analysis attack as a set of intermediate values of the algorithm. More
precisely, an adversary has access to a bounded number of internal variables, i.e., wires of
the implementation, which are more commonly called probes. A circuit is defined to be
secure in this model if any subset of at most t probes do not provide enough information
to recover the sensitive data of the computation. This model has the drawback of
being ideal, as it does not fully catch the reality of the physical leakages, which usually
reveal information related to the whole implementation, and not only on a smaller set of
variables. However, as we will discuss later, the simplicity of the probing model allows
the construction of efficient compilers that transform any implementation into a private
circuit, i.e., a circuit resilient against a probing attack, with a blow-up of the circuit size
by a factor O(t2).
Micali and Reyzin in [MR04] made a step in the direction of more realistic leakage
models. The authors proposed the principle that Only Computation Leaks Information,
and considered that the leakage takes into account calculations, and not data. They
assumed, therefore, that an implementation can still hide some secrets. More precisely,
an adversary can make a measurement on any computation step containing parts of
sensitive data, like secret keys, internally generated randomness, and outcomes of previous
computations performed on cryptographic keys. However, no adversary can measure
data that is not involved in a computation step at a particular point of time.
Later in 2013, Prouff and Rivain introduced a new leakage model which captures well
the power analysis attacks. The model was presented in [PR13], based on the work
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of [Cha+99], and it is called δ−noisy leakage model. It expresses the leakage of an
elementary operation on an input x in terms of a noisy leakage function f(x). More
precisely, during an attack in this setting, the adversary has access to computational
values, sampled according to a given distribution, say X. The leakage function f is a
randomized function such that the distance (measured with the euclidean norm) between
the distribution of the values X and the distribution of these values, given their leakage
function X|f(X), is bounded by a fixed value δ. In the paper, the authors additionally
showed the first security proof for the evaluation of a whole block cipher. The security
strongly relies on the contribution of [Cha+99], where the authors proved that employing
additive secret sharing on the variables of an implementation reduces drastically the
information leaked from the sensitive data. The proof is possible thanks to the strong
assumption that leak-free gates exist, i.e., that part of the computation does not leak
any information. These leak-free gates are used in order to refresh internal values. The
main limitation of this model is the difficulty in designing security proofs.
The latter drawback was mitigated by the work of Duc, Dziembowski and Faust [DDF14],
who presented a reduction between the noisy leakage model and the threshold probing
one and overcome the requirement of employing leakage-free gates. In the paper, the
authors recalled the so-called random probing model, already introduced in [ISW03],
where every intermediate value is leaked to the adversary with probability ε. Such a
model is used in order to build an intermediate step in the reduction, i.e., first the authors
show a reduction from the δ−noisy leakage model to the random probing model, and then
from the latter one to the probing model. In particular, by using the statistical distance
in place of the euclidean norm in the definition of noise, they showed that proving a
cryptographic implementation to be secure in the t−threshold probing model implies its
security in the δ−noisy leakage model as well. Specifically, given a set X l of intermediate
variables, proving the security in the δ−noisy leakage model for a set (x1, . . . ,xl) ∈X l can
be achieved by proving the security in the t−probing model, with t= 2δ(l−1)|X |. This
bound constitutes the main drawback of the reduction. In [DFS15b] the bound was later
improved, but the new proof requires the adoption of leak-free components again. In the
paper, the authors introduced a new leakage model, the average probing model, which is
a generalization of the random probing model. They proved a tight equivalence between
the noisy leakage model and the average probing model and show that the compiler
from [ISW03] is secure in the average probing model, assuming a leak-free component.
Such kinds of bounds are often the consequence of strategies deployed in the proofs for
theoretical reasons, and they do not reflect reality, as it has been later observed in the
work of Duc, Faust and Standaert [DFS15a].
Balasch et al. pointed out in [Bal+14] that other kinds of physical effects can influence
the leakage, e.g., the so-called transitions [Bal+14; Cor+12] and glitches [MPG05;
MPO05]. The former ones typically happen in software implementations and consist in
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memory recombinations, which happen when a register is used consecutively to store
two different variables. In this case, an adversary can observe both the first and the
second value stored. The glitches, instead, are combinatorial recombinations, which can
be encountered in hardware implementations, when differences in the timing signals
produce undesired transitions at the output of logical gates, before the gate switches to
the final output.
Barthe et al. in [Bar+17] introduced a new model, the bounded moment model, that
formalizes a weaker notion of security order, in line with the intuitions of the practical
side-channel community. The authors observed that the attacker’s intent to determine
higher-order statistical moments is exponentially difficult in the number of shares if their
leakages are independent of the sensitive data and sufficiently noisy. Therefore they
related the security order in the bounded moment model to the lowest key-dependent
statistical moment of the leakage distribution.
The rest of this thesis work will mainly consider in the t−threshold probing model,
and we will investigate the physical defaults described above as well.
2.4. Masking, a countermeasure against SCA
Since the discovery of side-channel attacks, several techniques to defeat them have been
designed. These strategies have in common that they aim at reducing, and often elimi-
nating, the dependencies between the physical leakage of a cryptographic implementation
and the sensitive values produced during the computations of the algorithm, i.e., those
values which, if observed through a side-channel attack, could otherwise leak secret data.
The various countermeasures aim at preserving the black-box security properties of the
cryptosystem and mainly differ from each other for the level they target. Some of them
act at the leakage level, trying to randomize the characteristics of the power consumption
or to make it uniform through the execution of the algorithm. To this end, techniques as
[CK10; Vey+12] inject changes in the time dimension of the leakage, by inserting dummy
operations or by altering the sequence of the computation. Other strategies, as [KJJ01;
Sha00], act on the amplitude domain of the leakage by increasing the noise in a signal or
by lowering the signal itself.
Other types of side-channel countermeasures target the protocol level by reducing
the frequency of cryptographic operations performed using the same key [KJJ99]. For
instance, a common technique is the one of re-keying [Med+10], which consists in changing
the secret frequently.
Masking schemes target at the algorithmic level and aim at randomizing the interme-
diate computation of the cryptographic device. Goubin and Patarin in [GP99] and Chari
et al. in [Cha+99] introduced such a strategy in 1999 and it is one of the most important




The countermeasure works by applying the principle of secret sharing to the sensitive
variables of a cryptographic implementation, for instance, intermediate values of block
ciphers depending on a known plaintext and a key. More formally, given a chosen
operation  and a DPA attack order d, masking a sensitive variable x means to encode it,
by splitting it into a number n= d+ 1 of shares x1, . . . ,xn such that the combination of
them according to  gives the original variable x, i.e., x= x1· · ·xn, and any combination
of less than n shares does not reveal any sensitive information. Generally, n−1 of the
shares are chosen uniformly at random, and the nth one is chosen such that the secret
can be recombined.
As Chari et al. showed in [Cha+99], under the fundamental assumption that each leaked
sample depends on a bounded number of shares and such leakage is sufficiently noisy,
the difficulty of performing a successful DPA attack of order d increases exponentially
with the number of shares n, also called the masking order.
Different types of masking schemes exist according to the different encoding functions,
i.e., to the operation  and the field the variables lie in. The choice of a certain
masking scheme depends on the algorithm to mask. For instance, when an algorithm
mostly performs arithmetic operations, it is convenient to use Arithmetic masking, i.e.,to
consider  as a modular addition in the arithmetic field F2k . On the other hand, when
most of the operations are boolean it is advantageous to consider  as the addition
or multiplication, in the field F28 . The most common masking is the Boolean masking,
i.e., =⊕. In this case, the complexity of the masked linear operations is only O(n), as
they simply operate component-wise, while masking the non-linear operations is more
expensive, and it requires a complexity of O(n2).
When a cryptographic algorithm uses both arithmetic and boolean variables, the
masking scheme is chosen according to the different cases, and a conversion algorithm
allows to pass from one kind of masking scheme to the other.
Besides the aforementioned Boolean and Arithmetic masking, other examples of
masking schemes are the Affine masking [Fum+10], the Polynomial masking [GM11;
PR11] and the Inner Product masking [Bal+12; BFG15; DF12; GR12]. They differ
from each other not only by their construction but also by their efficiency and security
guarantees. As an example, compared to the Boolean masking, the Inner Product masking
shows less evidence of leakage in practice but provides lower performance.
2.5. Conversion algorithms between Arithmetic and
Boolean masking
We mentioned previously the existence of conversion algorithms, which allow transforming
Boolean masking into Arithmetic ones, and vice versa. Goubin in [Gou01] proposed for
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the first time a transformation from Boolean to Arithmetic masking (B2A) based on the
fact that the function Φ(x,r) : F2k ×F2k 7→ F2k such that
Φ(x,r) = (x⊕ r)− r mod 2k (2.1)
is affine in r over F2, i.e., Φ(x,r′⊕ r′′) = Φ(x,r′)⊕Φ(x,r′′). The algorithm has a run
time complexity of O(1), i.e., independent of the size of the inputs k, and it is, therefore,
very efficient. However, the authors provided a security proof only against a first-
order adversary.
The first B2A algorithm secure at higher orders was presented much later, by Coron et
al. in [CGV14]. The new algorithm relies on a different approach than the previous work.
As a first step, it initializes n−1 shares (Ai)1≤i≤n−1 with random samples in F2k , and
uses them to generate a random encoding A′ of the form ∑ni=1A′i =−∑n−1i=1 Ai mod 2k.
Successively, a higher-order secure Arithmetic-to-Boolean (A2B) conversion algorithm
takes as input such encodings and outputs the Boolean shares ⊕i yi =∑iA′i mod 2k,













By using a function which securely decodes a given input encoding, the remaining share









Ai) = x mod 2k.
Later in [BCZ18], the affine relation given in Equation (2.1) inspired another higher-
order B2A conversion algorithm, which follows previous work of [HT19] and [Cor17].
This conversion is not based on the Boolean-masked addition of shares, therefore it has
run time independent of the input bit size, and it is, therefore, particularly efficient for
small values of n. However, for an increasing number of shares, the performance drops,
showing the asymptotic run time complexity of O(2n).
In the context of Arithmetic-to-Boolean (A2B) conversion algorithms, there is only one
secure higher-order A2B algorithm to the best of our knowledge, published in [CGV14].
Its underlying concept is rather simple. The algorithm works by, first transforming each
share of the arithmetic input encoding A into a Boolean encoding with n shares. Then,
such n Boolean encodings are added together using a Boolean-masked addition algorithm,
producing a Boolean encoding x with ⊕ixi =∑iAi mod 2k. This basic version has a
cubic complexity of O(n3 ·k). In the same paper, the authors additionally propose a
strategy to improve the conversion, resulting in a quadratic complexity of O(n2 ·k). The
core idea is adopt a recursive method to sum the input shares Ai, instead of summing
them up one by one. More precisely, the improved scheme splits the n shares into two
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halves of bn2 c and d
n
2 e, and recursively calls itself for the two halves. Finally, it adds
together the resulting encodings:
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In the next section, we will see more details on the construction of masked algorithms,
and we will show why they are secure against side-channel attacks.
2.6. Proving security in the probing model
The most important and convenient model to analyze masking schemes is the t− threshold
probing model. For this reason, and for being widely deployed in the field of leakage
resilient cryptography, among all the leakage models we focused on the probing model.
In this context, we represent a cryptographic implementation as a circuit. We call
private circuit a transformation of a circuit into another one, which is secure in the
probing model. According to the description in [ISW03], circuits can be distinguished
into deterministic and randomized ones. A deterministic circuit C is represented as a
direct acyclic graph whose vertexes are boolean gates and whose edges are wires. A
randomized circuit is a circuit augmented with random-bit gates. A random-bit gate is a
gate with fan-in 0 that produces a random bit and sends it along its output wire; the bit
is selected uniformly and independently. As pointed out in [Ish+13], a t-private circuit
is a randomized circuit which transforms a randomly encoded input into a randomly
encoded output while providing the guarantee that the joint values of any t wires reveal
nothing about the input. More formally a private circuit is defined as follows.
Definition 2.1 (Private circuit [Ish+13]). A private circuit for f : Fmi2 → Fmo2 , with
mi,mo ∈ N, is defined by a triple (I,C,O), where
• I : Fmi2 → F
m̂i
2 is a randomized input encoder;
• C is a randomized boolean circuit with input in Fm̂i2 , output in F
m̂o
2 and uniform
randomness r ∈ Fn2
• O : Fm̂o2 → Fmo2 is an output decoder
C is said to be a t-private implementation of f with encoder I and decoder O if the
following requirements hold:
• Correctness: For any input w ∈ Fmi2 we have Pr[O(C(I(w),ρ)) = f(w)] = 1, where
the probability is over the randomness of I and ρ;
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• Privacy: For any w,w′ ∈ Fmi2 and any set P of t wires (also called probes) in C, the
distributions CP(I(w),ρ) and CP(I(w′),ρ) are identical, where CP denotes the set
of t values on the wires from P (also called intermediate values).
The goal of a t-limited attacker, i.e., an attacker who can probe at most t wires, is to
find a set of probes P and two values w,w′ ∈ Fmi2 such that the distributions CP(I(w),ρ)
and CP(I(w′),ρ) are not the same.
For simplifying the notation, in Definition 2.1 we considered the easiest case, when
the underlining field is the binary field, and consequently the wires carry bits. However,
the definition is still valid in larger fields such as F2n . In the first case we consider the
Boolean masking, while in the second case the Arithmetic one. The encoder I consist
in the encoding function specified by the masking scheme, and the output decoder O
is the procedure which reconstructs the sensitive variable encoded. As an example,
in the case of Boolean masking, the input encoder I maps every input value x ∈ F2
into n binary shares (r1, . . . , rn), where the first n− 1 values are chosen at random
and rn = x⊕ r1⊕ ·· · ⊕ rn−1. On the other hand, the output decoder O takes the n
bits y1, . . . ,yn produced by the circuit and decodes the values in y = y1⊕·· ·⊕yn.
In its internal working a private circuit is composed by gadgets, namely transformed
gates which perform functions taking as input a set of masked inputs and outputting
a set of masked outputs. In particular, we distinguish between linear operations (e.g.,
addition), which can be performed by applying the operation to each share separately,
and non-linear functions (e.g., multiplication), which process all the shares together
and make use of additional random bits. A particular case of randomized gadget is the
refreshing gadget, which takes as input the sharing of a value x and outputs randomized
sharing of the same x.
One can show the security of a circuit in the probing model by proving its perfect
simulatability property, i.e., that any set of at most t intermediate values is jointly
independent of the sensitive values. In practice, it is sufficient to show that any set of
potential adversarial observations can be perfectly simulated by at most t shares of the
inputs. The simulation method, despite perfectly valid, is costly and can easily lead to
mistakes difficult to discover, as the proof designer needs to list all the possible subsets of
intermediate values and show for each case their simulation. The complexity and length
of the proof naturally increases with the security level and the circuit size. In order to
overcome the latter problem, the definition of probing security has been strengthened
in [Bar+15a] such that it could give a further guarantee: composability. With the
introduction of the notions of t-Non Interference (t− NI) and t-Strong Non Interference
(t− SNI), defined below, proving the probing security of a circuit can be done modularly,
by first showing with a simulation-based proof the security of the individual gadgets, and
then exploiting the properties of t− NI and t− SNI to show that the composition of the
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gadgets is still secure. The following definitions and lemma from [Bar+15a] formalize
the notion of t-Non Interference and show that this is also equivalent to the concept
of simulatability.
Definition 2.2 ((S,Ω)-Simulatability, (S,Ω)-Non Interference). Let g be a gadget hav-
ing m inputs (a(1), . . . ,a(m)) each split in n shares and Ω be a set of t adversary’s
observations. Let S = (S1, . . . ,Sm) such that Si ⊆ {1, . . . ,n} and |Si| ≤ t for all i.
1. The gadget g is (S,Ω)-simulatable (or (S,Ω)− SIM ) if there exists a simulator
which, by using only (a(1), . . . ,a(m))|S := (a
(1)
|S1
, . . . ,a
(m)
|Sm
), can simulate the adversary’s
view, where a(k)|Sj := (a
(k)
i )i∈Sj .
2. The gadget g is (S,Ω)-Non Interfering (or (S,Ω)− NI) if, for any pair s0,s1 ∈ (Fm2 )n
such that s0|S = s1|S , the adversary’s views of g respectively on input s0 and s1 are
identical, i.e., g(s0)|Ω = g(s1)|Ω.
Often when we talk about simulatability of a gadget we implicitly mean that for every
observation set Ω with |Ω| ≤ t, where t is the security order, there exists a set S as in
Definition 2.2 such that the gadget is (S,Ω)− SIM.
Lemma 2.3. Let g be a gadget with m inputs and let S = (S1, . . . ,Sm), where, for
each i= 1, . . . ,m, |Si| ≤ t and Si ⊆ {1, . . . ,n}. Let Ω be an observation set, with |Ω| ≤ t.
The gadget g is (S,Ω)− SIM if and only if g is (S,Ω)− NI, with respect to the same
sets (S,Ω).
Definition 2.4 (t-Non-Interference). A gadget g is t-Non-Interfering (t− NI) if and
only if for every observation set Ω, with |Ω| ≤ t, there exists a set S, with |S| ≤ t, such
that g is (S,Ω)− NI.
When applied to composed circuits, the definition of t− NI is not enough to guar-
antee the privacy of the entire circuit. While the notion of t− NI is not sufficient to
argue about secure composition of gadgets, the stronger definition of t−Strong Non-
Interference (t− SNI), introduced in [Bar+15a] as well, allows a secure composition
of gadgets.
Definition 2.5 (t−Strong Non-Interference). An algorithm A is t−Strong Non- Interfer-
ent (t− SNI) if and only if for any set of t1 probes on intermediate values and every set
of t2 probes on output shares with t1 + t2 ≤ t, the totality of the probes can be simulated
by only t1 shares of each input.
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Algorithm 2.1 Addition algorithm with n≥ 2 shares
Input: Shares (ai)1≤i≤n and (bi)1≤i≤n in F2k , such that
∑
iai = a and
∑
i bi = b
Output: Shares (ci)1≤i≤n in F2k , such that
∑
i ci = a+ b
1: for i= 1 to n do
2: ci = ai+ bi;
Algorithm 2.2 ISW multiplication algorithm with n≥ 2 shares
Input: Shares (ai)1≤i≤n and (bi)1≤i≤n in F2k , such that
∑
iai = a and
∑
i bi = b
Output: Shares (ci)1≤i≤n in F2k , such that
∑
i ci = a · b
1: for i= 1 to n do
2: for j = i+ 1 to n do
3: ri,j
$←− F2k ;
4: rj,i← (ri,j +ai · bj)⊕aj · bi;
5: for i= 1 to n do
6: ci← ai · bi+
∑n
j=1,j 6=i ri,j ;
Informally, it means that the simulator can simulate the adversary’s view, using a
number of shares of the inputs that is independent from the number of probed output wires.
Building gadgets secure in these models can be a more or less difficult task according to
the kind of operation to mask and the kind of masking. As mentioned previously, linear
operations, such as the addition, are trivially secure in the probing model by applying
the relative function component-wise, as depicted in Algorithm 2.1, which is t− NI. We
point out that these functions cannot be proven to be t− SNI, unless some randomness
is injected in the outputs.
On the other hand, multiplication schemes are more complex to mask and they need
to employ some randomness. An example of t− SNI multiplication algorithm is the
famous ISW scheme in Algorithm 2.2, introduced in [ISW03] and proven to be t− SNI
in [Bar+15a]. A t− SNI refreshing scheme is Algorithm 2.3, introduced in [DDF14] by
Duc et al. and proven to be t− SNI by Barthe et al. in [Bar+15a].
As pointed out in [RP10] and [Cor+13], secure multiplication schemes, like ISW,
require that the two masks in input are mutually independent. This condition is satisfied
in two cases: when at least one of the two inputs is taken uniformly at random or when at
least one of the two inputs is refreshed by means of a secure refreshing using completely
fresh and independent randomness, as in Algorithm 2.3.
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Algorithm 2.3 Multiplicative refreshing scheme
Input: Shares (ai)1≤i≤n in F2k , such that
∑
iai = a; random shares (rij)1≤i≤n,i+1≤j≤n
Output: Shares (ci)1≤i≤n in F2k , such that
∑
i ci = a
1: for i= 1 to n do
2: ci = ai;
3: for i= 1 to n do
4: for j = i+ 1 to n do
5: ci = ci+ ri,j
6: cj = cj− ri,j
2.7. Threshold Implementation
Threshold Implementation (TI) schemes are another kind of countermeasures against
DPA attacks. They are based on masking schemes and, compared to the probing model,
they have the additional advantage to take into account physical effects such as glitches.
When dealing with such additional physical defaults, we require circuits to be stateful.
For this purpose, the circuit model presented in the previous section is augmented with
memory gates which, on every invocation of the circuit, output the previous input to
the gate and store the current input for the next invocation. Such abstractions can be
reasonably and efficiently instantiated in practice, using true- or pseudo random number
generators for the random gates and registers (synchronized by a clock signal) for the
memory gates.
In order to implement a boolean function f : Fmi2 → Fmo2 , every input value x has to
be split into n shares (x1, . . . ,xn) such that x= x1⊕·· ·⊕xn, using the same procedure
seen in private circuits. We denote with C the output distribution f(X), where X
is the distribution of the encoding of an input x. The function f is then shared in
a vector of functions f1, . . . ,fn, called component functions, which must satisfy the
following properties:
1. Correctness: f(x) =∑ni=1 fi(x1, . . . ,xn)
2. t− Non-Completeness: any combination of up to t component functions fi of f
must be independent of at least one input share xi.
3. Uniformity: the probability Pr(C = c|c=∑ni=1 ci) is a fixed constant for every c,
where c denotes the vector of the output shares.
The last property requires that the distribution of the output is always a random
sharing of the output, and can be easily satisfied by refreshing the output shares. The
non-completeness property, instead, is used to prevent that any combinatorial logic has
access to all the shares of an encoded sensitive variable.
TI schemes are strongly related to private circuits. First, they solve a similar problem
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Algorithm 2.4 TI multiplication algorithm for t= 1
Input: Shares (ai)1≤i≤3 and (bi)1≤i≤3 in F2, such that
⊕
iai = a and
⊕
i bi = b
Output: Shares (ci)1≤i≤3 in F2, such that
⊕




of formalizing privacy against a t-limited attacker and moreover, as shown in [Rep+15],
the TI algorithm for multiplication is equivalent to the scheme proposed by Ishai et al.
in [ISW03]. An example of multiplication scheme at first order of security is depicted in
Algorithm 2.4
We additionally point out that the aforementioned properties of TI imply simulatability
of the circuit. Indeed, if a function f satisfies properties 1 and 2, then an adversary
who probes t or fewer wires will get information from all but at least one input share.
Therefore, the gadget g implementing such a function is t− NI and due to Lemma 2.3
is simulatable. As a consequence, proving security in the TI model does not require to
provide a simulation of the gadgets, but simply requires to show that the properties of
correctness, non-completeness and uniformity are satisfied.
Unfortunately, such a simulatability propety, at least in the original definition of TI,
is not proven to be guaranteed also when algorithms compose. However, even though
the concept of composability is not explicitly analyzed in TI, differently than in the
probing model, some works show that first-order TI benefits sometimes from a sort of
composability which can allow to protect full block cipher executions with a minimum
amount of randomness [Pos+11]. The same does not hold for higher-order TIs. Indeed
the first try to construct a higher-order TI in [Bil+14] failed due to a composability
flaw [Rep15; Rep+15].
2.8. Cryptographic building blocks
In this section, we introduce the main cryptographic building blocks that are considered
in this thesis. In the context of symmetric cryptography, we analyze the popular AES
block cipher, while when treating lattice-based cryptography we consider the NewHope
key exchange.
2.8.1. A symmetric key encryption scheme: the AES
In modern cryptography, thanks to their efficiency, the symmetric algorithms are generally
preferred to the asymmetric ones. In this setting, a widely adopted family of algorithms
that ensure secure communication is represented by the encryption schemes. Among
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them, the block cipher algorithms are the most popular.
In this thesis, we consider the AES (Advanced Encryption Standard), the most
commonly employed block cipher algorithm. Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen initially
proposed the scheme under the name of Rijndael and the NIST chose it in 2001 [RD01]
to become the new encryption standard, after a five-years standardization process.
AES algorithm consists of modifying a 4×4 array of bytes, called the state, in a series
of rounds. Like in many block ciphers, such rounds consist of a key addition, some linear
transformations, and a non-linear transformation. In the initialization, the state is set
equal to the input of the cipher. Then, the rounds follow, each executing the procedures
described below:
1. AddRoundKey: A 128-bit sub-key is obtained from the master key and XORed with
the state. The state array is updated accordingly.
2. SubBytes: At this stage, a lookup table, commonly called S-box, is used to represent
a bijection over {0,1}8. According to such a substitution table, each byte
of the state array is replaced by another byte. The S-box constitutes the
non-linear transformation of the AES.
3. ShiftRows: We cyclically shift i−1 places to the left the bytes in each row i of the
state array, where each row is enumerated from 1 to 4.
4. MixColumns: We apply an invertible transformation to the four bytes in each column.
According to such a transformation, any two inputs differing each other
in b > 0 bytes correspond to two outputs differing in at least 5− b bytes.
In the final round, in place of MixColumns we have once more AddRoundKey. The
AES block cipher has a 128-bit block length and can employ 128-, 192-, or 256-bit keys.
The key length does not affect the structure of each round, but only the key schedule
and the number of rounds, which can vary among 10, 12, or 14.
The main challenge in protecting such a block cipher against power analysis attackers
lies in masking the non-linear transformation, which is represented by the S-box. The
AES S-box SubBytes is the right-composition of an affine transformation over F82 with
the power function x 7→ x254 over the field F82 ≡ F2[x]/(x8 +x4 +x3 +x+1). The affine
transformation is usually straightforward to mask. Therefore the main focus of research is
on masking the power function. In this thesis we consider Rivain and Prouff’s algorithms
from [Cor+13; RP10], depicted in Figure 2.6, where Mult is a multiplication scheme
and R a refreshing scheme. In order to guarantee a t− SNI security of the algorithm,
the refreshing schemes and the third multiplication scheme have to be t− SNI, and the
rest of the multiplication schemes t− NI.
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Figure 2.6.: Inversion chain of the AES S-box from [Cor+13; RP10]
2.8.2. A lattice-based key exchange protocol: the NewHope
We now briefly describe a construction, the NewHope protocol, in the field of lattice-
based cryptography, which we use in this thesis for evaluating the applicability of our
contributions in the area. Before introducing it, we provide some foundations to post-
quantum cryptography.
Learning With Error
As it is the case for modern cryptography, the security of a cryptographic scheme against
a quantum adversary relies as well on the hardness of a computational problem. Many
primitives in lattice-based cryptography base their security properties on the hardness of
the Learning With Error (LWE) problem [Reg05], or one of its variants. LWE is believed
to be hard, based on certain assumptions regarding the worst-case hardness of standard
lattice problems, and it is defined as follows.
Definition 2.6 (Learning With Errors problem). Let n,m,q be positive integers and χ
be a distribution over Z. Given s←χ Zn let Ds,χ be the distribution that samples a←$ Znq
and e←χ Z and then returns (a,〈a,s〉+e) ∈ Znq ×Zq.
• The search LWE problem is to find s, given n, q ≥ 2, and m independent samples
from Ds,χ.
• The decisional LWE problem is to distinguish whether (ai, bi) ←$ (Znq ×Zq) or
(ai, bi)←Ds,χ for i= 1, ...,m, given n, q ≥ 2.
The schemes considered in this thesis mainly rely on the Ring-LWE problem [Pei14],
which is a variant of the LWE, where Z is substituted by a ring, typically Z[X]/〈Xn+1〉.
NewHope
NewHope [Alk+16] is a server-client key exchange protocol submitted to the NIST
post-quantum standardization competition. Its protocol bases its security on a Ring
Learning With Errors problem, and it informally works as follows. The server generates
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a temporary pair of public and secret keys. Then it transmits the public key to the client,
which uses it to encrypt a secret symmetric key. Such an encrypted key is transmitted
to the server, which decrypts the ciphertext to recover the corresponding symmetric
key, that can later be used for communicating. Error polynomials are used to hide the
symmetric key in the ciphertext.
In the literature, there exist two variants of NewHope: one is secure against chosen-
plaintext attackers (CPA), and one is secure against chosen-ciphertext attackers (CCA).
For our purposes, we review the basic construction of the CPA-secure NewHope.
We give a more precise description of the protocol in the key generation, encryption, and
decryption schemes respectively in Algorithms 2.5,2.6, and 2.7. The relevant parameters
of the scheme are the modulo q, the lattice dimension k, and the sampling parameter κ.
The routine SampleBinomial employs a Pseudorandom Number Generator (PRNG)
that, given the initial value seed, outputs two random bit strings of length κ bits. The
sampler then calculates the difference of the Hamming weights of both such bit strings,
resulting in a binomial distributed random number. The output of SampleBinomial is
an entire polynomial with binomially distributed coefficients. The algorithm Encode
transforms the input message into a polynomial. It encodes each bit of the message into
four coefficients. In particular, it sets such coefficients to {0,0,0,0} if the message bit







Algorithm 2.5 NewHope CPA.Keygen
Input: Public constant polynomial a
Output: Public key pk and secret key sk
1: seed $←{0, . . . ,255}32
2: r1, r2← SampleBinomial(seed)
3: p← r1 +ar2
4: return pk = (a,p),sk = r2
Algorithm 2.6 NewHope CPA.Encryption
Input: Public key (a,p), message µ ∈ {0, . . . ,255}32, coins ∈ {0, . . . ,255}32
Output: Ciphertext A= (c1, c2)
1: e1,e2,e3← SampleBinomial(coins)
2: c1← ae1 +e2
3: c2← pe1 +e3 +Encode(µ)
4: return (c1, c2)
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Algorithm 2.7 NewHope CPA.Decryption
Input: Secret key sk = r2, ciphertext A= (c1, c2)
Output: Message µ
1: return Decode(c2− c1r2)
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3. Randomness optimization in Boolean
masking
In this first contribution chapter, we focus on the popular Boolean masking. We discuss
the challenge of improving its efficiency by providing a method to recycle a part of the
randomness used in a Boolean-masked implementation.
Motivation
As described in Section 2.4, masking schemes prevent harmful power analysis attacks by
protecting all sensitive information through the encoding of sensitive values. Accordingly,
the designer of a masking scheme develops masked operations, the gadgets, that compute
on the encodings of the inputs securely. In our study, we analyze Boolean masking, which
is one of the most adopted masking schemes in practice. In this setting, masking linear
operations is straightforward thanks to the linearity of the encoding function, and the
main challenge is to develop secure masked non-linear gadgets, and in particular, the
multiplication operation. Random values play a central role in the internal computation
of the masked algorithm in order to achieve security. Belaid et al. showed in [Bel+16] that
any t-probing secure masked multiplication requires internally at least O(t) fresh random
elements and, more concretely, the typical schemes for masking non-linear operations
require O(t2) randoms. Additionally, the amount of randomness employed grows not
only with the probing parameter t but also with the number of operations that are used
by the algorithm. Since standard cryptographic algorithms typically consist of several
non-linear operations, the randomness complexity of a masked cipher can be high. As
an example, the AES S-box in [RP10] requires the execution of 4 multiplications and 2
refreshing schemes, for a total of hundreds masked multiplication operations in the whole
block cipher.
There are two possible ways to reduce the number of random bits used in a circuit. The
first method is in the spirit of the research work conducted by Belaid et al. in [Bel+16]
and consists of designing masked non-linear operations requiring less random values.
In this paper, the authors present a t− NI multiplication scheme at a general high
order that makes use of t+ t24 random bits and optimized multiplication schemes for
orders t = 1,2,3,4 using respectively 2,4 and 5 randoms. Despite the improvements
achieved, the randomness complexity is reduced only by a constant factor and the most
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efficient masked multiplication still requires O(t2) randomness. Moreover, this kind of
strategy has two main drawbacks. First, as shown in the same paper, it has to face
the natural lower bound on the amount of randomness needed to mask the non-linear
operation securely. Second, such an approach does not scale well when the number of
non-linear operations used in a cipher is high, as the asymptotic complexity of masking a
general circuit is still O(t2 ·s), with s the circuit size, as in the original countermeasure
in [ISW03].
A second technique to reduce the randomness cost in a circuit is to reuse random values
over several masked operations. In this chapter, we explore such an alternative strategy
that has gained only limited attention in the literature. Such an approach presents two
main technical challenges. First, we need to ensure that when we reuse randomness
among multiple operations, the composition of them does not accidentally cancel out
the random bits. As an illustrative example, suppose two sensitive values a and b are
masked using the same randomness r. That is, a is encoded as (a+r,r) and b is encoded
as (b+ r,r) (these may, for instance, be outputs of a masked multiplication). Now, if
at some point during the computation the algorithm calculates the sum of these two
encodings, then the randomness cancels out. Therefore, an adversary could access the
sensitive information a+ b because it is not protected by any random mask. While this
issue already occurs when t= 1, i.e., the adversary only learns one intermediate value,
the situation gets much more complex when t grows, and we aim at reducing randomness
between multiple masked operations. Our main contribution is to initiate the study of
masking schemes where multiple gadgets share randomness and show that, despite the
challenges mentioned above, amortizing randomness over multiple operations is possible
and can lead in some instances to significantly more efficient masked schemes.
Contribution
Our contribution can be split in two main parts. In the first part, we analyze the generic
case of reusing randomness in high-order masked implementations. In the second part,
we show a particular technique that applies to the case of first-order security. As a case
study, we apply our strategies to the widely known AES block cipher.
Reusing randomness for t > 1. We start, in Section 3.1, by considering the case of t > 1,
i.e., when the adversary is allowed to learn multiple intermediate values. As a first
contribution, we define two security notions: the weak−t− SCR, which ensures probing
security when reusing randomness, and the t− SCR, which additionally provides certain
composability guarantees with other gadgets, similar to the ones given by the t− NI
property. We provide a composition result for our new notion and show sufficient
requirements for constructing gadgets that satisfy our new notion. Our technique for





Figure 3.1.: Example of two gadgets sharing the same randomness
blocks, i.e., sets of gadgets where the individual gadgets share their random bits with a
gadget in another block.
As a warm-up, we briefly present a toy example which shows in a simplified case the
core idea of our contribution. As a first step, we consider two non linear gadgets g′ and g′′,
which internally employ the same random bits. For simplicity, in the following figures
we use the same color in order to indicate that the gadgets use the same randomness.
We formalize probing security in this case with the concept of Security with Common
Randomness, as defined below for the example in Figure 3.1.
Definition 3.1 (t− SCR). We say that the gadgets g′ and g′′, whose inputs are masked
by n shares, are t−Secure with Common Randomness (t− SCR in short) if
• each set P ′ of t′ probes on g′, and
• each set P ′′ of t′′ probes on g′′
such that t′+ t′′ ≤ t can be simulated by at most t′ shares of the inputs of g′ and t′′ shares
of the inputs of g′′.
If g′ and g′′ are t− SCR, the whole circuit in Figure 3.1 is probing secure, because,
despite probing the randomness in one gadget gives information on the other gadget, the
simulation is still possible without accessing the total number of input shares. In other
words, the adversary does not gain any advantage by probing on both gadgets rather
then only one.
As a second step, we consider the situation depicted in Figure 3.2, where g′1 is composed
with g′2, and g′′1 with g′′2 . The gadgets g′1 and g′′1 share the same randomness, as well as
the gadgets g′2 and g′′2 . We call G′ the composition g′1 ◦g′2, and G′′ the composition g′′1 ◦g′′2 .
In the following lemma we show how we can compose safely gadgets that share the same
randomness with other gadgets.
Lemma 3.2. If the two blocks of gadgets G′ and G′′ depicted in Figure 3.2 and sharing
the same randomness are such that
• g′1 and g′′1 are t− SCR
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Figure 3.2.: Example of two blocks of gadgets sharing the same randomness
• g′2 and g′′2 are t− SCR
then G′ and G′′ are t− SCR.
Proof. Let t′1 be the number of probes on g′1, t′′1 on g′′1 , t′2 on g′2, and t′′2 on g′′2 , such
that∑i(t′i+t′′i )≤ t. We start by simulating the gadgets g′2 and g′′2 . Thanks to the t− SCR
property, there exist S′2 and S′′2 two sets of indexes of the input shares of cardinality
respectively t′2 andt′′2, such that the probes on g′2, respectively g′′2 , can be simulated by
using the indexes in S′2, resp. S′′2 .
As for the simulation of g′1 and g′′1 , since t′1 + |S′2| ≤ t and t′′1 + |S′′2 | ≤ t according to
the t− SCR property, there exist S′1 and S′′1 two sets of indexes of the input shares of
cardinality respectively t′1 and t′′1 such that the probes on g′1, respectively g′′1 , can be
simulated by using the indexes in S′1, resp. S′′1 .
Combining the simulators, the whole circuit can be simulated by using the indexes in S′1
and S′2 of x′, and S′′1 and S′′2 of of x′′. Therefore the simulation requires at most t′1 + t′2
shares of each inputs of G′ and t′′1 + t′′2 shares of each inputs of G′′. We conclude that G′
and G′′ are t− SCR.
We point out that the blocks of gadgets G′ and G′′ could be composed with each other
in a bigger circuit, by additionally ensuring that they are t− SNI.
In the rest of the chapter, we will show how the technique just presented can scale to
a more general situation, where a circuit is divided into blocks of gadgets with shared
randomness. We will see that the randomness of a circuit cannot be totally reused.
Indeed, a crucial requirement to securely reuse randomness is independence among
the inputs of these aforementioned blocks of gadgets. To this end, the last gadget in





Figure 3.3.: Example of alternate reuse of randomness at 1st order
an extra refreshing scheme whenever the inputs of gadgets sharing randomness have
dependent masks.
Reusing randomness for t= 1. We design new schemes for multiplication and addition
that achieve probing security at first order and employ only 2 random bits. The result
holds for any arbitrary complex masked circuits. We remind that the multiplication
algorithm secure at first order requires only one random bit. Our approach consists in
using the two random bits alternatively in the schemes of a circuit, in such a way that two
consecutive gadgets use a different random bit. Notice that, since randomness can cancel
out when used several times in the same circuit, such a scheme needs to be designed
carefully. Moreover, the security analysis cannot easily rely on the compositional notion
of 1-SNI [Bar+15a]. Indeed, such notions require that each gadget employ independent
randomness. A graphical example of the idea is Figure 3.3, where different colors represent
dependence on different random bits.
Implementation results. We finally complete our analysis with a case study by applying
our new countermeasures to masking the AES algorithm. Our analysis shows that for
orders up to t= 3 we can not only significantly reduce the amount of randomness needed,
but also improve on efficiency.
Related work
Despite being a major practical bottleneck, reducing the amount of randomness in
masking schemes has not been the focus of many research works until 2017. Belaid et al.
in [Bel+16] presented constructions that reduce the number of random bits needed in
a masked multiplication. Additionally, the authors gave a lower bound on the minimal
amount of randomness required to protect a masked multiplication. However, the best-
known scheme still requires an amount of randomness quadratic in the security parameter.
Moreover, a strategy for reducing the randomness complexity of first-order threshold
implementations of Keccak was examined in [Bil+13].
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From a practical point of view, the concept of “recycled” randomness was briefly
investigated in [Bal+14]. The authors practically evaluated the influence of reusing part
of the masks in some case studies and concluded that, in some circumstances, this causes
a security decrease. Nevertheless, these results lacked formal security proofs and therefore
do not negatively reflect on our methodology.
From a theoretical point of view, Ishai et al. [Ish+13] showed that any circuit can be
masked using an amount of randomness which is independent of the size of the circuit.
More precisely, a circuit can be protected using polynomial in t random bits. The
constructions proposed are based on bipartite expander graphs and are mainly interesting
from a theoretical point of view, since they become meaningful only when t is very large.
On the contrary, in our work, we focused on the cases of small t, which are more relevant
in practice.
After the publication of our work, other papers with the scope of amortizing randomness
in masked implementations have been published. De Meyer et al., in their paper on
implementing the AES using multiplicative masks [DRB18], presented a method for
recycling randomness in the circuit computing the Kronecker delta function2. The
strategy improves the randomness requirement from 7 to 3 bits at first-order and from 21
to 13 bits for second-order of security. However, the method is tailored specifically for
this circuit and not easy to generalize.
In the same year, Wegener and Moradi [WM18] showed a first-order secure implemen-
tation of AES, which does not make use of fresh randomness. The methodology is valid
for any bijective S-box. Nevertheless, it considers masking in four-shares and does not
provide any security proofs, but only a practical analysis.
Lately, following the work of Ishai et al. [Ish+13], Coron et al. presented in [CGZ19] a
construction which reduces the number of calls to the TRNG employing a pseudorandom
generator that generates all the randomness used by the circuit. According to their
construction, masking the AES requires only 48 bytes of randomness to get second-order
security and 108 to get third-order security, instead of respectively 1415 and 2530, required
by our scheme.
3.1. Reusing randomness in private circuits
We start by analyzing privacy of a particular set of gadgets g1, . . . ,gd in which the random
component is substituted by a set of bits r = (r1, . . . , rl) taken at random, but reused by
each of the gadgets g1, . . . ,gd.
In the following we indicate with g(x,r) a gadget which takes as input a mask x and
internally uses a vector r of random bits, where r is of the form (r1, . . . ,rn) and each ri
is the vector of the random bits involved in the computation of the ith output share. For
2The Kronecker delta function outputs 1 when its input is 0, and outputs 0 otherwise.
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example, referring to Algorithm 3.4, r1 is the vector (r1, r7, r13, r8). If the input values
are already clear from the context, in the rest of this chapter we will mainly specify a
gadget with only its random component r, so it will be indicated as g(r). Moreover,
we suppose that all the gadgets g(r) are such that every intermediate value used in the
computation of the ith output share contains only random bits in ri.
In order to analyze the possibility of randomness reuse, we first introduce the definition
of t−Security-with-Common-Randomness, which formalizes the requirements to guarantee
security in a situation where the random values are shared among the gadgets. First, we
give in Definition 3.3 a weaker form of the new notion, which ensures probing security,
but it cannot be used when gadgets compose in a more complicated circuit. Then, we
give in Definition 3.4 a stronger notion that allows us to make security arguments on the
composition of t− SCR gadgets.
Definition 3.3 (Weak t− SCR). Let r be a set of random bits. We say that the
gadgets g1(r), . . . ,gd(r) receiving each m inputs split into n shares are t−Secure with
Common Randomness (t− SCR in short) if for each set Pi of ti probes on gi such
that ∑di=1 ti ≤ t, the probes in Pi can be simulated by at most n−1 shares of the input
of gi and the simulation is consistent with the shared random component.
Definition 3.4 (t− SCR). Let r be a set of random bits. We say that the gad-
gets g1(r), . . . ,gd(r) receiving each m inputs split into n shares are t−Secure with Common
Randomness (t− SCR in short) if for each set Pi of ti probes on gi such that
∑d
i=1 ti ≤ t,
the probes in Pi can be simulated by at most ti shares of the input of gi and the simulation
is consistent with the shared random component.
We point out that the definition of weak t− SCR exactly corresponds to the definition
of probing security, while the definition of t− SCR is the equivalent of the definition
of t− NI, considering a circuit formed by the g1(r), . . . ,gd(r) gadgets.
We now use this definition in order to analyze the randomness reuse among entire
regions of the circuit, which we refer to as blocks. More formally, with the term block
of gadgets, we define a sub-circuit composed by gadgets, with input an encoding of a
certain x and output an encoding of y. Since our analysis focuses on the randomness,
when we refer to such a block, we only consider the randomized gadgets. In particular,
we indicate a block of gadgets as G(R) = {g1(r1), . . . ,gd(rd)}, where the gi represent the
randomized gadgets in the block and R = (r1, . . . ,rd) constitutes the total amount of
randomness employed by G. We assume without loss of generality that the input of such
a G is the input of the first randomized gadget g1. Indeed, even if the first gadget of the
block was a non-randomized one (i.e., a linear gadget), then this would change the value
of the input, but not its properties related to the independence. We call dimension of a
block G the number of randomized gadgets gi composing the block. In Figure 3.4, it is
depicted an example of N blocks of gadgets of dimension 4 each.
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Figure 3.4.: An example of N blocks of gadgets of dimension d= 4 each
The first result that we show about the block of gadgets aforementioned is the following
lemma, which gives a simple compositional result for multiple blocks of gadgets, where
each of such blocks uses the same random component R. Informally speaking, let Gj
be multiple sets of gadgets, where all gadgets in Gj share the same randomness. Then,
the lemma below shows that if the gadgets in Gj are t− SCR, then also the composition
of the gadgets in all sets Gj are t− SCR. We underline that such a block constitutes
itself a gadget. For simplicity, we assume that the blocks of gadgets that we consider in
the lemma below all have the same dimension d. However, our analysis can be easily
generalized to a setting where each block has a different dimension.
Lemma 3.5. Consider N blocks of gadgets
G1(R) = {g1,1(r1), . . . ,g1,d(rd)}
...
GN (R) = {gN,1(r1), . . . ,gN,d(rd)}
sharing the same random component R = (r1, . . . ,rd).
If for all j = 1 . . . ,d the gadgets {g1,j(rj), . . . ,gN,j(rj)} are t− SCR and each gadget
is t− SNI, then the blocks of gadgets {G1, . . . ,GN} are t− SCR as well.
Proof. For each i= 1, . . . ,N and each j = 1, . . . ,d let tij be the number of probes on the
gadget gi,j . We can prove the statement with an inductive argument on the dimension of
the blocks j = 1, . . . ,d.
• If j = d, then by hypothesis {g1,d, . . . ,gN,d} are t− SCR, i.e., for each i= 1, . . . ,N
there exists a set of indexes Sid, with |Sid| ≤ tid, such that for each gi,d the adversary’s
view can be simulated by using the input shares with indexes in Sid.
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• If j < d and {{g1,j+1, . . . ,gN,j+1}, . . . ,{g1,d, . . . ,gN,d}} are t− SCR, then there exists
a set of indexes Sij+1, with |Sij+1| ≤ tij+1, such that for each gi,j+1 ◦ · · · ◦ gi,d the
adversary’s view can be simulated by using the indexes in Sij+1. Since for each i we
have that tij+ |Sij+1| ≤ tij+tij+1≤ t and gi,j is t− SNI, the simulation of {g1,j , . . . ,gN,j}
is independent from each |Sij+1|. Since by hypothesis {g1,j , . . . ,gN,j} are t− SCR, for
each i= 1, . . . ,N there exists a set of indexes Sij , with |Sij | ≤ tij , such that for each gi,d
the adversary’s view can be simulated by using the input shares with indexes in Sij .
We conclude that for every dimension d of the blocks, the set {G1, . . . ,GN} is t− SCR.
As a next step we want now to use the result above in order to build circuits composed
by block of gadgets sharing the same randomness. We first point out that the t− SCR
property itself is not sufficient to guarantee a sound composition. Therefore, when
used in combination with other gadgets, a t− SCR scheme needs additionally to satisfy
the t− SNI property. We summarize this observation in the following theorem, which gives
a global result for circuits designed in blocks of gadgets sharing the same randomness.
Theorem 3.6. Let C be a circuit composed by N blocks of gadgets G1(R), . . . ,GN (R)
where Gi(R) = {gi,1(r1), . . . ,gi,d(rd)} for each i= 1, . . . ,N and with inputs encoded in n
shares and such that the gadgets outside such blocks are either linear or t− SNI. If
• ∀i= 1, . . . ,N Gi is t− SNI and
• ∀j = 1, . . . ,d g1,j , . . . ,gN,j are t− SCR
then the circuit C is t−probing secure.
Proof. The proof of the theorem is straightforward. Indeed, Lemma 3.5 implies that
G1, . . . ,GN are t− SCR. Moreover, we point out that since the Gi is t− SNI, for every
i= 1, . . . ,N , the composition is secure
• among the blocks Gi
• of the Gi with other randomized and t− SNI gadgets using fresh randomness
This is sufficient to prove that the circuit C is t probing secure.
To sum up, we showed in this section that, under certain conditions, it is possible to
design a circuit which internally reuses the random bits involved and remains probing
secure. Therefore, if used appropriately, this result allows us to decrease the amount of
randomness necessary in order to have a private circuit (because all the blocks share
the same randomness). Nevertheless, we remark that in practice, in order to have
blocks of t− SCR gadgets, the inputs of the first gadget of each block must be mutually
independent. Indeed, otherwise, it would not be always possible to have the independent
simulation required by Definition 3.4. Our analysis needs another step to determine how
to fulfill this requirement in the presence of not naturally independent inputs.
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Algorithm 3.1 Refreshing gadget Ind
Input: a1, . . . ,an such that
⊕
ai = a
Output: ain1 , . . . ,ainn such that
⊕
aini = a
1: (ain1 , . . . ,ainn )← (a1, . . . ,an);
2: for i= 2 to n do
3: ri
$←− Fn2 ;
4: aini ← aini + ri;
5: ain1 ← ain1 + ri;
The Ind gadget
In this section, we present a gadget, that we call Ind, which, given an input x, produces
an output Ind(x) independent from x. Thanks to this property, Ind can be adopted in
order to create independence between inputs of gadgets sharing the same randomness.
The algorithm, already proposed in [Cor+13] as a refreshing scheme, is depicted in
Algorithm 3.1, and it requires the use of n fresh random bits, where n is the number of
input shares. It was proven to be t− NI and not t− SNI in [Bar+15a], and therefore it
must be used carefully, because it is not always securely composable with other gadgets.
As an example, the scheme Ind can be applied at the inputs of the multiplication
schemes using the same randomness in order to make them independent of each other.
Whenever the scheme cannot be used because leading to an insecure circuit, the gadgets
with dependent inputs cannot share the same randomness.
Therefore, when designing such circuits, even if on the one hand the randomness involved
in the gadgets can be reused entirely, on the other hand additional Ind schemes are often
required to guarantee the independence of the inputs of gadgets sharing randomness.
Let us consider, for example, the case when we aim at reusing the randomness among N
multiplication schemes. Let t= 2, n= 3, and let the number of random bits per scheme be
3 (this is a reasonable supposition since the most efficient known t− SNI multiplication
scheme uses 3 random bits). If the inputs of the multiplication schemes are dependent to
each other, in order to have independent inputs and securely reuse the randomness, we
need to add two Ind gadgets, one per each input, as for Mult′′ in Figure 3.5. It is easy to
check that the number of fresh random bits injected in the circuit by the Ind gadgets
exceeds the one that it would be used if the multiplication schemes would not reuse the
same randomness. On the contrary, if only one of the two inputs of the multiplication
schemes sharing randomness is dependent, we need only one Ind scheme per multiplication,
as for Mult′ in Figure 3.5. In this case, reusing randomness is convenient.
The examples above show that the process of reusing randomness is not straightforward.
Only a good trade-off between the fresh randomness used by the Ind gadgets and the
amount of randomness saved by sharing it gives actual efficiency. Therefore, it is important
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Figure 3.5.: Example of gadgets with different use of the Ind refreshing scheme
to make a careful analysis of the circuit structure before applying our method. First, to
understand if the randomness cost is actually amortized, and secondly, to check that
the security still holds, even when employing the Ind gadgets. As we will see later in
Section 3.5, for circuits with an obvious structure (e.g., layers for symmetric ciphers),
which contain easily-exploitable regularities, this is not a hard task, and the optimal
solutions can be usually found quickly.
3.2. A t− SCR multiplication Scheme
Now that we have set the basic theory about the reuse of randomness in a circuit, we can
show how to construct the basic randomized gadgets, i.e., multiplication and refreshing,
such that they satisfy the t− SCR property.
We start from the multiplication schemes. We notice that it is possible to build






-non-completeness and t− SNI. Then, we discuss how to construct instantiations of
our multiplication according to these properties, and we finally provide their security proof.






complete. We point out that when n= t+1, this property ensures the t− SCR notion,
as defined in Definition 3.4. On the other hand, if n > t+ 1 the property guarantees
only the weak t− SCR from Definition 3.3. We provide the formal security analysis in
Section 3.2.











-order TI of the AND-gate [Rep+15] or multiplica-
tion [Cnu+15]. For our application, we additionally need that the number of output
shares is equal to the number of input shares. Most higher-order TI avoid this re-






-non-completeness without fresh randomness, and therefore we cannot rely
on the compression of the output shares. Unfortunately, this is only possible for very
specific values of n. Due to this minor difference, we cannot directly use the bounds
from the original publications related to higher-order TI. In the following, we derive an
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Let l be the number of input shares that are leaked by each of the output shares. We











must be independent of one input share. Therefore, we can construct a scheme with the















of the form aibj +ajbi over n output shares, i.e., each output share is made up of the sum
of n−12 terms. Each of these terms leaks information about the tuples (ai,aj) and (bi, bj),
assuming that the encodings a and b are independent and randomly chosen. For a
given l, the maximum number of possible terms, which can be combined without leaking




. The remaining aibi are equally distributed





























We use Equation (3.3) to compute the number of shares for our t− SCR multiplication
scheme with t≥ 4. For t≤ 3, the number of shares is bounded by the requirement for
the multiplication to be t− SNI, i.e., n > t.






multiplication scheme with n= t+1 for values of t≥ 4. This means that for t≥ 4 we can
only provide a weakly t− SCR multiplication scheme.
To achieve t− SCR, it is necessary to employ randomness in the calculations. Ini-
tially, n22 random components ri need to be added for the multiplication to be t− SNI.
We add a subset of n random components to each output share, and we equally distribute
it over the sum. In order to ensure the simulatability of the gadget by using a limited
number of input shares, as required by the definition of t− SNI, each random bit is
involved a second time in the computation of a single different output share. In this way,
the distribution of the random bits allows simulating the output probes with a random
and independent value.
Particular attention has to be reserved for odd orders. Indeed, when dealing with odd
orders, the two properties aforementioned are not sufficient for guaranteeing privacy in
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Algorithm 3.2 Mult2 for order t= 2 with n= 3 shares
Input: shares a1, . . . ,a3 such that
⊕
ai = a, shares b1, . . . , b3 such that
⊕
bi = b
Output: shares c1, . . . , c3 such that
⊕
ci = a · b
1: c1 = (a1b2 + r1) + (a2b1 + r2) +a2b2;
2: c2 = (a2b3 + r2) + (a3b2 + r3) +a3b3;
3: c3 = (a3b1 + r3) + (a1b3 + r1) +a1b1;










of the values in two different gadgets sharing the same randomness, without that the
cancellation of the random bits let the adversary know more than n−1 shares of the
secret. However, when t is odd, the adversary can also have another probe with the





probes per gadget sharing the same randomness.
This probe might add at least another input share to the knowledge of the adversary.
Consequently, the scheme needs to satisfy a third property, the Special Non-Completeness.
Definition 3.7 (Special Non-Completeness). For every set of at most t probes p1, ...,pk,
q1, ..., qh such that
• p1, ...,pk are probes on the output shares depending respectively on the vectors of
random bit rp1 , ...,rpk , where k ≤ t2 ,
• q1, ..., qh are probes on the internal values depending respectively on the vectors of
random bit rq1 , ...,rqh, where h≤ t−2 ·k,
• ∀i ∈ [1,h], ∃j ∈ [1,k]such that rqi ⊆ rpj ,
the set {p1, ...,pk, q1, ..., qh} is non-complete without randomness.
The construction of a t− SCR multiplication scheme following the aforementioned






-non-completeness or special non-completeness becomes a complex task,
due to a large number of possible combinations. For t≤ 5, possible t− SCR multiplication
schemes are defined respectively in Algorithms 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5. We stress that
Algorithms 3.2, 3.3 achieve the stronger version of t− SCR, while Algorithms 3.4 and 3.5
are only weak t− SCR. We recall that the computation in all the algorithms follows
from left to right, and the operations in brackets are executed first.
Security analysis
In this section we present the security analysis of the multiplication schemes, constructed
according to the properties given in the previous section. We highlight that the schemes
in Algorithm 3.2 and 3.3 were both already proven to be t− SNI in [Bar+15a]. We
prove the schemes for orders 2 and 3 to be t− SCR according to Definition 3.4 and we
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Algorithm 3.3 Mult3 for order t= 3 with n= 4 shares
Input: shares a1, . . . ,a4 such that
⊕
ai = a, shares b1, . . . , b4 such that
⊕
bi = b
Output: shares c1, . . . , c4 such that
⊕
ci = a · b
1: c1 = (a1b2 + r1) + (a3b1 + r5) + (a3b2 + r4) +a1b1;
2: c2 = (a2b1 + r1) + (a4b2 + r6) + (a4b1 + r2) +a2b2;
3: c3 = (a3b4 + r3) + (a2b3 + r5) + (a2b4 + r2) +a3b3;
4: c4 = (a4b3 + r3) + (a1b4 + r6) + (a1b3 + r4) +a4b4;
Algorithm 3.4 Mult4 for order t= 4 with n= 7 shares
Input: shares a1, . . . ,a7 such that
⊕
ai = a, shares b1, . . . , b7 such that
⊕
bi = b
Output: shares c1, . . . , c7 such that
⊕
ci = a · b
1: c1 = r15 +a1b1 + r1 +a1b2 +a2b1 + r18 +a1b3 +a3b1 + r7 +a2b3 +a3b2 + r13 + r8;
2: c2 = r16 +a2b2 + r2 +a2b4 +a4b2 + r17 +a2b6 +a6b2 + r1 +a4b6 +a6b4 + r14;
3: c3 = r17 +a4b4 + r8 +a4b1 +a1b4 + r10 +a4b5 +a5b4 + r2 +a1b5 +a5b1 + r3;
4: c4 = r18 +a5b5 + r9 +a5b2 +a2b5 + r16 +a5b7 +a7b5 + r4 +a2b7 +a7b2 + r11;
5: c5 = r5 +a7b7 + r4 +a7b1 +a1b7 + r15 +a7b6 +a6b7 + r12 +a1b6 +a6b1 + r3;
6: c6 = r6 +a6b6 + r13 +a6b3 +a3b6 + r5 +a6b5 +a5b6 + r9 +a3b5 +a5b3 + r11;
7: c7 = r10 +a3b3 + r12 +a3b4 +a4b3 + r6 +a3b7 +a7b3 + r14 +a4b7 +a7b4 + r7;
prove the scheme for orders 4 and 5 to be both t− SNI and weak t− SCR, according to
Definition 3.3.
The proofs are all structured similarly. As a first step, we list all possible probes.
Secondly, for each set of at most t possible probes, we construct sets of indexes of input
shares. The third and last step consists of providing a simulation of the probes using
only the input shares with the index contained in such sets. The crucial point of the
proof is showing that the simulation uses a number of input shares corresponding to
the requirements of the property that we are proving. So, for instance, in the case of
proofs of t− SNI, the simulation should require a number of input shares that is less or
equal to the number of internal probes. We remind that, as explained in Section 2.6 and
Lemma 2.3, showing the simulatability according to the definitions of t-probing security
and t− NI is equivalent to show that the distributions of the simulation and the t-limited
attack are identical.
In the rest of the section, N is a natural number, with N ≥ 2, and it represents the
number of gadgets sharing the same randomness.
Proposition 3.8 (t− SCR for order t= 2). Let Mult21, . . . ,Mult2N be a set of N multipli-
cation schemes as in Algorithm 3.2, with inputs (a(1),b(1)), . . . ,(a(N),b(N)) and outputs
the values c(1), . . . ,c(N). Suppose that the maskings of the inputs are independent and
uniformly chosen and that for k= 1, . . . ,N each Mult2k uses the same random bits r1, r2, r3.
44
3.2. A t− SCR multiplication Scheme
Algorithm 3.5 Mult5 for order t= 5 with n= 7 shares
Input: shares a1, . . . ,a7 such that
⊕
ai = a, shares b1, . . . , b7 such that
⊕
bi = b
Output: shares c1, . . . , c7 such that
⊕
ci = a · b
1: c1 = (a2b3 + r1) + (a3b2 + r7) + (a1b3 + r8) + (a3b1 + r13) + (a2b1 + r15) + (a1b2 + r19) +a1b1;
2: c2 = (a4b2 + r2) + (a2b4 + r1) + (a6b2 + r9) + (a4b6 + r14) + (a2b6 + r16) + (a6b4 + r20) +a2b2;
3: c3 = (a5b4 + r3) + (a1b4 + r2) + (a4b5 + r10) + (a1b5 + r8) + (a5b1 + r17) + (a4b1 + r21) +a4b4;
4: c4 = (a2b7 + r4) + (a5b7 + r3) + (a5b2 + r11) + (a2b5 + r9) + (a7b2 + r18) + (a7b5 + r15) +a5b5;
5: c5 = (a6b7 + r5) + (a7b6 + r4) + (a7b1 + r12) + (a1b7 + r10) + (a1b6 + r19) + (a6b1 + r16) +a7b7;
6: c6 = (a3b6 + r6) + (a6b3 + r5) + (a5b3 + r13) + (a5b6 + r11) + (a6b5 + r20) + (a3b5 + r17) +a6b6;
7: c7 = (a3b4 + r7) + (a7b4 + r14) + (a3b7 + r6) + (a4b7 + r12) + (a7b3 + r21) + (a4b3 + r18) +a3b3;
Then Mult21, . . . ,Mult2N are 2− SCR.
Proof. Let Ω = (P1, . . . ,PN ) be a set of 2 observations respectively on Mult21, . . . ,Mult2N .
We show that Mult21, . . . ,Mult2N satisfy Definition 3.4, i.e., that the probes in Pi can be
consistently simulated by at most |Pi| shares of the inputs of Mult2i .
Probes classification.
We classify all the possible probes in the following groups, for i, j = 1,2,3:
(1) r1, r2, r3







(3) (a(k)i · b
(k)
j + rh)
(4) (a(k)i · b
(k)







Construction of sets of shares indexes.
We construct the sets of input shares I(k),J (k) by adding i to I(k) and j to J (k), for
each k = 1, . . . ,N . Note that |I(k)|, |J (k)| ≤ 2.
Simulation.
The simulation starts by defining R the set of all random bits appearing in the
adversarial’s observations and simulating each of them uniformly at random. Then it
proceeds as follows:
• For each probe in group (2), simulate the value using the shares of the inputs with
index in I(k) and J (k).
• For each probe in group (3), if rh ∈ R or ∃k such that a(k)i · b
(k)
j + rh ∈ Ω, use the
shares of the inputs with index i ∈ I(k) and j ∈ J (k). Otherwise, simulate the probe
with a uniformly random value.
• For each probe in group (4), if ∃k̂ such that (a(k̂)i · b
(k̂)




i + rl) ∈ Ω,
then use the shares of the inputs with index in I(k) and J (k) and the same random
bits rh, rl; otherwise, since for any other kind of probe there will always be a random
bit not observed, we can simulate the probe with a uniformly random value.
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• For each probe in group (5), proceed similarly as in the previous step. If ∃k̂ such that
c
(k̂)
i ∈ Ω, then use the shares of the inputs with index in I(k) and J (k) and the same
random bits rh, rl and note that each product a(k)i · b
(k)
i does not add any index to
I(k) and J (k). Otherwise we can simulate the probe with a uniformly random value.
Since for each case the simulation uses only the shares of the inputs with indexes in
I(k),J (k), and since |I(k)|, |J (k)| ≤ 2, the simulation requires at most 2 shares per each
input. Therefore Mult21, . . . ,Mult2N is 2− SCR.
Proposition 3.9 (t− SCR for order t= 3). Let Mult31, . . . ,Mult3N be a set of N multipli-
cation schemes as in Algorithm 3.3, with inputs (a(1),b(1)), . . . ,(a(N),b(N)) and outputs
the values c(1), . . . ,c(N). Suppose that the maskings of the inputs are independent and uni-
formly chosen and that for k= 1, . . . ,N each Mult3k uses the same random bits r1, r2, r3, r4.
Then Mult31, . . . ,Mult3N are 3− SCR.
Proof. Let Ω = (P1, . . . ,PN ) be a set of 3 observations respectively on Mult31, . . . ,Mult3N .
We show that Mult31, . . . ,Mult3N satisfy Definition 3.4, i.e., that the probes in Pi can be
consistently simulated by at most |Pi| shares of the inputs of Mult3i .
Probes classification.
We classify all the possible probes in the following groups, for i, j = 1, . . . ,4:
(1) r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6







(3) (a(k)i · b
(k)
j + rh)
(4) (a(k)i · b
(k)






(5) (a(k)i · b
(k)










Construction of sets of shares indexes.
We construct the sets of input shares I(k),J (k) by adding i to I(k) and j to J (k), for
each k = 1, . . . ,N . Note that |I(k)|, |J (k)| ≤ 3.
Simulation.
The simulation starts by defining R the set of all the random bits appearing in the
adversarial’s observations and simulating each of them uniformly at random. Then it
proceeds as follows:
• For each probe in group (2) and (3), follow the same procedure of the proof for
Proposition 3.8.
• For each probe in group (4), if ∃k̂ such that (a(k̂)i · b
(k̂)




i + rl) ∈ Ω,
or (a(k̂)i · b
(k̂)




i + rl) ∈ Ω) and rl ∈ Ω (resp. rh ∈ Ω), then
use the shares of the inputs with index in I(k) and J (k) and the same random bits
simulated in R; otherwise, we can simulate the probe with a uniformly random value.
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• For each probe in group (5), if ∃k̂ such that (a(k̂)j · b
(k̂)




i + rl) ∈ Ω
or c(k̂)i ∈Ω, and rm ∈Ω, then use the shares of the inputs with index in I(k) and J (k)
and the same random bits rh, rl, rm simulated at the beginning. Otherwise we can
simulate the probe with a uniformly random value.
Since for each case the simulation uses only the shares of the inputs with indexes
in I(k),J (k), and since |I(k)|, |J (k)| ≤ 3, the simulation requires at most 3 shares per each
input. Therefore Mult31, . . . ,Mult3N is 3− SCR.
In the following, we first present the proof of weak t− SCR for both orders 4 and 5,
and than the ones for 4− SNI and 5− SNI. Due to the much higher number of possible
probes, the security proofs for orders 4 and 5 will be more involved than the previous ones.
Therefore after the proofs we will provide some insights on how the simulations work.
Proposition 3.10 (weak t− SCR for orders t= 4,5). Let t= 4,5 and let Multt1, . . . ,MulttN
be a set of N multiplication schemes as in Algorithm 3.4 for t = 4 or Algorithm 3.5
for t = 5. Let (a(1),b(1)), . . . ,(a(N),b(N)) be the input values and c(1), . . . ,c(N) the out-
put values. Suppose that the maskings of the inputs are independent and uniformly





Then Multt1, . . . ,MulttN are weak t− SCR.
Proof. Let Ω = (P1, . . . ,PN ) be a set of t observations respectively on Multt1, . . . ,MulttN .
We start by showing that Multt1, . . . ,MulttN satisfy Definition 3.3, i.e.,that the probes
in Pk can be consistently simulated by at most n−1 shares of the inputs of Multtk, for
each k = 1, . . . ,N .
Probes classification.
Suppose p1, . . . ,pt are t adversary’s probes. We indicate with rpi the vector of the
respective randomness for every i= 1, . . . , t and we classify such pi in the following groups:
(1) ∃j ∈ [1, t] such that rpi = rpj
(2) ∃j ∈ [1, t] such that rpi ⊂ rpj
(3) ∀j ∈ [1, t]rpi ∩rpj = ∅
(4) rpi = 0
(5) ∃J ∈ [1, t] such that, for all j ∈ J , rpj ⊂ rpi and
⋃
j rpj = rpi
(6) ∀j ∈ [1, t] such that rpj ⊂ rpi :
⋃
j rpj 6= rpi
Construction of sets of shares indexes.
We define the sets I1, . . . , IN ,J1, . . . ,JN with |Ii|<n and |Ji|<n for every i = 1, . . . ,N
such that the values of the wires ph can be perfectly simulated given the shares of the
inputs (a(1)i )i∈I1 , (b
(1)
i )i∈J1 , . . . ,(a
(N)
i )i∈IN , (b
(N)
i )i∈JN .
The procedure to construct the sets is the following:
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• For every wire in the group (1), (2), (4) or (5), add all the indexes of the shares
of a(j) in Ij and of b(j) in Jj for every j = 1, . . . ,N .
We remark that
• by construction of Multt, for every probe in group (4) we add at most only one index
to each set,





probes per each gadget in group (1),





probes per each gadget in group (5),
• for every probe pi with |rpi | < t, the number of indexes added is inferior then
when |rpi |= t.





probes per gadget for which we add all the indexes of the





non completeness without randomness
of Multt we can conclude that |Ii|< n and |Ji|< n. In particular, we point out that if
the inputs are not independent (or outputs of another t− SCR and t− SNI gadget), we
cannot guarantee this bound on the sets of indexes, because the shares of inputs of a
certain gadget might provide information regarding the shares of another one.
Simulation.
We now simulate, consistently with the randomness involved, the probes pi by
using (a(1)i )i∈I1 , (b
(1)
i )i∈J1 , . . . ,(a
(N)
i )i∈IN , (b
(N)
i )i∈JN .
The simulation starts with a preliminary phase in which for every probe in group (1),
(2) and (5) we pick at random the components of rpi . Then, it follows the steps below,
according to the different groups of probes.
• Groups (1) and (2). For every probe in group (1) and (2), we simulate pi by using
the random bits rpi selected in the preliminary phase and the indexes of the inputs
in I1,J1, . . . , IN ,JN .
• Group (3). For every probe in group (3), since pi does not share randomness with
any other probe, we simulate it as a uniformly random bit.
• Group (4). For every probe in group (4), since pi does not contain any randomness,
we simulate it only by using the indexes of the inputs in I1,J1, . . . , IN ,JN .
• Group (5). For every probe in group (5) , since all the component of the random-
ness rpi have been assigned in the preliminary phase, then we simulate pi by using
the random bits rpi selected in the preliminary phase and the indexes of the inputs
in I1,J1, I2,J2.
• Group (6). For every probe in group (6), since pi contains some randomness
which does not appear elsewhere in the other probes, we simulate it as a uniformly
random bit.
We showed that all possible sets of probes can be simulated using only the indexes of the
input shares contained in I and J . Therefore, since |Ii|< n and |Ji|< n, according to
Definition 3.3 we conclude that Multt1, . . . ,MulttN are weakly t− SCR.
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We provide now an intuition about the simulation above, by considering a representative
attack to Mult4.
Let Mult41 and Mult42 be two multiplication schemes sharing the same randomness. As
a toy example, we consider the critical situation when the adversary accesses the first
two output shares of Mult41, let them be c1, c2, and the first two output shares of Mult42,
let them be c′1, c′2:
c1 = r15 +a1b1 + r1 +a1b2 +a2b1 + r18 +a1b3 +a3b1 + r7 +a2b3 +a3b2 + r13 + r8
c2 = r16 +a2b2 + r2 +a2b4 +a4b2 + r17 +a2b6 +a6b2 + r1 +a4b6 +a6b4 + r14
c′1 = r15 +a′1b′1 + r1 +a′1b′2 +a′2b′1 + r18 +a′1b′3 +a′3b′1 + r7 +a′2b′3 +a′3b′2 + r13 + r8
c′2 = r16 +a′2b′2 + r2 +a′2b′4 +a′4b′2 + r17 +a′2b′6 +a′6b′2 + r1 +a′4b′6 +a′6b′4 + r14.
According to the classification of the probes in the proof above, since c1, c2 and c′1, c′2 share
the same randomness they belong to group (1). We define the sets of indexes according
to the procedure in the proof, by adding all the indexes of the input shares involved in
the computation: I := {1,2,3,4,6}, I ′ := {1,2,3,4,6}, J := {1,2,3,4,6}, J ′ := {1,2,3,4,6}.
The intuition behind this step is the fact that an adversary, by summing the probes up,
could completely cancel out the randomness, and consequently discover all the input
shares appearing in the computation. Thus the simulation needs to use such shares. Now,





−non-completeness, which Algorithm 3.4 satisfies by
construction, each of these sets contains less than n= 7 indexes (in particular, in our
example, they contain each 5 indexes). We simulate the probes using only the indexes
in I,I ′,J,J ′ in the following way.
• First, we assign uniformly at random all the random bits involved in the computation,
i.e., r1, r2, r13, r18, r17, r7, r16, r14, r15.
• The, we compute c1, c2 and c′1, c′2 exactly as in the real algorithm, by using the
shares ai with i ∈ I, bj with j ∈ J , a′i with i ∈ I ′ and b′j with j ∈ J ′.
Since the simulation uses only input shares with index in I,J,I ′,J ′, which have cardinality
5, the conditions in Definition 3.3 are satisfied and the gadgets are weakly 4− SCR.
Proposition 3.11 (t− SNI for order t= 4). Let Mult4 be a multiplication scheme as in
Algorithm 3.4, with inputs a,b and output c. Then Mult4 is 4− SNI.
Proof. Let Ω = (I,O) be a set of 4 observations respectively on the internal and on the
output wires, where |I|= t1 and in particular t1 + |O| ≤ 4.
Probes classification.
We classify the internal wires in the following groups:
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(1) ai, bj ,aibj
(2.1) rk
(2.2) rk +aibi
(3.1) rk +aibi+ rh,
(3.2) rk +aibi+ rh+aibj ,
(3.3) rk +aibi+ rh+aibj +ajbi,
(4.1) rk +aibi+ rh+aibj +ajbi+ rl,
(4.2) rk +aibi+ rh+aibj +ajbi+ rl+aibu,
(4.3) rk +aibi+ rh+aibj +ajbi+ rl+aibu+aubi,
(5.1) rk +aibi+ rh+aibj +ajbi+ rl+aibu+aubi+ rm,
(5.2) rk +aibi+ rh+aibj +ajbi+ rl+aibu+aubi+ rm+ajbu,
(5.3) rk +aibi+ rh+aibj +ajbi+ rl+aibu+aubi+ rm+ajbu+aubj
(6) ci = rk +aibi+ rh+aibj +ajbi+ rl+aibu+aubi+ rm+ajbu+aubj + re
(7) c1 = rk +aibi+ rh+aibj +ajbi+ rl+aibu+aubi+ rm+ajbu+aubj + re+ rf
Construction of sets of shares indexes.
Suppose an adversary corrupts at most 4 wires w1, . . . ,w4. We define two sets I,J
with |I|< t1 and |J |< t1 such that the values of the wires wh can be perfectly simulated
given the values (ai)i∈I , (bi)i∈J .
The procedure to construct the sets is the following. We first define a set K such that
for all the probes in group (2.1) and (2.2) we add k to K. Initially I,J are empty and
the wi unassigned. Then
• Group (1). For every wire in the group (1) or a combination of this, add i to I
and j to J .
• Group (2.2). For every wire in group (2.2) if i /∈ I, add i to I, if i /∈ J , add i to J .
• Group (3.1). For every wire in group (3.1) and such that k,h ∈K, if i /∈ I, for
every index of the shares of a which is not in I, add the index to I and for every
index of the shares of b which is not in J , add the index to J .
• Group (3.2).
– For every wire in group (3.2) and such that k,h ∈K, if i /∈ I, for every index of
the shares of a which is not in I, add the index to I and for every index of the
shares of b which is not in J , add the index to J .
∗ For every wire in group (3.2) such that rk+aibi+rh was probed, if i /∈ I, add i
to I, if j /∈ I, add j to I, if i /∈ J , add i to J , if j /∈ J , add j to J .
∗ For every wire in group (3.2) or (3.3) such that rk+aibi was probed and h ∈K,
if i /∈ I, add i to I, if j /∈ I, add j to I, if i /∈ J , add i to J , if j /∈ J , add j to J .
• Group (3.3).
– For every wire in group (3.1), (3.2), (3.3) and such that k,h ∈K, if i /∈ I, for
every index of the shares of a which is not in I, add the index to I and for every
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index of the shares of b which is not in J , add the index to J .
∗ For every wire in group (3.3) such that rk+aibi+rh was probed, if i /∈ I, add i
to I, if j /∈ I, add j to I, if i /∈ J , add i to J , if j /∈ J , add j to J .
∗ For every wire in group (3.3) such that rk +aibi+ rh+aibj was probed if j /∈ I,
add j to I, if i /∈ J , add i to J .
• Group (4.1).
– For every wire in group (4.1) and such that k ∈K, h ∈K and l ∈K, for every
index of the shares of a which is not in I, add the index to I and for every index
of the shares of b which is not in J , add the index to J .
– For every wire in group (4.1) such that rk +aibi+ rh was probed and l ∈K, or
such that rk +aibi was probed and h, l ∈K, if i /∈ I, add i to I, if i /∈ J , add i
to J , if j /∈ I, add j to I, if j /∈ J , add j to J .
• Group (4.2).
– For every wire in group (4.2) and such that k ∈K, h ∈K and l ∈K, for every
index of the shares of a which is not in I, add the index to I and for every index
of the shares of b which is not in J , add the index to J .
– For every wire in group (4.2) such that rk +aibi + rh was probed and l ∈K,
if i /∈ I, add i to I, if i /∈ J , add i to J , if u /∈ I, add u to I, if u /∈ J , add u
to J .
• Group (4.3).
– For every wire in group (4.3) and such that k ∈K, h ∈K and l ∈K, for every
index of the shares of a which is not in I, add the index to I and for every index
of the shares of b which is not in J , add the index to J .
∗ For every wire in group (4.3) such that rk+aibi+rh+aibj+ajbi+rl was probed,
if i /∈ I, add i to I, if i /∈ J , add i to J , if u /∈ I, add u to I, if u /∈ J , add u
to J .
– For every wire in group (4.3) such that rk +aibi + rh was probed and l ∈K,
if i /∈ I, add i to I, if i /∈ J , add i to J , if u /∈ I, add u to I, if u /∈ J , add u
to J .
• Group (5.1).
– For every wire in group (5.1) such that rk +aibi+ rh was probed and l,m ∈K,
if i /∈ I, add i to I, if i /∈ J , add i to J , if j /∈ I, add j to I, if j /∈ J , add j
to J , if u /∈ I, add u to I, if u /∈ J , add u to J .
– For every wire in group (5.1) such that rk+aibi+rh+aibj +ajbi+rl was probed
and m ∈K, if i /∈ I, add i to I, if i /∈ J , add i to J , if j /∈ I, if u /∈ I, add u
to I, if u /∈ J , add u to J .
• Group (5.2).
– For every wire in group (5.2) such that rk +aibi+ rh+aibj +ajbi+ rl+aibu+
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aubi + rm was probed and m /∈K, if j /∈ I, add j to I, if j /∈ J , add j to J ,
if u /∈ I, add u to I, if u /∈ J , add u to J .
– For every wire in group (5.2) such that rk + aibi + rh + aibj + ajbi + rl was
probed and m ∈K, if i /∈ I, add i to I, if i /∈ J , add i to J , if j /∈ I, add j
to I, if j /∈ J , add j to J , if u /∈ I, add u to I, if u /∈ J , add u to J .
– For every wire in group (5.2) such that rk +aibi+ rh was probed and l,m ∈K,
if i /∈ I, add i to I, if i /∈ J , add i to J , if j /∈ I, add j to I, if j /∈ J , add j
to J , if u /∈ I, add u to I, if u /∈ J , add u to J .
• Group (5.3).
– For every wire in group (5.3) such that rk +aibi+ rh+aibj +ajbi+ rl+aibu+
aubi + rm was probed and m /∈K, if j /∈ I, add j to I, if j /∈ J , add j to J ,
if u /∈ I, add u to I, if u /∈ J , add u to J .
– For every wire in group (5.3) such that rk + aibi + rh + aibj + ajbi + rl was
probed and m ∈K, if i /∈ I, add i to I, if i /∈ J , add i to J , if j /∈ I, add j
to I, if j /∈ J , add j to J , if u /∈ I, add u to I, if u /∈ J , add u to J .
– For every wire in group (5.3) such that rk +aibi+ rh was probed and l,m ∈K,
if i /∈ I, add i to I, if i /∈ J , add i to J , if j /∈ I, add j to I, if j /∈ J , add j
to J , if u /∈ I, add u to I, if u /∈ J , add u to J .
We now point out that |I|< t1 and |J |< t1. Indeed, if t1 = 1, according to the distribution
of the randomness, the only groups which add indexes to I and J are groups (1) and
(2.2). Therefore |I| ≤ 1 and |J | ≤ 1. If t1 = 2, then the only groups which add indexes to I
and J can be the ones marked with ∗. Therefore, in all the previous situations |I| ≤ 2
and |J | ≤ 2. If t1 ≥ 3, then the groups which add indexes to I and J are all the remaining
and in any of these cases |I| ≤ 3 and |J | ≤ 3 if t1 = 3 or |I| ≤ 4 and |J | ≤ 4 if t1 = 4.
Simulation.
We now simulate the wires w1, . . . ,w4 using only the input shares (ai)i∈I and (bj)j∈J .
Initially, for every k ∈K assign rk to a random and independent value. This simulates
the probes in (2.1). Then we follow the procedure below.
• Group (1). For every probe in group (1), then by construction i ∈ I and j ∈ J and
the values are perfectly simulated.
• Group (2.2). For every probe in group (2.2), rk has been simulated in the first
step of the simulation. Moreover, by construction i ∈ I and j ∈ J and therefore the
probe can be perfectly simulated.
• Group (3.1). For every probe in (3.1)
– if rk and rh have been observed, then the values have been assigned to a
random and independent value at the beginning of the simulation and, since
by construction i ∈ I,J , the probe can be simulated by using rk, rh and the
required shares of a and b;
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– otherwise, if rh or rk has not been observed, then the probe can be simulated
as a uniformly random value.
• Group (3.2). For every probe in (3.2)
– if rk and rh have been observed, then the values have been assigned to a
random and independent value at the beginning of the simulation and, since
by construction i, j ∈ I,J , the probe can be simulated by using rk, rh and the
required shares of a and b;
– otherwise, if rh or rk has not been observed, then the probe can be simulated
as a uniformly random value.
– If p := rk +aibi+ rh was probed, then by construction i, j ∈ I,J and the probe
can be simulated by summing p and aibj ;
– otherwise, if p := rk +aibi and rh have been probed, then rh has been assigned
to a random and independent value at the beginning of the simulation and by
construction i, j ∈ I,J . Therefore, the probe can be simulated by summing p, rh
and the needed shares of a and b.
– Finally, if p := rk +aibi but rh has not been probed, then the observation can
be simulated as a random and independent value.
• Group (3.3). For every probe in (3.3), the simulation proceeds in the same way
as in the previous group. Moreover, if the value p := rk +aibi+ rh+aibj has been
probed, then by construction i ∈ J and j ∈ I, therefore the probe can be simulated
by adding p and ajbi.
• Group (4.1). For every probe in group (4.1)
– if rk or rk+aibi and rh and rl have been observed, then the values of the random
bits have been assigned to a random and independent value at the beginning of
the simulation and, since by construction i, j ∈ I,J , the probe can be simulated
by using rk, rh, rl and the required shares of a and b;
– if rh or rk or rl has not been observed, then the probe can be simulated as a
uniformly random value;
– if p := rk + aibi + rh and rl have been probed, then rl has been assigned to
a random and independent value at the beginning of the simulation and by
construction i, j ∈ I,J . Therefore the probe can be simulated by using p, rl
and ai,aj , bi, bj ;
– otherwise we can simulate the probe as a random and independent value.
• Group (4.2). For every probe in group (4.2)
– if rk or rk + aibi and rh and rl have been observed, then the values of the
random bits have been assigned to a random and independent value at the
beginning of the simulation and, since by construction i, j,u ∈ I,J , the probe
can be simulated by using rk, rh, rl and the required shares of a and b.
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– if p := rk + aibi + rh and rl have been probed, then rl has been assigned to
a random and independent value at the beginning of the simulation and by
construction i, j,u ∈ I,J . Therefore the probe can be simulated by using p, rl
and ai,aj , bi, bj , bu;
– if p := rk+aibi+rh+aibj +ajbi+rl has been probed, then by construction i ∈ I
and u ∈ J . Therefore the probe can be simulated by using p and ai, bu;
– otherwise we can simulate the probe as a random and independent value.
• Group (4.3). For every probe in group (4.3)
– if rk or rk+aibi and rh and rl have been observed, then the values of the random
bits have been assigned to a random and independent value at the beginning of
the simulation and, since by construction i, j ∈ I,J , the probe can be simulated
by using rk, rh, rl and the required shares of a and b;
– if p := rk + aibi + rh and rl have been probed, then rl has been assigned to
a random and independent value at the beginning of the simulation and by
construction i, j,u ∈ I,J . Therefore the probe can be simulated by using p, rl
and ai,aj ,au, bi, bj , bu;
– if p := rk+aibi+rh+aibj+ajbi+rl has been probed then by construction the in-
dexes i,u∈ I,J . Therefore the probe can be simulated by using p and ai,au, bi, bu;
– otherwise we can simulate the probe as a random and independent value.
• Groups (5.1), (5.2) and (5.3). For every probe in group (5.1), (5.2) or (5.3)
– if p := rk + aibi + rh and rl, rm have been probed, then rl and rm have been
assigned to a random and independent value at the beginning of the simulation
and by construction i, j,u ∈ I,J . Therefore the probe can be simulated by
using p, rl, rm and ai,aj ,au, bi, bj , bu;
– if p := rk+aibi+rh+aibj +ajbi+rl and rm have been probed, then by construc-
tion i,u ∈ I,J . Therefore the probe can be simulated by using p and ai,au, bi, bu;
– otherwise we can simulate the probe as a random and independent value.
• Groups (6) and (7). For every probe in group (6) or (7), since there exists a
random bit which was not probed, the value can be simulated as a random and
independent value.
We just showed that all possible sets of probes can be simulated using only the indexes
of the input shares contained in I and J . Therefore, since |I|< t1 and |J |< t1, according
to Definition 2.5 we conclude that Mult4 is 4− SNI.
Again, we give an intuition on the proof of t− SNI by showing an exemplary attack. Let
us suppose that an attacker has two internal probes p1,p2 and two external probes c1, c2,
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looking as in the following
p1 = r18
p2 = r18 +a5b5 + r9 +a5b2 +a2b5
c1 = r15 +a1b1 + r1 +a1b2 +a2b1 + r18 +a1b3 +a3b1 + r7 +a2b3 +a3b2 + r13 + r8
c2 = r16 +a2b2 + r2 +a2b4 +a4b2 + r17 +a2b6 +a6b2 + r1 +a4b6 +a6b4 + r14
According to the probes classification in the proof, p1 is in group (2.1), and therefore,
as a preliminary phase, we need to add r18 to a set K. Then, we define sets of indexes,
I and J , as in the following. Since p2 is in group (3.3), r18 ∈K but r9 /∈K, and none
of its partial addends was probed, we do not add any index to I or J . The insight at
the base of this is the fact that, thanks to the random bits r18 and r9, which cannot be
canceled out with any of the other probes, p2 looks to the adversary uniformly random
and therefore no indexes are needed for its simulation. Finally, since c1 is in group (6)
and c2 in group (7), in both cases we do not need to add any index to I or J . Indeed,
since they differ to each other and to p1 and p2 of at least one random bit, they look to
the adversary uniformly random. At this point, the simulation phase is quick. Thanks to
the arguments above, we simulate uniformly at random the probes p2, c1 and c3 and we
assign p1 to r18.
Similar principles are at the base of the proof of 5− SNI.
Proposition 3.12 (t− SNI for order t= 5). Let Mult5 be a multiplication scheme as in
Algorithm 3.5, with inputs a,b and output c. Then Mult5 is 5− SNI.
Proof. Let Ω = (I,O) be a set of 5 observations respectively on the internal and on the
output wires, where |I|= t1 and |O|= t2 (and in particular t1 + t2 ≤ 5).
Probes classification.
We can classify the internal wires in the following groups:
(1) ai, bj ,aibj
(2) aibj + rk
(3) rk
(4) ci,j , which corresponds to a partial sum of the output share ci.
For example, c1,0 = a1b1, c1,2 = a1b1 + (a1b2 + r19) + (a2b1 + r15).
Construction of sets of shares indexes.
Suppose an adversary probes at most t wires w1, . . . ,wt. We define two sets I,J
with |I| < t1 |J | < t1 such that the values of the wires wh can be perfectly simulated
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given the values (ai)i∈I , (bi)i∈J .
The procedure to construct the sets is the following:
1. We first define a set K such that for all probes in group (2), (3) or (4) we add the
index k of each random bit rk to K.
2. Initially I,J are empty and the wi unassigned.
3. For every wire in group (1) or a combination of this, if i /∈ I add i to I and if j /∈ J
add j to J .
4. For every wire in group (2), add i to I and j to J .
5. For every wire in group (4) such that all the indexes of the random bits appear
in K at least two times, for every share ai observed, if i /∈ I, add i to I and for
every share bj observed, if j /∈ J , add j to J .
6. For every wire in group (4) such that a certain ci,j−h was probed for h=1, . . . , j− 1,
if for every rk in ci,j− ci,j−h k ∈K, then add all the indexes of the shares of a in I
and all the shares of b in J , unless they are already in I and J .
We point out that the sets just constructed are such that |I| ≤ t1 and |J | ≤ t1. Indeed,
for each probe in group (1) and (2) at most one index is added. For each probe in (4),
we add more than one index to I and J only in the following four possible scenarios:
(a) The attacker’s probes are of the form
– p1 := (aibj + rk1) + (aebf + rk2)
– p2 := agbh+ rk1
– p3 := albm+ rk2
(b) The attacker’s probes are of the form
– p1 := (aibj + rk1) + (aebf + rk2) + (apbq + rk3)
– p2 := agbh+ rk1
– p3 := albm+ rk2
– p4 := arbs+ rk3
(c) The attacker’s probes are of the form
– p1 := (aibj + rk1) + (aebf + rk2) + (apbq + rk3) + (aubv + rk4)
– p2 := agbh+ rk1
– p3 := albm+ rk2
– p4 := arbs+ rk3
– p5 := awbz + rk4
(d) The attacker’s probes are of the form
– p1 := (aibj + rk1) + (aebf + rk2) + (apbq + rk3)
– p2 := (agbh+ rk1) + (aubv + rk4)
– p3 := albm+ rk2
– p4 := arbs+ rk3
– p5 := awbz + rk4
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We give below a table with all the possible sets of probes in the previous four scenarios
and the corresponding cardinality of I and J , representing the number of shares needed
for the simulation. We can see that it always holds |I| ≤ t1 and |J | ≤ t1.
Probes in scenario (a) |I| |J |
p1 := (a2b3 + r1) + (a3b2 + r7), p2 := (a2b4 + r1), p3 := (a3b4 + r7) 2 3
p1 := (a4b2 + r2) + (a2b4 + r1), p2 := (a2b3 + r1), p3 := (a1b4 + r2) 3 3
p1 := (a5b4 + r3) + (a1b4 + r2), p2 := (a4b2 + r2), p3 := (a5b7 + r3) 3 3
p1 := (a2b7 + r4) + (a5b7 + r3), p2 := (a7b6 + r4), p3 := (a5b4 + r3) 3 3
p1 := (a6b7 + r5) + (a7b6 + r4), p2 := (a6b3 + r5), p3 := (a2b7 + r4) 3 3
p1 := (a3b6 + r6) + (a6b3 + r5), p2 := (a3b7 + r6), p3 := (a6b7 + r5) 2 3
p1 := (a3b4 + r7) + (a7b4 + r14), p2 := (a3b2 + r7), p3 := (a4b6 + r14) 2 3
Probes in scenario (b)
p1 := (a2b3 + r1) + (a3b2 + r7) + (a1b3 + r8),p2 := (a2b4 + r1),
p3 := (a3b4 + r7),p4 := (a1b5 + r8)
3 4
p1 := (a4b2 + r2) + (a2b4 + r1) + (a6b2 + r9), p2 := (a2b3 + r1),
p3 := (a1b4 + r2),p4 := (a2b5 + r9)
4 4
p1 := (a5b4 + r3) + (a1b4 + r2) + (a4b5 + r10), p2 := (a4b2 + r2),
p3 := (a5b7 + r3),p4 := (a1b7 + r10)
3 4
p1 := (a2b7 + r4) + (a5b7 + r3) + (a5b2 + r11), p2 := (a7b6 + r4),
p3 := (a5b4 + r3),p4 := (a5b6 + r11)
3 4
p1 := (a6b7 + r5) + (a7b6 + r4) + (a7b1 + r12), p2 := (a6b3 + r5),
p3 := (a2b7 + r4),p4 := (a4b7 + r12)
4 4
p1 := (a3b6 + r6) + (a6b3 + r5) + (a5b3 + r13), p2 := (a3b7 + r6),
p3 := (a6b7 + r5),p4 := (a3b1 + r13)
3 1
p1 := (a3b4 + r7) + (a7b4 + r14) + (a3b7 + r6), p2 := (a3b2 + r7),
p3 := (a4b6 + r14),p4 := (a3b6 + r6)
3 4
Probes in scenario (c)
p1 := (a2b3 + r1) + (a3b2 + r7) + (a1b3 + r8) + (a3b1 + r13),
p2 := (a2b4 + r1), p3 := (a3b4 + r7),p4 := (a1b5 + r8),p5 := (a5b3 + r13)
4 5
p1 := (a4b2 + r2) + (a2b4 + r1) + (a6b2 + r9) + (a4b6 + r14),
p2 := (a2b3 + r1), p3 := (a1b4 + r2),p4 := (a2b5 + r9),p5 := (a7b4 + r14)
5 5
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p1 := (a5b4 + r3) + (a1b4 + r2) + (a4b5 + r10) + (a1b5 + r8),
p2 := (a4b2 + r2), p3 := (a5b7 + r3),p4 := (a1b7 + r10),p5 := (a1b3 + r8)
3 5
p1 := (a2b7 + r4) + (a5b7 + r3) + (a5b2 + r11) + (a2b5 + r9),
p2 := (a7b6 + r4), p3 := (a5b4 + r3),p4 := (a5b6 + r11),p5 :=
3 5
p1 := (a6b7 + r5) + (a7b6 + r4) + (a7b1 + r12) + (a1b7 + r10),
p2 := (a6b3 + r5), p3 := (a2b7 + r4),p4 := (a4b7 + r12),p5 := (a6b2 + r9)
5 5
p1 := (a3b6 + r6) + (a6b3 + r5) + (a5b3 + r13) + (a5b6 + r11),
p2 := (a3b7 + r6), p3 := (a6b7 + r5),p4 := (a3b1 + r13),p5 := (a5b2 + r11)
3 5
p1 := (a3b4 + r7) + (a7b4 + r14) + (a3b7 + r6) + (a4b7 + r12),
p2 := (a3b2 + r7), p3 := (a4b6 + r14),p4 := (a3b6 + r6),p5 := (a7b1 + r12)
4 5
Probes in scenario (d)
p1 := (a2b3 + r1) + (a3b2 + r7) + (a1b3 + r8), p2 := (a3b4 + r7),
p3 := (a4b2 + r2) + (a2b4 + r1),p4 := (a1b5 + r8),p5 := (a1b4 + r2)
4 4
p1 := (a2b3 + r1) + (a3b2 + r7) + (a1b3 + r8), p2 := (a2b4 + r1),
p3 := (a3b4 + r7) + (a7b4 + r14),p4 := (a1b5 + r8),p5 := (a7b4 + r14)
5 5
p1 := (a4b2 + r2) + (a2b4 + r1) + (a6b2 + r9), p2 := (a2b5 + r9),
p3 := (a2b3 + r1) + (a3b2 + r7),p4 := (a3b4 + r7),p5 := (a1b4 + r2)
5 3
p1 := (a4b2 + r2) + (a2b4 + r1) + (a6b2 + r9), p2 := (a2b5 + r9),
p3 := (a5b4 + r3) + (a1b4 + r2),p4 := (a2b3 + r1),p5 := (a5b7 + r3)
5 5
p1 := (a5b4 + r3) + (a1b4 + r2) + (a4b5 + r10), p2 := (a1b7 + r10),
p3 := (a4b2 + r2) + (a2b4 + r1),p4 := (a5b7 + r3),p5 := (a2b3 + r1)
4 5
p1 := (a2b7 + r4) + (a5b7 + r3) + (a5b2 + r11), p2 := (a7b6 + r4),
p3 := (a5b4 + r3) + (a1b4 + r2),p4 := (a4b2 + r2),p5 := (a5b6 + r11)
5 4
p1 := (a2b7 + r4) + (a5b7 + r3) + (a5b2 + r11), p2 := (a5b4 + r3),
p3 := (a6b7 + r5) + (a7b6 + r4),p4 := (a6b3 + r5),p5 := (a5b6 + r11)
4 5
p1 := (a6b7 + r5) + (a7b6 + r4) + (a7b1 + r12), p2 := (a5b4 + r3),
p3 := (a2b7 + r4) + (a5b7 + r3),p4 := (a6b3 + r5),p5 := (a4b7 + r12)
5 5
p1 := (a3b6 + r6) + (a6b3 + r5) + (a5b3 + r13), p2 := (a2b7 + r4),
p3 := (a6b7 + r5) + (a7b6 + r4),p4 := (a3b1 + r13),p5 := (a3b7 + r6)
5 5
p1 := (a3b4 + r7) + (a7b4 + r14) + (a3b7 + r6), p2 := (a2b4 + r1),
p3 := (a2b3 + r1) + (a3b2 + r7),p4 := (a3b6 + r6),p5 := (a4b6 + r14)
4 5
p1 := (a3b4 + r7) + (a7b4 + r14) + (a3b7 + r6), p2 := (a6b7 + r5),
p3 := (a3b6 + r6) + (a6b3 + r5),p4 := (a3b2 + r7),p5 := (a4b6 + r14)
4 5
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Simulation.
Now we simulate the wires wh using only the values (ai)i∈I and (bi)i∈J .
• We start the simulation with a preliminary phase in which for every k ∈ K we
assign rk to a random and independent value.
• For every probe in group (1), i ∈ I and i ∈ J . Therefore the values are perfectly sim-
ulated.
• For every probe in group (2), since k ∈K and rk has been simulated in the preliminary
phase as a random and independent value, we can compute wi by using rk and the
indexes of the inputs which are, by construction, in the sets I and J .
• For every probe in group (4):
– if for all the random bits rk used in the computation, k ∈K, then by construction
the indexes of the shares of a and b are respectively in I and J and the bits rk
have been taken randomly in the initial step of the simulation. Therefore the
probe can be simulated using these values.
– if none of the sums ci,j−h have been probed and there exists at least one random
bit rk used in the computation such that k /∈K, then ci,j can be simulated as a
uniform and random value.
– if a sum ci,j−h, with h= j−1, . . . ,1, has been probed and every rk in ci,j−h is
such that k ∈K, then we can simulate ci,j from rk assigned at random in the
preliminary phase, the probe ci,j−h and the shares of a and b which are in I
and J by construction.
– if a sum ci,j−h, with h= j−1, . . . ,1, has been probed and there exists a random
bit rk in ci,j− ci,j−h such that k /∈K, then we can simulate ci,j as a uniform
and random bit.
Finally, the simulation of the output probes ci follows the same steps of the probes in
group (4) and it can be therefore performed by using at most t1 shares of the inputs,
completing the proof.
3.3. A t− SCR refreshing scheme
In the following, we show that the refreshing scheme in Algorithm 2.3 is t− SCR. We
remark that, due to the use of n > t+ 1 shares in the multiplication algorithm for
order t > 3, the refreshing scheme in Algorithm 2.3 makes use of a significant amount
of randomness, more precisely n(n−1)2 random bits, which can be optimized. In the
following we propose a more efficient t− SCR refreshing scheme for orders t≥ 4. The
principle at the base of such a refreshing is to add fresh random bits to each input share
such that there are t random bits involved in the computation of each output share
and each of such random bits is used a second time in a distinct output share. The
new scheme makes use of n·t2 random bits. An example for order t = 4 is depicted in
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Algorithm 3.6 Refreshing scheme R′ for order t= 4
Input: shares a1, . . . ,a7 such that
⊕
ai = a
Output: shares c1, . . . , c7 such that
⊕
ci = a
1: c1 = a1 + r1 + r7 + r13 + r8;
2: c2 = a2 + r2 + r1 + r14 + r9;
3: c3 = a3 + r8 + r10 + r3 + r2;
4: c4 = a4 + r9 + r4 + r3 + r11;
5: c5 = a5 + r5 + r10 + r4 + r12;
6: c6 = a6 + r6 + r13 + r11 + r5;
7: c7 = a7 + r14 + r6 + r12 + r7;
Algorithm 3.6. In Lemma 3.13 we show that both the refreshing schemes just mentioned
are t− SCR. In particular, we point out that the proof is general and applies not only to
Algorithm 3.6, but to any refreshing scheme at any other order built according to the
description aforementioned. In Lemma 3.14 we show that the new refreshing scheme
is t− SNI.
Lemma 3.13. Let R′1, . . . , R′N be a set of N multiplication schemes as in Algorithm 2.3
or Algorithm 3.6, with inputs a(1), . . . ,a(N) and outputs c(1), . . . ,c(N). Suppose that the
maskings of the inputs are independent and uniformly chosen, and that for k = 1, . . . ,N






1, . . . , R′N are t− SCR.
Proof. Let Ω = (P1, . . . ,PN ) be a set of t observations respectively on R′1, . . . , R′N .
We show that R′1, . . . , R′N satisfy Definition 3.4, i.e., that the probes in Pk can be
consistently simulated by at most n−1 shares of the inputs of R′k, for each k = 1, . . . ,N .
Suppose p1, . . . ,pt are t adversary’s probes. We indicate with rpi the vector of the
respective randomness for every i= 1, . . . , t and we classify such pi in the following groups:
(1) ∃j ∈ [1, t] such that rpi = rpj
(2) ∃j ∈ [1, t] such that rpi ⊂ rpj
(3) ∀j ∈ [1, t]rpi ∩rpj = ∅
(4) rpi = 0
(5) ∃j ∈ [1, t] such that rpj ⊂ rpi and
⋃
j rpj = rpi
(6) ∀j ∈ [1, t] such that rpj ⊂ rpi :
⋃
j rpj 6= rpi .
We define now the sets I1, . . . , IN and J1, . . . ,JN with |Ii| ≤ |Pi| and |Ji| ≤ |Pi| for every
i = 1, . . . ,N such that the values of the wires ph can be perfectly simulated given the
values (a(1)i )i∈I1 , (b
(1)
i )i∈J1 , . . . ,(a
(N)
i )i∈IN , (b
(N)
i )i∈JN . The procedure to construct the
sets is the following:
• For every wire in group (1), (2), (4) or (5), add the index of the shares of a(j) in Ij .
We note that, since for every probe we add at most one input share, |Ij | ≤ |Pi| for all j.
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We now proceed with the simulation, consistently with the randomness involved.
• First of all, we pick at random every component of rpi .
• Then we simulate every probe, by using the respective vector of random bits
defined in the first phase and by using the share of the input (a(j)i )i∈Ij , which exist
by construction.
This completes the proof.
Lemma 3.14. The refreshing scheme in Algorithm 3.6 is t− SNI.
Proof. We now prove the t− SNI property of R′.
Let Ω = (I,O) be a set of t observations respectively on the internal and on the output
wires, where |I|= t1 and in particular t1 + |O| ≤ t.
We can classify the internal wires in the following groups:
(1) ai
(2) ai+ rh, airh+ rk, airh+ rk + rl
(3) ci = airh+ rk + rl+ rm
Suppose an adversary observes at most t wires w1, . . . ,wt. We define two sets I with |I|< t1
such that the values of the wires wh can be perfectly simulated given the values (ai)i∈I .
The procedure to construct the sets is the following:
• Initially I is empty and the wi unassigned.
• For every wire in the group (1), (2), (3), (4) add i to I.
Note that by construction |I| ≤ t1.
We now proceed with the simulation of the wires wh, using only the input shares (ai)i∈I .
• For each observation as in the group (1), i ∈ I and then by definition of I the
simulator has access to the value of ai.
• For each observation as in the group (2), by construction i ∈ I and if all the random
bits have been probes, we can pick rh (resp. rh, rk, or rh, rk, rl) at random and
simulate the value by using the share ai. On the other hand, if there exists at least
one random value which has not been observed, the probe can be sampled uniformly
at random.
As for the output wires, we distinguish two cases. If some partial sum has already been
observed, we remark that each output share involves the computation of t random bits
and each of them appears a second time in a different output share. Therefore, since we
have at most t−1 additional probes to the current one, there exists at least one random
value which has not been observed, the probe can be sample uniformly at random.
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3.4. First-order security with constant amount of randomness
The first order ISW scheme is not particularly expensive in terms of randomness because
it uses only one random bit. Unfortunately, when composed in more complicated circuits,
the randomness involved increases with the size of the circuit, since we need fresh
randomness for each gadget. Our idea is to avoid injecting new randomness in each
multiplication and, instead, use alternatively the same random bits in all gadgets. We
aim at providing a lower bound to the minimum number of bits needed in total to protect
any circuit. Moreover, we show a matching upper bound, i.e., that it is possible to obtain
a 1-probing secure private circuit, which uses only a constant amount of randomness. We
emphasize that this means that the construction uses randomness that is independent of
the circuit size, and, in particular, uses only 2 random bits in total per execution.
We will present a modified version of the usual gadgets for refreshing, multiplication,
and the linear ones, which, in place of injecting new randomness, use a value taken from
a set of two bits chosen at the beginning of each evaluation of the masked algorithm.
We will design these schemes such that they will produce outputs depending on at most
one random bit and such that every value in the circuit will be of a fixed form. The
most challenging gadgets to treat are the multiplication and refreshing, as they are
randomized and so responsible for the accumulation of randomness. On the other hand,
even though the gadget for the addition does not use random bits, it will be subjected
to some modifications as well, in order to avoid malicious situations that the reusing of
the same random bits in the circuit can cause. As for the other linear gadgets, such as
the powers .2, .4, and so on, they will be not affected by any change but will perform as
usual share-wise computation.
We proceed by showing step by step the strategy to construct such circuits. First, we
fix a set of bits R= {r0, r1} where r0 and r1 are taken uniformly at random. The first
randomized gadget of the circuit does not need to be substantially modified because there
is no accumulation of randomness to be avoided yet. The only difference with the usual
multiplication and refreshing gadgets is that, in place of the random component, we need
to use one of the random bits in R, as shown in Algorithm 3.7 and Algorithm 3.8.
Secondly, we analyze the different configurations that an element can take when not
Algorithm 3.7 SecMult case (i)
Input: a1,a2 such that a1 +a2 = a, b1, b2 such that b1 + b2 = b
Output: rk, ci depending on a random number rk ∈R such that c1 + c2 = a · b
1: rk
$←R;
2: c1← a1b1 + (a1b2 + rk);
3: c2← a2b1 + (a2b2− rk);
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Algorithm 3.8 Refreshing case (i)
Input: a1,a2 such that a1 +a2 = a
Output: rk, ci depending on the random number rk ∈R such that c1 + c2 = a
1: rk
$←R;
2: c1← a1 + rk;
3: c2← a2− rk;
more than one randomized gadget has been executed, i.e., when only one random bit has
been used in the circuit. The categories listed below represent the different forms that
such an element takes if it is respectively the first input of the circuit, the output of the
first refreshing scheme as in Algorithm 2.3, and the one of the first ISW multiplication
scheme as in Algorithm 2.2 with inputs x and y:
(1) a = (a1,a2);
(2) a = (a1 + r,a2− r), where r is a random bit in R;
(3) a = (x1y1 +x1y2 + r,x2y1 +x2y2− r), where r is a random bit in R.
This categorization is important because, according to the different forms of the values
that the second randomized gadget takes in input, the scheme accumulates randomness
in different ways. Therefore, we need to modify the gadgets by taking into account the
various possibilities for the inputs, i.e., distinguish if:
(i) both the inputs are in category (1);
(ii) the first input is as in category (1), i.e., a = (a1,a2), and the second one in category
(2), i.e., b = (b1 + r1, b2− r1);
(iii) the first input is as in category (1), i.e., a = (a1,a2), and the second one in category
(3), i.e., b = (c1d1 + c1d2 + r1, c2d1 + c2d2− r1);
(iv) the first input is in category (3), i.e., a = (c1d1 + c1d2 + r0, c2d1 + c2d1− r0), and
second one in category (2), i.e., b = (b1 + r1, b2− r1);
(v) both inputs are in category (2), i.e., a = (a1 + r1,a2− r1) and b = (b1 + r0, b2− r0);
(vi) both inputs values are in category (3), i.e., a = (c1d1 + c1d2 + r1, c2d1 + c2d2− r1)
and b = (c′1d′1 + c′1d′2 + r0, c′2d′1 + c′2d′2− r0).
where, for the moment, we suppose that the two inputs depend on two different random
bits each. A more general scenario will be analyzed later. The goal of having the
modified gadgets presented below is not only to reuse the same random bits, avoiding
an accumulation at every execution, but also to produce outputs in the groups (1), (2)
or (3), in order to keep such a configuration of the wires unchanged everywhere in the
circuit. In this way, we guarantee that every wire depends only on one random bit and
that we can use the same multiplication schemes in the entire circuit. According to this
remark, we modify the ISW as depicted in Algorithm 3.9 and Algorithm 3.10.
It is easy to prove that the new multiplication algorithms are such that their outputs
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Algorithm 3.9 SecMult case (ii) and (iii)
Input: a1,a2 such that a1 +a2 = a, b1, b2 depending on a random number ri ∈R such
that b1 + b2 = b, the set R= {r0, r1}, ri
Output: r1−i, ci depending on the random number r1−i such that c1 + c2 = a · b
1: c1← a1b1 + (a1b2 + r1−i);
2: c2← a2b1 + (a2b2− r1−i);
Algorithm 3.10 SecMult case (iv), (v) and (vi)
Input: a1,a2 depending on the random number ri such that a1 +a2 = a, b1, b2 depending
on the random number r1−i satisfying b1 + b2 = b, the set R= {r0, r1}
Output: , r1−i, ci depending on the random number r1−i ∈R satisfying c1 + c2 = a · b
1: δ←−r1−i;
2: δ← δ+ rib1;
3: δ← δ+ rib2;
4: c1← a1b1 + (a1b2− δ);
5: c2← a2b1 + (a2b2 + δ);
always belong to group (3).
Lemma 3.15. Let a and b be two input values of Algorithm 3.9 or of Algorithm 3.10.
Then, the output value e = SecMult(a,b) is of the form (3).
Proof. We show the proof of the lemma for the more complicated case of Algorithm 3.10.
Case (iv): Let a = (c1d1 + c1d2 + r0, c2d1 + c2d2− r0) and b = (b1 + r1, b2− r1). Then,
according to Algorithm 3.10, the output e = a · b is such that:
e1 = (c1d1 + c1d2 + r0)(b1 + r1) + ((c1d1 + c1d2 + r0)(b2− r1)− (r1 + r0b1 + r0b2))
= c1d1b1 + c1d2b1 + (c1d1b2 + c1d2b2 + r1)
e2 = (c2d1 + c2d2− r0)(b1 + r1) + ((c2d1 + c2d2− r0)(b2− r1) + (r1 + r0b1 + r0b2))
= c2d1b1 + c2d1b1 + (c2d1b2 + c2d2b2− r1)
Then e is in category (3).
Case (v): Let a= (a1 +r1,a2−r1) and b= (b1 +r0, b2−r0), then the product SecMult(a,b) is
e1 = (a1 + r1)(b1 + r0) + ((a1 + r1)(b2− r0)− (r0 + r1b1 + r1b2))
= a1b1 +a1r0 +a1b2−a1r0 + r0
e2 = (a2− r1)(b1 + r0) + ((a2− r1)(b2− r0) + (r0 + r1b1 + r1b2))
= a2b1 +a2r0 +a2b2−a2r0 + r0
and then it is in category (3).
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Algorithm 3.11 Modified refreshing R′
Input: a1,a2 such that a1 +a2 = a depending on a random bit ri, the value ri
Output: r1−i, ci depending on the random number r1−i such that c1 + c2 = a
1: c1← (a1 + r1−i)− ri;
2: c2← (a2− r1−i) + ri;
Case (vi): Let us suppose that a = (c1d1 + c1d2 + r1, c2d1 + c2d2− r1) and that b =
(c′1d′1 + c′1d′2 + r0, c′2d′1 + c′2d′2− r0). Then the product e = SecMult(a,b) is:
e1 = (c1d1 + c1d2 + r1)(c′1d′1 + c′1d′2 + r0) + ((c1d1 + c1d2 + r1)(c′2d′1 + c′2d′2− r0)
− (r0 + r1c′1d′1 + r1c′1d′2 + r1c′2d′1 + r1c′2d′2))
= c1d1c′1d′1 + c1d1c′1d′2 + c1d2c′1d′1 + c1d2c′1d′2 + c1d1c′2d′1 + c1d1c′2d′2 + c1d2c′2d′1 + c1d2c′2d′2 + r0
e2 = (c2d1 + c2d2− r1)(c′1d′1 + c′1d′2 + r0) + ((c2d1 + c2d2− r1)(c′2d′1 + c′2d′2− r0)
+ (r0 + r1c′1d′1 + r1c′1d′2 + r1c′2d′1 + r1c′2d′2))
= c2d1c′1d′1 + c2d1c′1d′2 + c2d2c′1d′1 + c2d2c′1d′2 + c2d1c′2d′1 + c2d1c′2d′2 + c2d2c′2d′1 + c2d2c′2d′2 + r0
and then it is in category (3).
As specified before, in the previous analysis we are supposed to have as input to the
multiplication schemes values depending on different random bits. Since this is not always
the case in practice, we need to introduce a modified refreshing scheme, which replaces
the random bit on which the input depends, with the other random bit of the set R. The
scheme is presented in Algorithm 3.11, and it has to be employed every time one of the
input values of a multiplication scheme depends on the same randomness. Algorithm 3.11
is also useful before an addition gadget with inputs depending on the same random bit
because it avoids that the randomness cancels out. The proof of correctness is quite
straightforward, therefore we provide only an exemplary proof for a value in category (3).
Lemma 3.16. Let a be an input value of the form (3) depending on a random bit ri ∈R
for Algorithm 3.11. Then the output value e :=R′(a) is of the form (3) and depends on
the random bit r1−i.
Proof. Suppose without loss of generality that the input a depends on the random bit r1,
so that a = (c1d1 + c1d2 + r0, c2d1 + c2d1− r0). Then the output e :=R′(a) is:
e1 = (c1d1 + c1d2 + r0 + r1)− r0 = c1d1 + c1d2 + r1
e2 = (c2d1 + c2d1− r0− r1) + r0 = c2d1 + c2d1− r1
completing the proof.
Lastly, in Algorithm 3.12 we define a new scheme for addition, which allows to have
outputs in one of the three categories (1), (2) or (3). Note that, thanks to the use of the
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Algorithm 3.12 Modified addition Add′
Input: a1,a2 such that a1 +a2 = a depending on a random bit ri,
Input: b1, b2 such that b1 + b2 = b depending on a random bit r1−i
Output: rk ∈R, ci depending on the random bit rk such that c1 + c2 = a+ b
1: rk
$←R;
2: c1← a1 + b1− rk;
3: c2← a2 + b2 + rk;
refreshing R′, we can avoid having a dependence on the same random bit in the input
of an addition gadget. The proof of correctness is again quite simple and therefore we
provide only an exemplary proof for inputs as in case (iv).
Lemma 3.17. Let a and b be two input values of Algorithm 3.12 as in case (iv). Then
the output value e := Add′(a,b) is in category (2).
Proof. Suppose without loss of generality that the first input depends on r0 and the
second one on r1 and that the value rk picked at random in R during the execution of
Algorithm 3.12 is r1. Let a = (c1d1 + c1d2 + r0, c2d1 + c2d1− r0) and b = (b1 + r1, b2− r1).
Then according to Algorithm 3.12 the output e := Add′(a,b) is:
e1 = c1d1 + c1d2 + r0 + b1 + r1− r0 = c1d1 + c1d2 + b1 + r1
e2 = c2d1 + c2d1− r0 + b2− r1 + r0 = c1d1 + c1d2 + b1− r1
completing the proof.
In conclusion, we notice that by using the schemes above and composing them according
to the instructions just given, we obtain a circuit where each wire carries a value of a fixed
form (i.e., in one of the categories (1), (2) or (3)). Consequently, we can always use one of
the multiplication schemes given in the Algorithms 3.7, 3.9, and 3.10 without accumulating
randomness and without the risk of canceling the random bits out. Furthermore, it is
easy to see that all the schemes just presented are secure against a 1-probing attack.
Counterexample for the 1-bit randomness case
In the following we show that it is impossible in general to have a 1st-order probing
secure circuit, which uses only 1 bit of randomness in total. In particular, we present a
counterexample which breaks the security of a circuit using only one random bit.
Let us restrict our attention to the F2 field and consider c and c′ two outputs of two
multiplication schemes between the values a, b and a′, b′ respectively, and let r be the
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Figure 3.6.: Example of composition where the randomness can completely cancel out
only random bit which is used in the entire circuit. Then c and c′ are of the form{
c1 = a1b1⊕a1b2⊕ r
c2 = a2b1⊕a2b2⊕ r
and
{
c′1 = a′1b′1⊕a′1b′2⊕ r
c′2 = a′2b′1⊕a′2b′2⊕ r
.
Suppose now that these two values are inputs of an additive gadget, as in Figure 3.6.
Such a gadget could either use no randomness at all and just add the components to
each other, or involve in the computation the bit r maintaining the correctness. In the
first case we obtain
c1⊕ c′1 = a1b1⊕a1b2⊕a′1b′1⊕a′1b′2 = a1b⊕a′1b′
c2⊕ c′2 = a2b1⊕a2b2⊕a′2b′1⊕a′2b′2 = a2b⊕a′2b′
and then the randomness r will be completely canceled out, revealing the secret. In the
second case, if we inject in the computation another r, then, in whatever point of the
computation we put it, it will cancel out again one of the two r revealing one of the
secrets during the computation of the output. For example, we can have
c1⊕ c′1 = r⊕a1b1⊕a1b2⊕ r⊕a′1b′1⊕a′1b′2⊕ r = a1b⊕a′1b′1⊕a′1b′2⊕ r
c2⊕ c′2 = r⊕a2b1⊕a2b2⊕ r⊕a′2b′1⊕a′2b′2⊕ r = a2b⊕a′2b′1⊕a′2b′2⊕ r
In view of this counterexample, we can conclude that the minimum number of random
bits needed in order to have a 1st-order private circuit is 2.
3.5. Case study: AES
To evaluate the impact of our methodology on the performance of protected imple-
mentations, we present the implementation of the AES-128 without and with common
randomness performed in [FPS17]. In particular, we consider the inversion of each Sbox
call as a block of gadgets Gi=1,...,200 using the same random components and the last
multiplication of each of these inversions is using fresh randomness. We use Rivain and
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Figure 3.7.: Non-linear part of the AES S-box with the insertion of the Ind gadget
Prouff’s algorithms chain from [Cor+13; RP10], depicted in Figure 2.6. For the imple-
mentation without common randomness, we use the multiplication algorithm from [RP10]
and the refreshing from [DDF14] (cf. Algorithm 2.3). To enable the use of common
randomness, we replace the multiplication with our t− SCR multiplication schemes, and
we place the Ind gadgets where needed. In particular, since the inputs of the first call of
the inversion are independent, we do not need to add Ind before the first multiplication
scheme with common randomness, while this is needed for the next multiplications in
the circuit. On the other hand, the last multiplication scheme of each inversion needs to
be completely refreshed, because the insertion of the gadgets Ind for guaranteeing the
independence of the inputs would make the circuit insecure and not t− SNI. For this
reason, the outputs of each inversion are independent again and the S-box is composable.
Therefore the same procedure can be used for each round. The algorithm is depicted in
Figure 3.7 and Lemma 3.18 shows its security.
Lemma 3.18. Gadget .254, depicted in Figure 3.7, is t− SNI.
Proof. Let Ω = (⋃1≤i≤11,O) be a set of t probes such that ∑1≤i≤11 |Ii| ≤ t1 |O|+ t1 ≤ t.
In the following, we show the existence of a simulator which simulates the probes by
using at most t1 internal values. The simulation is processed from right to left, according
to the enumeration in Figure 3.7.
Gadget 1: Since Mult is t− SNI and |I1∪O|≤ t, then there exist two sets of indexes S11
and S12 such that |S11 | ≤ |I1|, |S12 | ≤ |I1| and the gadget can be perfectly simulated from
its input shares corresponding to the indexes in S11 and S12 .
Gadget 2: Since Mult is t− SNI and |I2∪S12 | ≤ t, then there exist two sets of indexes
S21 and S22 such that |S21 | ≤ |I2|, |S22 | ≤ |I2| and the gadget can be perfectly simulated
from its input shares corresponding to the indexes in S21 and S22 .
Gadget 3: Since .16 is a linear gadget, then there exists a set of indexes S3 such that
|S3| ≤ |I3|+ |S21 | ≤ |I3|+ |I2| and the gadget can be perfectly simulated from its input
shares corresponding to the indexes in S3.
Gadget 4: Since Ind is t− NI then there exists a set of indexes S4 such that |S4| ≤
|I4|+ |S3| ≤ |I4|+ |I3|+ |I2| and the gadget can be perfectly simulated from its input
shares corresponding to the indexes in S4.
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W/o Common Randomness W/ Common Randomness
t n Mult. Refresh n Mult. Refresh
1 2 1 1 2 1 1
2 3 3 3 3 3 3
3 4 6 6 4 6 6
4 5 10 10 7 18 14
5 6 15 15 7 21 18
Table 3.2.: Number of random elements required for the multiplication and refresh algo-
rithms with and without common randomness from t= 1 to t= 5
Gadget 5: Since Mult is t− SNI and |I5 ∪S4| ≤ t, then there exist two sets of
indexes S51 and S52 such that |S51 | ≤ |I5|, |S52 | ≤ |I5| and the gadget can be perfectly
simulated from its input shares corresponding to the indexes in S51 and S52 .
Gadget 6: Since R is t− SNI and |I6∪S52 | ≤ t, then there exist a set of indexes S6
such that |S6| ≤ |I6| and the gadget can be perfectly simulated from its input shares
corresponding to the indexes in S6.
Gadget 7: Since .4 is a linear gadget then there exists a set of indexes S7 such that
|S7| ≤ |I7|+ |S6| ≤ |I7|+ |I6| and the gadget can be perfectly simulated from its input
shares corresponding to the indexes in S7.
Gadget 8: Since Ind is t− NI then there exists a set of indexes S8 such that |S8| ≤
|I8|+ |S7| ≤ |I8|+ |I7|+ |I6| and the gadget can be perfectly simulated from its input
shares corresponding to the indexes in S8.
Gadget 9: Since Mult is t− SNI and |I9 ∪S8| ≤ t, then there exist two sets of
indexes S91 and S92 such that |S91 | ≤ |I9|, |S92 | ≤ |I9| and the gadget can be perfectly
simulated from its input shares corresponding to the indexes in S91 and S92 .
Gadget 10: Since R is t− SNI and |I10∪S91 | ≤ t, then there exist a set of indexes S10
such that |S10| ≤ |I10| and the gadget can be perfectly simulated from its input shares
corresponding to the indexes in S10.
Gadget 11: Since .2 is linear then there exists a set of indexes S11 such that |S11| ≤
|I11|+ |S10| ≤ |I11|+ |I10| and the gadget can be perfectly simulated from its input shares
corresponding to the indexes in S11.
Each of the previous steps show the existence of a simulator each of the respective
gadgets and by composing them we obtain a global simulator of the entire circuit which
uses |S11∪S92 | shares of the input. Since |S11∪S92 | ≤ I11|+ |I10|+ |I9| ≤ t1 we conclude
that the gadget .254 is t− SNI.
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Without Common Randomness With Common Randomness
TRNG Cycle Count TRNG Cycle Count
t n Calls TRNG32 TRNG8 n Calls TRNG32 TRNG8
2 2 73,441 73,560
1 2 1,200 112,919 187,519 2 605 86,137 99,334
2 3 3,600 308,600 548,477 3 1,415 200,423 230,334
3 4 7,200 496,698 1,089,092 4 2,430 292,579 412,523
Table 3.3.: Cycle counts of our AES implementations on an ARM Cortex-M4F with
TRNG32. In addition, we provide the required number of calls to the TRNG
for each t
Table 3.2 summarizes the randomness requirements of both types of refresh and
multiplication algorithms presented in the chapter. We point out that the implementation
of the S-box is performed only up to order t= 3, since the schemes for higher orders are
only weakly t− SCR, and therefore cannot be composed while sharing randomness.
In [FPS17], both types of protected AES were implemented on an ARM Cortex-
M4F running at 168 MHz using C. The random components were generated using
the TRNG of the evaluation board (STM32F4 DISCOVERY) which generates 32 bits
of randomness every 40 clock cycles running in parallel at 48 MHz. To assess the
influence of the TRNG performance on the result, the authors considered two modes of
operation for the randomness generation: a fast TRNG32 and a slower TRNG8. The problem
of randomness generation affects a majority of implementations independently of the
degree of optimization and can pose a bottleneck, especially if no dedicated TRNG is
available. Therefore, the performance results provided can be transferred to other types
of implementations and platforms. As shown in Table 3.3, the implementations with
common randomness requires fewer calls to the TRNG.
For the special case of t= 1, we presented a solution (cf. Section 3.4) with constant
randomness independent of the circuit size. Following the aforementioned procedure, we
realized a 1-probing secure AES implementation with only two TRNG calls. Overall, the
implementation using the constant randomness scheme requires less cycles than the one
with common randomness. In general, however, this advantage strongly depends on the
performance of the TRNG as the implementation with constant randomness requires




We proposed the new security notions of t− SCR and weak- t− SCR, for gadgets that
have part of the internal randomness in common. The new definition provides the
requisites to reuse randomness securely among multiple gadgets (or sets of gadgets). We
showed a method to design multiplication schemes secure under these notions. Since
the number of n for our t− SCR multiplication grows in O(t2) and our multiplication
algorithm (resp. R) requires O(n2) (resp. O(nt)) random elements, the practicability of
our proposed methodology becomes limited for increasing t. An additional limitation
is given by the fact that it is possible to build t− SCR multiplication schemes only
up to order 3. Nevertheless, our case study showed that for small t ≤ 3 our approach
results in significant performance improvement for the masked implementations. The
improvement factor could potentially be even larger, if we replace our efficient TRNG
with a common PRNG.
Another interesting aspect for future work is designing an automatic application of our
methodology to an arbitrary circuit. While we showed how to use our methodology on
a circuit with a layered structure which contains easily-exploitable regularities, further
research might be able to derive an algorithm which finds the optimal grouping for any
given design. This would help to create a compiler which automatically applies masking
to an unprotected architecture in the most efficient way removing the requirement for a
security-literate implementer and reducing the chance for human error.
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4. Randomness optimization in Inner
Product masking
In this chapter, we move our attention to another type of masking scheme, that exhibits a
higher security level, at the cost of reduced performances: the Inner Product (IP) masking.
Motivations
As already mentioned before in this work, the most employed masking scheme in protected
implementations is the Boolean masking, thanks to its simplicity and comparably low
complexity overheads. Nevertheless, several works have proposed masking schemes using
alternative encoding functions. Such different masking schemes can be compared to
each other by using the framework proposed in [SMY09]. According to it, the mutual
information between a secret variable and its corresponding leakages can serve as a
figure of merit for side-channel security, since it is proportional to the success rate of a
(worst-case) Bayesian adversary exploiting these leakages (see [DDF14]).
An example of a masking scheme different from the Boolean one is the Inner Product
masking scheme, introduced by Balasch et al. [Bal+12], and based on the inner product
construction of Dziembowski and Faust [DF12]. According to its encoding function, a
sensitive variable S is masked into 2 ·n shares given by two random vectors (L,S) of n
elements each, such that S = 〈L,S〉. Interestingly, applying the evaluations from [SMY09],
it emerges that, for low noise levels, the Inner Product masking achieves lower information
leakage compared to other types of masking at the same security order t. Additionally,
the multiplication scheme proposed in [Bal+12] achieves the complexity of O(n2), hence
similar to the one for Boolean masking. Despite the advantages just mentioned, the first
version of the Inner Product masking suffers from the efficiency point of view since the
addition and refreshing algorithms require larger constant terms than their analogs in
the Boolean masking schemes.
After the first version of the Inner Product masking presented in [DF12], Balasch et
al. in [BFG15] improved the encoding function, by letting L be a public value with first
element L1 = 1. This change reduces the number of secret shares from 2n to n and results
as well in excellent efficiency improvements for all masked operations. Specifically, the
complexity of the addition and refreshing schemes is comparable to those of Boolean
and Polynomial masking schemes. However, the authors did not provide security proofs
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according to the properties of t− NI and t− SNI [Bar+16], which allows to compose the
algorithms securely.
Our work has the goal of increasing the practicality of the Inner Product masking
scheme and providing novel insights into it. Our main contribution is to consolidate the
existing works of Balasch et al. [Bal+12; BFG15], by mainly improving the previous
algorithms in terms of efficiency and security guarantees. Moreover, in [Bal+17], we
provide a further investigation on the information theoretic evaluation of the Inner
Product masking as well as implementation results and experimental evaluations, which
we briefly mention at the end of this chapter.
Contribution
We describe our contribution, focusing on the main concepts.
New efficient algorithms satisfying the t− SNI security property. We propose sim-
plified algorithms for the multiplication operation protected with Inner Product masking.
In contrast to the schemes from [Bal+12; BFG15], out algorithms resemble the schemes
originally proposed by Ishai et al. [ISW03], but handle the Inner Product encoding
function. Thanks to this similarity, they are more efficient and easier to implement than
the schemes in [BFG15]. Additionally, we prove that our new algorithms satisfy the
property of t-Strong Non-Interference (t− SNI) introduced by Barthe et al. [Bar+16],
and hence can be easily composed in a secure circuit.
To give an intuition about how our algorithms work and why they constitute an
improvement over previous schemes, in the following, we shortly present the multiplication
scheme at 2nd order of security. In particular, we start by recalling the multiplication
scheme introduced in [BFG15], in order to underline the main differences with ours.
Every masked implementation initially starts by a set-up phase, where we define a
random vector L, whose first component is set to 1 and all the others are non zero random
elements in a field K of characteristic 2. The two inputs A,B ∈ K of the multiplication
scheme are masked as A = (A1,A2,A3) and B = (B1,B2,B3) such that A= 〈L,A〉 and
B= 〈L,B〉. The encoded output of the multiplication between A and B is C = (C1,C2,C3)
and it is defined as in Figure 4.1, where the elements Ui,j , with i, j = 1,2,3, are sampled
uniformly at random from the field K. The algorithm requires the use of n2 = 9 random
elements, additionally to the ones used in the set-up phase.
In order to improve the efficiency of such a multiplication scheme, we completely
change the algorithm in [BFG15], and we rather follow an approach analog to the one of
Ishai et al. [ISW03]. Similarly, first we construct a matrix containing all the products
of the input shares Ai ·Bj , and a symmetric matrix of random elements. Then, we sum
component-wise the matrices, and we assign the sum of the elements on each row to



































Figure 4.1.: Multiplication scheme by [BFG15] for t= 2 with inputs A,B and output C
main challenge with respect to the Boolean masking is to take into account the vector L,
such that the correctness holds, i.e., that C = 〈L,A〉 · 〈L,B〉. To this end, we multiply
each AiBj with Lj , and each random element U ′i,j with Li and −U ′i,j with Lj . Our new
multiplication scheme, which we name IPMult(1)L , is depicted in Figure 4.2, where the
elements U ′i,j , with i= 1,2 and j = 2,3, are sampled at random from the field K. The
correctness comes from the following calculation:
〈L,C〉=L1C1 +L2C2 +L3C3 =
=L1(V1,1 +V1,2 +V1,3) +L2(V2,1 +V2,2 +V2,3) +L3(V3,1 +V3,2 +V3,3) =
=L1(A1B1 +A1B2 +A1B3 +U ′1,2L−11 +U ′1,3L−11 ) +L2(A2B1L1−U ′1,2L−12 +A2B2L2
+U ′2,3L−12 +A2B3L3) +L3(A3B1L1−U ′1,3L−13 +A3B2L3−U ′2,3L−13 +A3B3L3)
=L1(A1B1 +A1B2L2 +A1B3L3) +L2(A2B1 +A2B2L2 +A2B3L3)
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Figure 4.2.: New IPMult(1) for t= 2 with inputs A,B and output C
+L3(A3B1 +A3B2L2 +A3B3L3) +U ′1,2 +U ′1,3−U ′1,2 +U ′2,3−U ′1,3−U ′2,3
=(L1A1 +L2A2 +L3A3)(L1B1 +L2B2 +L3B3) = 〈L,A〉〈L,B〉
It is easy to see that in our IPMult(1)L algorithm there is a drop in the use of randomness
compared to the algorithm in [BFG15]. In particular, our scheme employes only n(n−1)2 = 3
random elements, in contrast to the n2 = 9 needed in [BFG15].
To this first contribution, we add a second multiplication algorithm, IPMult(2), that
shows better efficiency when composed with linear operations. Concretely, when we want
to compose a multiplication with a linear function g of one of its inputs, then, in order to
guarantee independence between the inputs of the multiplication, we can use IPMult(1)L
and require an additional refreshing operation at the output of g, or we use our new
algorithm IPMult(2)L that eliminates the need for the additional refreshing. We will see
that this strategy can save at least O(n2) random elements.
Again, we briefly show the algorithm at 2nd security order. The input B is represented
by g(A), i.e., the evaluation of a linear function g on the first input A. The core of our
idea is to internally refresh the input A by adding to each share Ai a random element
uj such that the inputs become independent. The rest of the computation is the same
as IPMult(1)L , with the only difference that, before generating the matrix of the Vi,j , we
need to add a matrix of elements g(Aj)ujLj and 0 on the diagonal, which guarantees
the correctness. The complete algorithm is represented in Figure 4.3. We point out
that our approach requires only n extra random elements. On the other hand, if we use
the IPMult(1)L we need to additionally refresh one of the inputs via a t− SNI refreshing
scheme, which means using n(n−1) extra random elements.
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Figure 4.3.: New IPMult(2) for t= 2 with inputs A,B and output C
Complementary analysis from [Bal+17]. We discuss the comprehensive analysis con-
ducted in [Bal+17]on our new construction and Inner Product masking in general. The
implementation results show a reduction in the execution times by approximately 60%
(for 2 shares) and 55% (for 3 shares) compared to earlier works [BFG15]. Tn information
theoretic evaluation, that examines the mutual information between a secret variable and
its corresponding leakages, shows that, in some cases, the increased algebraic complexity
of Inner Product masking gives a good impact on the security order in the bounded
moment model. Finally, the leakage detection techniques adopted in the experimental
evaluations reveal that Inner Product masking present notably less evidence of leakage
than Boolean masking.
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Related work
Several other works in the literature study countermeasures against SCA based on other
types of masking schemes, than the popular Boolean masking. Von Willich [von01]
proposed the Affine masking, which encodes a variable X as S =R1 ·X+R2, where R1
is a uniformly distributed non-zero multiplicative mask and R2 a uniformly distributed
additive mask. The advantage of their masking scheme is based on the observation
that a higher algebraic complexity of the shares results in reduced information leakage.
Fumaroli et al. [Fum+10] present an implementation of the AES using Affine masking,
which shows performance results similar to the ones of Boolean masking. However, a
drawback of Affine masking is that it has not been generalized to high-order.
Another proposed different type of masking is the Polynomial masking. Independently
introduced by Prouff and Roche [PR11] and Goubin and Martinelli [GM11], it is based on
Shamir’s secret-sharing [Sha79] and secure multi-party computation techniques [BGW88].
Every sensitive variable X is associated to a polynomial of degree the security order t
of the form pX =X+
∑t
i=1ai ·Xi, where the ai are random secret coefficients. In order
to encode X we select n distinct non-zero elements αi and evaluate Xi = pX(αi) for
i = 1, . . . ,n. The mask of X consists of (α1,X1), . . . ,(αn,Xn). The decoding process
consists in the computation of S =∑ni=1Xi ·βi, where the coefficients βi are computed
from the public αi. The multiplication algorithms presented in the two papers, despite
different from each others, have the same complexity in the number of shares, which is
O(n3). Later in [Cor+13], Coron et al. improved this complexity to O(n2) by using the
discrete Fourier transform for fast polynomial evaluation, achieving the same complexity
of Boolean masking.
Notation
In the following we denote by K a field of characteristic 2. We denote with upper-case
letters the elements of the field K and with bold notation the elements of the K-vector
space. The field multiplication is represented by the dot · while the standard inner
product over K is denoted as 〈X,Y〉=∑iXi ·Yi, where Xi and Yi are the components of
the vectors X and Y.
4.1. A new multiplication scheme for IP masking
We present in this section the algorithms for the protection of a circuit using the Inner
Product masking, and, in particular, we show the first of our new multiplication schemes.
Each masked implementation is associated to a vector L, which is a fixed but random
non-zero parameter with first component L1 = 1. We recall that the Inner Product
encoding of a variable S ∈K consists of a vector S ∈Kn such that S = 〈L,S〉. Concretely,
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the algorithms for initialization and masking are depicted in the IPSetup and Encode
procedures. The subroutine rand(K) samples an element uniformly at random from the
field K. The algorithm for addition is kept the same as in [BFG15] and it is depicted in
Algorithm 4.3.
As for the refreshing scheme, we use the one from [BFG15], IPRefreshL represented
in Algorithm 4.4, which was proven to be t−probing secure, and we design a new t− SNI
refreshing SecIPRefreshL. This essentially consists of the execution of IPRefreshL n
times. In [BFG15] the authors already remarked that such a scheme ensures security
even if composed with other gadgets, but no formal proof was provided. In the following
we formally analyze the security of the algorithm, by giving the proof of t− SNI.
As for the multiplication, we propose a new scheme IPMult(1) in Algorithm 4.6. The
symbol δij corresponds to the element 0 when i = j and 1 otherwise. The scheme
achieves t− SNI security. Our starting point for the construction of the algorithm is the
multiplication scheme from [ISW03]. We reuse the idea of summing the matrix of the
products of the inputs with a symmetric matrix of random elements, in order to compute
the shares of the output in a secure way. In particular we design these two matrices (T
and U′ in the algorithm) to be consistent with our different masking scheme.
The correctness of the scheme is proved in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1 (Correctness). For any L,A,B ∈ Kn and C = IPMult(1)L (A,B), we have
〈L,C〉= 〈L,A〉 · 〈L,B〉.








































Algorithm 4.1 Setup the masking scheme: L← IPSetupn(K)
Input: field description K
Output: random vector L
1: L1 = 1;
2: for i= 2 to n do
3: Li← rand(K\{0});
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Algorithm 4.2 Masking a variable: S← EncodeL(S)
Input: variable S ∈ K
Output: vector S such that S = 〈L,S〉
1: for i= 2 to n do
2: Si← rand(K);
3: S1 = S+
∑n
i=2Li ·Si;
Algorithm 4.3 Add masked values: C← Add(A,B)
Input: vector A,B
Output: vector C such that 〈L,C〉= 〈L,A〉+ 〈L,B〉
1: for i= 1 to n do
2: Ci←Ai+Bi;
Security analysis
We analyze the security of our new multiplication scheme in the t-probing model, and in
particular we prove the stronger property of t–Strong Non-Interference (t− SNI) defined
by Barthe et al. in [Bar+15a] and recalled in Definition 2.5.
The following lemma proves the security of the refreshing scheme SecIPRefreshL.
Lemma 4.2. The algorithm SecIPRefreshL is t− SNI with t= n−1.
Proof. Let Ω = (I,O) be a set of t observations respectively on the internal and on the
output wires, where |I|= t1 and in particular t1 + |O| ≤ t. We point out the existence of
a perfect simulator of the adversary’s probes, which makes use of at most t1 shares of
the secret X.
The internal wires wh are classified as follows:
(1) Xi
(2) Ri,j , which is the component i of the vector R in the jth IPRefreshL
(3) Yi,j =Xi+
∑j
k=1Ri,k, which is the component i of Y in the jth IPRefreshL
We define a set of indices I such that |I| ≤ t1 as follows: for every observation as in group
(1), (2) or (3) add i to I.
Now we construct a simulator that makes use only of (Xi)i∈I .
• For each observation as in group (1), i ∈ I and then by definition of I the simulator
has access to the value of Xi.
• For each observation as in group (2), Ri,j can be sampled uniformly at random.
Indeed, this is what happens in the real execution of the algorithm for the shares Ri,j
with i = 2, . . . ,n. Otherwise, since we have at most n−1 probes, the adversary’s
view of Ri,j is also uniformly random.
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Algorithm 4.4 Refresh vector: X′← IPRefreshL(X) [BFG15]
Input: vector X
Output: vector X′ such that 〈L,X〉= 〈L,X′〉




3: X′ = X+R;
Algorithm 4.5 Refresh vector: Y← SecIPRefreshL(X)
Input: vector X
Output: vector Y such that 〈L,X〉= 〈L,Y〉
1: Y0 = X;
2: for i= 1 to n do
3: Yi = IPRefreshL(Yi−1);
4: Y = Yn;
• For each observation as in group (3), Xi can be perfectly simulated, Ri,j can be
sampled as in the real execution of the algorithm, and then all the partial sums Yi,j
can be computed.
As for the output wires, we distinguish two cases. If some partial sum has already
been observed, we remark that each output share Yi,n involves the computation of n−1
random bits Ri,1, . . . ,Ri,n−1. The situation can be better understood from the following
matrix, which shows the use of the random bits for each output share.
























Now, since the adversary can have just other n−2 observations, there exists at least
one non-observed random bit and we can simulate Yi,n as a uniform and independent
random value. Moreover, if all the partial sums have been observed, we can use the
values previously simulated and add them according to the algorithm. Otherwise, if
no partial sum has been probed, since the random values involved in the computation
of Y1,n, . . . ,Yi−1,n,Yi+1,n, . . . ,Yn,n are picked at random independently from that one of Yi,n,
we can again simulate Yi,n as a uniform and independent random value, completing
the proof.
The following lemma shows the security of the multiplication scheme IPMult(1)L .
81
4. Randomness optimization in Inner Product masking
Algorithm 4.6 Multiply masked values: C← IPMult(1)L (A,B)
Input: vectors A and B of length n
Output: vector C such that 〈L,C〉= 〈L,A〉 · 〈L,B〉
1: . Computation of the matrix T
2: for i= 1 to n do
3: for j = 1 to n do
4: Ti,j =Ai ·Bj ·Lj ;
5: . Computation of the matrices U and U′
6: for i= 1 to n do
7: for j = 1 to n do
8: if i < j then
9: U ′ij ← rand(K);
10: if i > j then
11: U ′i,j =−U ′j,i;
12: Ui,j = U ′i,j · δijL−1i ;
13: . Computation of the matrix V
14: V = T+U;
15: . Computation of the output vector C




Lemma 4.3. The algorithm IPMult(1)L is t− SNI with t= n−1.
Proof. Let Ω = (I,O) be a set of t observations respectively on the internal and on
the output wires, where |I|= t1 and in particular t1 + |O| ≤ t. We construct a perfect
simulator of the adversary’s probes, which makes use of at most t1 shares of the secrets A
and B.
Let w1, . . . ,wt be the probed wires. We classify the internal wires in the following groups:
(1) Ai,Bi,
(2) Ui,j ,U ′i,j ,
(3) Ai ·Bj ,Ti,j ,Vi,j ,
(4) Ci,j , which represents the value of Ci at iteration i, j of the last for loop.
We define two sets of indices I and J such that |I| ≤ t1, |J | ≤ t1 and the values of
the wires wh with h = 1, . . . , t can be perfectly simulated given only the knowledge
of (Ai)i∈I and (Bi)i∈J . The sets are constructed as follows.
• Initially I and J are empty.
• For every wire as in groups (1), (2) and (4), add i to I and to J .
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• For every wire as in group (3) if i /∈ I add i to I and if j /∈ J add j to J .
Since the adversary is allowed to make at most t1 internal probes, we have |I| ≤ t1
and |J | ≤ t1.
We now show how the simulator behaves, by starting to consider the internal ob-
served wires.
1. For each observation as in group (1), by definition of I and J the simulator has
access to Ai and Bi, and therefore the values are perfectly simulated.
2. For each observation as in group (2), we distinguish two possible cases:
• If i ∈ I,J and j /∈ J , the simulator assigns a random and independent value
to U ′i,j : if i < j this is what would happen in the real algorithm, otherwise
since j /∈ J the element U ′ij will never enter into the computation of any wh
(otherwise j would be in J).
• If i ∈ I,J and j ∈ J , the values U ′i,j and U ′j,i can be computed as in the actual
algorithm: one of them (say U ′j,i) is assigned to a random and independent
value and the other U ′i,j to −U ′i,j .
The value Ui,j is computed using the simulated U ′i,j and the public value Li.
3. For each observation as in group (3), by definition of the sets I and J and from the
previous points, the simulator has access to Ai,Aj ,Bi,Bj , to the public value Lj
and Ui,j ,U ′i,j can be simulated. Therefore Ai ·Bj ,Ti,j and Vi,j can be computed as
in the real algorithm.
4. For each observation as in group (4), by definition i∈ I,J . At first we assign a random
value to every summand Vik, with k ≤ j and k /∈ J , entering in the computation of
any observed Cij . Then if one of the addends Vik with k ≤ j composing Cij has been
probed, since by definition k ∈ J , we can simulate it as in Step 3. Otherwise Vik has
been previously assigned at the beginning of the current Step 4.
We now simulate the output wires Ci. We have to take into account two cases. At
first, the case when the attacker has already observed only a partial sum Cij . In
this case the remaining part which has not been simulated is, for 1 < k ≤ n, of the
form ∑nj=k Vi,j = ∑nj=k(Ti,j +Ui,j) if k > i and ∑nj=k Vi,j = ∑nj=k,j 6=i(Ti,j +Ui,j) + Ti,i
otherwise. We note that each Ci depends on the random values in the ith row of the
matrix U′, i.e. U ′il for l < i and U ′li for l > i. In particular each of the U ′il appears a second
time in one of the remaining C1, · · · ,Ci−1,Ci+1, · · · ,Cn, as shown in the following matrix.
0 U ′1,2 U ′1,3 . . . U ′1,n
−U ′1,2 0 U ′2,3 . . . U ′2,n
−U ′1,3 −U ′2,3 0 . . . U ′3,n
...
...
... . . .
...







4. Randomness optimization in Inner Product masking
Since each Ci depends on n−1 random values and the adversary may have probed
at most n−2 of that, then, independently of the intermediate elements probed, at least
one of the U ′il does not enter into the computation of Cij and so Ci can be simulated
as a random value. Moreover, if all the partial sums have been observed, we can use
the values previously simulated and add them according to the algorithm. Finally it
remains to simulate a Ci when no partial sum Cij has been observed. By definition, at
least one of the U ′il involved in the computation of Ci is not used in any other observed
wire. Therefore we can assign a random value to Ci and complete the proof.
4.2. Application to AES S-box
Since IPMult(1)L is proved to be t− SNI, it can easily be composed with other gadgets,
keeping the probing security. In this section, we analyze in detail the algorithm for the
exponentiation to the power 254 in GF(28), i.e., the non-linear part of the AES S-box.
We consider Rivain and Prouff’s algorithms chain from [Cor+13; RP10], depicted in
Figure 2.6.
We recall the squaring routine IPSquareL from [BFG15]in Algorithm 4.7. Considering
that the multiplication gadget IPMult(1)L and the refreshing scheme SecIPRefreshL are
both t− SNI, and since the exponentiations .2, .4 and .16 are linear functions in GF(28), we
can claim that the entire algorithm for the computation of .254, using our schemes for IP
masking, is t− SNI, according to the arguments of the security proof given in [Bar+15a].
4.2.1. A more efficient scheme for dependent inputs
We underline that for achieving (n− 1)th-order security the masked inputs A and B
of IPMult(1)L must be mutually independent. If this is not the case, a refreshing of one of
the factors is needed before processing the multiplication.
In this section we present an extended multiplication scheme IPMult(2)L , illustrated in
Algorithm 4.8, which can securely receive as input two values of the form A and g(A),
where g is a linear function. Thanks to this property, in case of mutual dependence of
the inputs, the refreshing is no longer needed and we can save on the number of random
Algorithm 4.7 Square masked variable: Y← IPSquareL(X)
Input: vector X
Output: vector Y such that 〈L,Y〉= 〈L,X〉 · 〈L,X〉
1: for i= 1 to n do
2: Yi← (Xi)2 ·Li;
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bits. The main idea of the new algorithm is to introduce a vector u sampled at random
at the beginning of the execution and used to internally refresh the shares of the secrets.
The correctness of IPMult(2)L is proved in the following.
Lemma 4.4 (Correctness). For any L,A ∈ Kn and C = IPMult(2)L (A,g(A)), we have
〈L,C〉= 〈L,A〉 · 〈L,g(A)〉.
Proof. First notice that for all i 6= j the following relation holds:
Vi,j = (Ti,j +Ui,j)−B′j =A′i,j ·g(Aj) ·Lj +U ′i,j ·L−1i −g(Aj) ·uj ·Lj
=Ai ·g(Aj) ·Lj +uj ·g(Aj) ·Lj +U ′i,j ·L−1i −g(Aj) ·uj ·Lj
=Ai ·g(Aj) ·Lj +U ′i,j ·L−1i





















(Li ·Ai ·g(Aj) ·Lj +U ′i,j) =
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g(Aj) ·Lj) = 〈L,A〉 · 〈L,g(A)〉
Lemma 4.5 provides the security analysis of IPMult(2)L .
Lemma 4.5. Let g be a linear function over K. The algorithm IPMult(2)L (A,g(A))
is t− SNI, with t= n−1.
Proof. Let Ω = (I,O) be a set of t observations respectively on the internal and on the
output wires, where |I|= t1 and in particular t1 + |O| ≤ t. We point out the existence of
a perfect simulator of the adversary’s probes, which makes use of at most t1 shares of
the secret A.
Let w1, . . . ,wt be the probed wires. We classify the internal wires in the following groups:
(1) Ai,g(Ai),g(Ai) ·ui,B′i,ui
(2) Ui,j ,U ′i,j
(3) A′i,j ,A′i,j ·g(Aj),Ti,j ,Ti,j +Ui,j ,Vi,j
(4) Ci,j , which represents the value of Ci at iteration i, j of the last for
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Algorithm 4.8 Multiply dependent masked values: C← IPMult(2)L (A,g(A))
Input: vector A of length n
Output: vector C satisfying 〈L,C〉=〈L,A〉·〈L,g(A)〉, for g linear function
1: . Sampling at random of the vector u
2: for i= 1 to n do
3: ui← rand(K);
4: . Computation of the matrix A′
5: for i= 1 to n do
6: for j = 1 to n do
7: A′i,j =Ai+ δijuj ;
8: . Computation of the vector B′
9: for i= 1 to n do
10: B′i = g(Ai) ·ui ·Li;
11: . Computation of the matrix T
12: for i= 1 to n do
13: for j = 1 to n do
14: Ti,j =A′i,j ·g(Aj) ·Lj ;
15: . Computation of the matrices U and U′
16: for i= 1 to n do
17: for j = 1 to n do
18: if i < j then
19: U ′ij ← rand(K);
20: if i > j then
21: U ′ij =−U ′ji;
22: Ui,j = U ′i,j · δijL−1i ;
23: . Computation of the matrix V
24: for i= 1 to n do
25: for j = 1 to n do
26: Vi,j = (Ti,j +Ui,j)− δijB′j ;
27: . Computation of the output vector C
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We now define the set of indices I with |I| ≤ t1 such that the wires wh can be perfectly
simulated given only the knowledge of (Ai)i∈I . The procedure for constructing the set is
the following:
• Initially I is empty.
• For every wire as in the groups (1), (2) and (4), add i to I.
• For every wire as in the group (3), if i /∈ I add i to I and if i ∈ I add j to I.
Since the adversary is allowed to make at most t1 internal probes, we have that |I| ≤ t1.
In the simulation phase, at first we assign a random value to every ui entering in the
computation of any observed wh. Then the simulation for all internal wires wh proceeds
as follows.
1. For each observation in category (1), then i ∈ I and by definition we can directly
compute from Ai,ui and the public value Li.
2. For each observation in category (2), then i∈ I and we distinguish two possible cases:
• If j /∈ I, then we can assign a random and independent value to U ′i,j . Indeed
if i < j this is what would happen in the real execution of the algorithm and
if i > j, since j /∈ I, U ′i,j will never be used in the computation of other observed
values. We compute Ui,j using U ′i,j and the public value Li.
• If j ∈ I, the values U ′i,j and U ′j,i can be computed as in the actual circuit:
we assign one of them (say U ′j,i) to a random and independent value and the
other U ′i,j to −U ′i,j . We compute Ui,j using U ′i,j and the public value Li.
3. For each observation in category (3), then i∈ I and we distinguish two possible cases:
• If j /∈ I, then we can assign a random and independent value to wh. Indeed,
since j /∈ I, one of the values composing wh has not been observed (otherwise
by construction j would be in I) and for the same reason also any of the wh
does not enter in the expression of any other observed wire.
• If j ∈ I, the value wh can be perfectly simulated by using the accessible val-
ues Ai,g(Aj),ui,uj ,Li,Lj and the values Ui,j ,U ′i,j assigned in Step 2.
4. For each observation as in the group (4), by definition i ∈ I. At first we assign
a random value to every summand Vik, with k ≤ j and k /∈ I, entering in the
computation of any observed Cij . Then if one of the addends Vik with k ≤ j
composing Cij has been probed, since by definition k ∈ I, we can simulate it as
in Step 3. Otherwise Vik has been previously assigned at the beginning of the
current Step 4.
As for the probed output wires, if the attacker has already observed a partial sum Cij ,
for 1< k ≤ n the remaining non-simulated part is ∑nj=k Vi,j = ∑nj=k(Ti,j +Ui,j)−B′j if
k > i and∑nj=k Vi,j =∑nj=k,j 6=i(Ti,j +Ui,j)−B′j +Ti,i otherwise. Using a similar argument
to the one in the proof of Lemma 4.3, we point out that Ci can be simulated as a random
value. Moreover, if all the partial sums have been observed, we can use the values
87





































Figure 4.4.: Gadget .254 which makes use of IPMult(1)L and IPMult
(2)
L
previously simulated and add them according to the algorithm. Finally, when no partial
sum Cij has been observed, again as before, by definition at least one of the U ′il involved
in the computation of Ci is not used in any other observed wire and then we can assign
to Ci a random value, completing the proof.
We can now exploit this new scheme in the .254 algorithm, by eliminating the first
two refreshing and substituting the first two multiplications with our IPMult(2)L (·, ·2)
and IPMult(2)L (·, ·4), while using in the rest the IPMult
(1)
L . In particular, according to the
squaring routine in Algorithm 4.7, we point out that in IPMult(2)L (·, ·2) the shares g(Ai)
correspond to the products A2i ·Li and in IPMult
(2)
L (·, ·4) the shares g(Ai) correspond to
the products A4i ·Li ·Li ·Li. The implementation of the gadget .254 is depicted in Figure 4.4
and in Lemma 4.6 we prove that it is t− SNI, using the techniques presented in [Bar+15a].
Lemma 4.6. Gadget .254, shown in Figure 4.4, is t− SNI.
Proof. Let Ω = (⋃7i=1Ii,O) a set of t observations respectively on the internal and output
wires, where each Ii refers to the gadget Gi and ∑7i=1 |Ii|+ |O| ≤ t. In the following
we construct a simulator which makes use of at most ∑7i=1 |Ii| shares of the secret, by
simulating each gadget in turn.
Gadget G1: Since IPMult(1)L is t− SNI and |I1∪O| ≤ t, then there exist two sets of
indices S11 ,S12 such that |S11 | ≤ |I1|, |S12 | ≤ |I1| and the gadget can be perfectly simulated
from its input shares corresponding to the indices in S11 and S12 .
Gadget G2: Since IPMult(1)L is t− SNI and |I2∪S12 | ≤ |I1|+ |I2| ≤ t, then there exist
two sets of indices S21 ,S22 such that |S21 | ≤ |I2|, |S22 | ≤ |I2| and the gadget can be perfectly
simulated from its input shares corresponding to the indices in S21 and S22 .
Gadget G3: Since .16 is affine, there exists a set of indices S3 such that its cardinality
is |S3| ≤ |I3|+ |S22 | and the gadget can be perfectly simulated from its input shares
corresponding to the indices in S3.
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IPMult(2)L 4n2 3n2 + 2n
n(n+1)
2
SecIPRefreshL 2n2−n 2n n2
IPMult(1)L and
SecIPRefreshL
4n2−n 3n2 + 2n n(3n−1)2
IPMult in [BFG15] (n+ 1)(2n−1)+1 n(3n+ 1) n2
Alg. 5 in [Cor+13] 4n(n−1) − n(n−1)
Alg. 3 in [Bel+16] 4n(n−1)
1




Table 4.1.: Complexity of IPMult(1)L and IPMult
(2)
L and comparison with the IPMult in
[BFG15]and the multiplication algorithms of [Cor+13] and [Bel+16]
Gadget G4: Since .4 is affine, there exists a set of indices S4 such that |S4| ≤ |I4|+ |S21 |
and the gadget can be perfectly simulated from its input shares corresponding to the
indices in S4.
Gadget G5: Since IPMult(2)L is t− SNI and |I5∪S3| ≤ |I5|+ |I3|+ |I2| ≤ t, then there
exists a set of indices S5 such that |S5| ≤ |I5| and the gadget can be perfectly simulated
from its input shares corresponding to the indices in S5.
Gadget G6: Since IPMult(2)L is t− SNI and |I6∪S5| ≤ |I6|+ |I5| ≤ t, then there exists
a set of indices S6 such that |S6| ≤ |I6| and the gadget can be perfectly simulated from
its input shares corresponding to the indices in S6.
Gadget G7: Since .2 is affine, there exists a set of indices S7 such that its cardinality
is |S7| ≤ |I7|+ |S11 | ≤ |I7|+ |I1| and the gadget can be perfectly simulated from its input
shares corresponding to the indices in S7.
Each of the previous steps guarantees the existence of a simulator for the respective
gadgets. The composition of them allows us to construct a simulator of the entire circuit
which uses S6∪S7 shares of the input. Since |S6∪S7| ≤ |I7|+ |I1|+ |I6| ≤∑7i=1 |Ii| we
can conclude that the gadget .254 is t− SNI.
The advantage of the use of IPMult(2)L mostly consists in amortizing the randomness
complexity. Indeed the new scheme requires only n (for the vector u) plus n(n−1)2 (for
the matrix U) random bits, while the previous one uses a larger amount of randomness,
corresponding to n2 (for the SecIPRefreshL) plus n(n−1)2 (for the IPMult
(1)
L ) bits. We
summarize in Table 4.1 the complexities of the two schemes.
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The issue of providing a secure multiplication of two dependent operands was first
addressed by Coron et al. in [Cor+13]. In their work the authors proposed a new
algorithm which requires n(n−1) random bits and that has later been proved to be t− SNI
in [Bar+15a]. By analyzing the amount of random generations and comparing it to the
one of IPMult(2)L , we can see that our scheme is more efficient whenever n > 3, while
it requires the same amount of randomness for n= 3 and more random bits for n < 3.
On the other hand, from a complexity point of view the scheme in [Cor+13] is better
optimized in terms of field multiplications since it makes use of look-up tables.
A more detailed performance analysis is provided in [Bal+17] and summarized in the
next section.
4.3. Performance evaluations
In this section, we briefly summarize the results of the performance evaluations of our
improved IP masking construction performed in [Bal+17].
The authors developed masked software implementations of the AES-128 encryption
for AVR architectures, using either our new multiplication scheme IPMult(1)L alone, or
in combination with IPMult(2)L . Additionally, they also developed protected instances of
AES-128 with Boolean masking, in order to compare performances.
The algorithm considered for the power function x254 is the one in [Cor+13; RP10]
represented in Figure 2.6. Additionally, they provided a faster implementation using
the addition chain proposed by Grosso et al. [GPS14], which leverages on the algorithm
introduced by Coron et al. [Cor+13] to securely evaluate functions of the form x ·g(x),
where g is a linear function.
We report in Table 4.2 the performance evaluations for assembly implementations
with n= 2,3 shares. The implementation protected by IP masking using only IPMult(1)L
represents a notable improvement compared to earlier work [BFG15]. Our implementation
requires roughly 157 k cycles and 372 k cycles for security levels n = 2 and n = 3,
respectively, against the 375 k and 815 k cycles needed to protect instances of AES-128
for the same security levels in [BFG15]. The implementation protected by IP masking
using IPMult(2)L in combination with IPMult
(1)
L achieves weaker performance in terms of
cycles but, as mentioned earlier, it improves the randomness complexity. The results
for Boolean masking are 110 k and 230 k, respectively. We point out that the source
of the timing gap for IP masking is the computation of x254, since the rest of AES
operations perform in a similar amount of cycles. IP masking is slower than the Boolean
masking, mainly due to the extra operations to perform in the multiplication gadgets.
However, since L is fixed, it is possible to optimize the cycle count by tabulating the
field multiplications with elements Li and L−1i . This technique costs more in terms of
non-volatile storage and it is feasible only for small numbers of shares n. The results of the
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MASKING TIMINGS MEMORY
x254 AES-128
IP masking n=2 709 157 196 2 816
(only IPMult(1)L ) n=3 1 752 372 225 3 328
IP masking n=2 763 167 996 2 816
(IPMult(1)L and IPMult
(2)
L ) n=3 1 766 375 025 3 328
Boolean masking n=2 459 110 569 2 048
(addition chain [RP10]) n=3 1 043 230 221 2 048
Boolean masking n=2 275 73 769 1 792
(addition chain [GPS14]) n=3 676 160 357 1 792
Table 4.2.: Performance evaluation of protected AES-128 implementations on AVR ar-
chitectures (optimized in assembly code). Timings in clock cycles, memory
requirements in bytes [Bal+17]
evaluations show a decrease in the gap between Boolean and IP masking implementations
to slightly more than a factor 2.
4.4. Information theoretic evaluation
In this section, we extend our investigations by reporting on the information theoretic
evaluation of the Inner Product encoding, which was conducted in [Bal+17].
Linear (e.g., Hamming weight) leakages
We start by reporting on the results of the analysis of the information leakage of the
Inner Product encoding of Algorithm 4.2 for n= 2 shares and a Hamming weight leakage
function. We represent in Figure 4.5 the result of the information theoretic analysis for
Hamming weight leakages, for vectors L2 = 17,5,7 and noise variances between 10−2
and 103. In the figure, it is additionally reported the leakage of an unprotected target
secret variable A and of a Boolean encoding (which is a special case of Inner Product
encoding such that L1 =L2 = 1) for illustration. We can observe that, for low noise levels,
the increased algebraic complexity of Inner Product masking allows significantly lower
leakages than Boolean masking, as already discussed in [Bal+12; BFG15]. On an intuitive
level, the reason of such phenomenon can be explained by the fact that, in Boolean
masking, knowing one bit of each share leads directly to one bit of the secret, while, in
Inner Product masking, it only leads to a (smaller) bias on the secret variable distribution.
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Figure 4.5.: Information theoretic evaluation of an Inner Product encoding with Hamming
weight leakage function [Bal+17]
For large noise levels, we recognize the security order (in the bounded moment model)
of the masking schemes according to the slope of the information theoretic curves. The
latter one moves from −1 for an unprotected implementation to −2 for Boolean masking,
corresponding to a security order 1 in the bounded moment model. Moreover, by
considering different values of L2 in the Inner Product encoding, the results also show
that the slope of the information theoretic curves can be reduced. In particular, it reaches
a level of −3 (which corresponds to a security order 2 in the bounded moment model)
and even −4 (which corresponds to a security order 3 in the bounded moment model).
The reasons of such order amplifications were analyzed in [Wan+16] and [Bal+17], and
we refer to these works for further details.
Non-linear (e.g., random) leakages
Let us now consider the case when, in place of the Hamming weight leakages, we have a
random leakage function G with similar output range {0,1, . . . ,8}.
The result of the information theoretic analysis for random leakages, noise variances
between 10−2 and 103, and vectors L2 = 17,5,7 is given in Figure 4.5, where it is again
reported the leakage of an unprotected A and a Boolean encoding. We can see that,
for large noise levels, the security order amplification vanishes and all the information
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Figure 4.6.: Information theoretic evaluation of an Inner Product encoding with random
leakage function [Bal+17]
theoretic curves corresponding to d= 2 shares have slope −2, as predicted by the proofs
in the probing model. This phenomenon is due to the non-linear leakage function,
that recombines the shares, reducing the security order. Additionally, we notice that
making the leakage function non-linear compensates the low algebraic complexity of
the Boolean encoding and therefore reduces the distance between Boolean and Inner
Product encodings. These experiments show that the security order amplification of
Inner Product masking is highly implementation-dependent.
4.5. Empirical side-channel leakage evaluation
We complete our analysis by providing the results of empirical side-channel leakage
evaluations for both Boolean and IP masking with two shares, and L1 = 1,L2 = 7,
conducted in [Bal+17].
The target platform is an STM32 Nucleo board equipped with an ARM Cortex-M4
processor core. The processor runs at 168 MHz and features a built-in RNG capable of
generating 32-bit random numbers every 40 clock cycles.
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RNG deactivated
We first show the evaluation of both implementations with the RNG deactivated, i.e.,
when all random numbers are zero.
Figure 4.7.: t-test results for Boolean masking (top) and IP masking (bottom) with RNG
deactivated; each based on 10000 measurements. The red lines mark the
±4.5 threshold [Bal+17]
The authors consider 10000 measurements from each implementation. Figure 4.7
depicts the plots of the t-scores for Boolean masking and IP masking in gray (respectively
at the top and bottom of the figure). The red lines indicate the ±4.5 threshold, which is
typically used in the literature and roughly corresponds to 99.999% confidence.
In this scenario, both implementations leak significantly, and repetitive patterns in the
plots of the t-scores reveal the rounds of AES (the areas with high t-scores) interleaved
by the key scheduling. However, even if both implementations leak, we can already notice
that the implementation protected with IP masking has lower t-scores, corresponding to




Now we show the evaluation with activated RNG. This time the authors consider 1 million
measurements. Figure 4.8 displays the results for both Boolean masking and IP masking
(respectively at the top and at the bottom of the figure).
Figure 4.8.: t-test results for Boolean masking (top) and IP masking (bottom) with RNG
activated; each based on 1 million measurements. The red lines mark the
±4.5 threshold [Bal+17]
This time we can see a big difference between the two masking schemes. The imple-
mentation protected with Boolean masking leaks. On the other hand, the one protected
with IP masking shows significantly less evidence of leakage, and, in particular, it does
not show any significant leakage.
These results show that the more complicated algebraic structure of the Inner Product
encoding leads to less evidence of leakage in practice compared to the Boolean masking.
4.6. Conclusions
In this chapter, we examined the Inner Product masking, which is characterized by a
more complicated algebraic structure compared to Boolean masking. We showed that
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this property leads to less evidence of leakage in practice, and, in some cases, to a security
order amplification. However, such qualities come with the price of performance overhead.
We focused on such main drawback and suggested improvements over the previous
Inner Product schemes. In particular, we proposed new multiplication algorithms that
are conceptually close to the schemes of Ishai et al. [ISW03] and improve the efficiency
of prior work. Compared to the previous schemes in [BFG15], our new algorithms show
a reduced randomness cost, while providing the strong security property of t− SNI.
Additionally, we provided a multiplication scheme optimized for the case of dependent
inputs, which allow us to save on the cost of refreshing one of the inputs. Since this
composition pattern is typical in the algorithm for the exponentiation x254, such an
optimization is particularly helpful to decrease the randomness complexity of Inner
Product masked implementation of the AES.
These improvements in the performance overhead showed how the Inner Product
masking could be a valid alternative to Boolean masking.
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probing model
In this chapter, we move our attention to another research direction, which consists in
discussing and formalizing the security requirements for a secure masked implementation
in hardware.
Motivations
The analysis conducted until now in this work focused only on software-oriented masking,
i.e., on masking schemes principally designed for software implementations. However, also
the protection of hardware implementations against side-channel attacks is an important
objective in cryptographic engineering. In this setting, one crucial additional issue is the
presence of physical defaults, such as glitches (i.e., combinatorial recombinations) [MPG05;
MPO05], transition-based leakages (i.e., memory recombinations) [Bal+14; Cor+12] and
couplings (i.e., routing recombinations) [Cnu+17], that can provide extra information for
each adversarial probe.
In the last years, multiple solutions have been proposed in the literature to extend
software countermeasures to protect hardware implementations. Some examples are
Threshold Implementations (TIs), Consolidated Masking (CMS) scheme in [Cnu+16;
Rep+15], the Domain-Oriented Masking (DOM) in [GMK16; GMK17], the Unified
Masking Approach (UMA) in [GM17] and the Generic Low Latency Masking (GLM)
in [GIB18]. However, while provably security is at the base of software-oriented masking,
the schemes deployed in the context of hardware-oriented masking have not been formally
proven for arbitrary security orders so far, nor their composability guarantees have been
discussed in detail. For instance, TI, which showed that the simple property of non-
completeness 3 is sufficient to counteract the glitch issue [NRS11], found some obstacle on
the way to its generalization at high-order and the first attempt to build a higher-order
TI in [Bil+14] failed due to a lack of refreshing, causing a composability flaw [Rep15;
Rep+15].
When dealing with software implementations, avoiding such flaws is not a difficult task,
3See Section 2.7 for details.
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as security proofs in the probing model of Ishai et al. [ISW03], according to the notions
of Non-Interference (NI) and Strong Non-Interference (SNI), can be used to ensure the
compositional security of masked gadgets [Bar+16].
Moreover, next to such theoretical approaches, security analysis can be supported
by practical ones as well, exploiting program verification techniques. For instance,
Barthe et al. [Bar+15b] developed a tool capable of verifying the security of a masked
implementation up to a specific order. Other examples are the works in [EWS14; Rep16],
which suggest similar but more specialized ideas. In practice, when in a software masked
implementation security is claimed for arbitrary orders, we need to provide a hand-made
security proof for the target gadgets. Additionally, in case the implementation considered
is a full cipher combining several gadgets, the proof has to show that secure composability
is ensured as well. On the other hand, if the security is claimed only up to a given order,
program verification techniques can be used to analyze the target implementation.
In the intent of formalizing security requirements for hardware implementations, the
properties that we desire to achieve are robustness against physical defaults and com-
posability. Probing security is not enough for guaranteeing protection in this setting.
Indeed, even if an implementation is proven not to leak sensitive information in the
probing model, physical defaults can decrease the security order in the bounded moment
model [Bar+17]. Specifically, the lowest key-dependent statistical moment of the leakage
distribution is lower than the optimal value, which is the number of shares. In practice,
we can explain this phenomenon in a recombination of the shares by the leakage function.
On the other hand, a lack of composability can reduce the security order in the probing
model as well, as shown in an attack by Coron et al. [Cor+13].
Tools that guarantee such properties of robustness and composability separately already
exists. For instance, the security in the bounded moment model can be guaranteed by
some algorithmic characteristics that moderate the shares’ recombinations. An example
already mentioned is TI, which offers an excellent technique to prevent glitches. The lazy
engineering method in [Bal+14] is another example, where, by increasing the number of
shares, full memory recombination can be ruled out. As for composability guarantees,
the probing model provides formal methods that can ensure a secure combination of
gadgets. However, no current model analyzes their combination.
In this context, we study in our work how to connect the security solutions discussed
above and provide a unified model that simultaneously captures the issues concerning
physical defaults and composability at any order, at the scope of guiding practically-
oriented implementations.
Contribution
As a first contribution, we analyze the interesting case of first-order threshold imple-
mentations, which are characterized by their low randomness requirements. We explain
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such a phenomenon by giving a slight variant of the concept of Strong Non-Interference
(SNI) in Definition 2.5, which we call Pseudo-Strong Non-Interference. In this setting, we
additionally discuss the natural tradeoff between the number of shares and the cycle count.
In particular, we observe that the correctness property in threshold implementations
does not necessarily have to be satisfied by the intermediate results, but it is enough that
only the final result is correct.
In the second part of the chapter, we move to analyze the additional challenges raised
by higher-order glitch-free implementations and provide a formal tool to analyze them.
We introduce our main contribution, the robust probing model, which tweaks the original
probing model in order to capture a broad class of physical defaults and can easily be
combined with composability notions, as the (Strong) Non-Interference.
In order to capture the physical defaults of glitches, transitions and couplings, we
define ε−extended probes. We distinguish them in specifically extended, when the model
is dependent on the circuit topology, and generic extended when it is independent of it.
Informally speaking (we refer to Section 5.2 for an in-depth discussion), according to the
model for glitches, each observation is modeled as a specific ε−extended probe, where ε
is equal to the number of input shares. In the context of transitions, each observation
corresponds to a specific 2−extended probe. And as for couplings, each observation is
modeled as a generic γ− extended probe, where γ is the number of couplings. Using such
a new model, we discuss and conjecture simple propositions concerning the combination
of physical defaults.
We then study concrete constructions of masked and threshold implementations,
reaching the important conclusion that a 2-cycle implementation of Ishai et al.’s (slightly
tweaked) multiplication algorithm [ISW03], or the parallel multiplication algorithm in
[Bar+17], offers good robustness against glitches, while also offering good composability
by design. In order to provide some intuition on the algorithm and on how the model is
used more in detail, we illustrate the example of the 3-share implementation of the ISW
multiplication scheme in 2 cycles, depicted in Figure 5.1, where the rectangles clearly
indicate where to place the registers.
In the following, we give some basic ideas regarding the reason why the gadget is
secure against glitches and explain how the extended probes look like in this context.
Concretely, an adversary attacking the internal values of this scheme can observe the
possible extended probes, each of them allowing to access between 2 and 3 shares:
• 1st stage:
p1,1 := (a1, b1,0), p1,2 := (a1, b2, r1,2), p1,3 := (a1, b3, r1,3),
p2,1 := (a2, b1, r1,2), p2,2 := (a2, b2,0), p2,3 := (a2, b3, r2,3),
p3,1 := (a3, b1, r1,3), p3,2 := (a3, b2, r2,3), p3,3 := (a3, b3,0).
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a1 · b1 a1 · b2 a1 · b3
a2 · b1 a2 · b2 a2 · b3


















Figure 5.1.: (1,0,0)-robust 2-SNI implementation of ISW in 2 cycles
• 2nd stage:
p1 := (u1,1,u1,2,u1,3), p2 := (u2,1,u2,2,u2,3), p3 := (u3,1,u3,2,u3,3).
Attacking output shares allows the observation of c1, c2, c3. Note that the probes on the
output shares are standard ones, since the shares are stored in registers, preventing the
propagation of glitches.
Moving to the simulation, we have to distinguish three possible options:
1. Both probes are on the internal shares (e.g., p1,2,p1).
2. One probe is internal, the other one is on the output shares (e.g., p1,2, c1).
3. Both probes are on the output shares (e.g., c1, c2).
In the first case, and according to the proof, we construct the set of indexes I = {1}
and J = {1,2}. In the simulation phase we assign r1,2 to a random value and we can
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perfectly compute p1,2 by having access to a1 and b2. As for p1, we perfectly simulate the
first component u1,1 by using a1 and b1; since 2 ∈ J and 2 /∈ I we can use the components
of the probed p1,2 to simulate the second component u1,2; and since 3 /∈ J we can pick a
uniform and random value for simulating the third component u1,3.
In the second case, we have I = {1} and J = {1,2}. We simulate p1,2 as before and we
assign a uniform and random value to c1, thanks to the presence of the random bit r1,3.
In the third case, since c1 depends on the random bit r1,3 which does not appear in
the computation of c2, and c2 depends on the random bit r2,3 which does not appear in
the computation of c1, we can simulate both shares as random and independent values.
This reasonings are at the base of the security proof that we provide in the chapter,
showing that, after a clever placement of the registers, the ISW multiplication scheme
is t− SNI against glitches.
Furthermore, our theoretical contributions are completed by practical evaluations,
taken from [Fau+18].
Related work
Numerous other works in the literature tried to achieve higher-order side-channel security
in the presence of physical default, and, in particular, of glitches.
Reparaz et al. with their work on Consolidated Masking Scheme [Rep+15], studied links
between the ISW multiplication scheme and the concept of TIs. The authors proposed
an approach to mask implementations in hardware using only t+ 1, where t indicates
the security order. Such a scheme was later instantiated in [Cnu+16] to implement a
masked AES.
The Domain Oriented Masking (DOM), introduced by Gross et al. in [GMK16;
GMK17], has as well the goal of allowing secure masking in hardware with only t+ 1
shares. In this case, the authors propose two masked multipliers, one for independent
inputs and one for dependent ones. In particular, the first one is closely related to the ISW
multiplication scheme, while the second one is more efficient in terms of randomness cost.
With the Unified Masking Approach (UMA) in [GM17], Gross and Mangard follow the
concept of DOM, proposing a new hardware multiplication scheme which provides the
most efficient randomness use so far. More precisely, according to the different values of d,
their scheme extends the parallel masking algorithm from [Bar+17] with the randomness
optimizations proposed in [Bel+16] and the DOM multiplier.
We underline that none of the works just mentioned provide security proofs at arbitrary
orders. Additionally, the authors in [Moo+19], exibited composability flaws for each
of the works aforementioned, showing how the lack of formal proofs makes flaws more
difficult to detect.
The implementation of Section 5.4.2 is the only published algorithm that is jointly
robust against glitches and composable at arbitrary orders with n+1 shares. We note
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that the parallel masking algorithm introduced by Barthe et al. in [Bar+17] exploits the
same “compute partial products - refresh - compress” structure as our implementation
in Figure 5.1. So despite more specialized to software implementations, it can lead to
similar 2-cycle hardware implementations.
After the publication of our study in [Fau+18], many other works followed it up.
Meyer et al. in [DBR19] described an information theoretic condition, called-glitch
immunity, which is both necessary and sufficient for ensuring security in the presence of
glitches. Additionally, in order to unify security concepts, they revised the notions of
(Strong) Non-Interference in an information theoretic manner as well.
Dhooghe et al. in [DNR19] studied in further detail TIs in the robust-probing model.
They proved that TI provides first-order and higher-order univariate security in the
glitch-robust probing model. In particular, the authors revised the properties of TIs
in terms of composability. They showed a link between uniformity and the notion of
Non-Interference and relaxed the notion of non-completeness, in order to facilitate the
design of secure expansion and compression functions.
Lastly, Cassiers et al. in [Cas+20] extended the simulatability framework of Belaïd et
al. [Bel+16] and provided a framework of probing security with a compositional security
notion against glitches. In the new setting, called Hardware Private Circuits, the authors
presented masked gadgets that allow trivial composition with glitches at arbitrary orders.
Other follow up works focused on automatic verification of hardware masked imple-
mentations. For instance, in [Blo+18] the authors proposed an automated analysis of
masked implementations for detecting the presence of glitches. Their approach consists in
estimating the Fourier coefficients of each gate, in order to identify statistical dependence
on their inputs. Moreover, the authors in [Bar+18a] provided an alternative method for
proving security of masked implementations in the threshold probing model with glitches,
by improving their popular tool maskVerif.
5.1. A composability notion for Threshold Implementation
In this section, we analyze the case of Threshold Implementations’ (TIs), a type of masking
scheme, recalled in Section 2.7, aimed at counteracting power (or electromagnetic) analysis
attacks in the presence of glitches.
5.1.1. Pseudo−NI and pseudo−SNI security
We start our analysis by considering an attractive property of Threshold Implementations,
i.e., the fact that it benefits not only for security guarantees in the presence of glitches
but also for its low randomness requirements. As shown in [Pos+11], some block
ciphers can be protected in the TI model with a minimum randomness cost, as the block
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size. This interesting property hints that such implementations profit from some sort of
composability guarantees, which we aim at investigating in this section.
We begin by considering a function at the core of many efficient S-box decompositions
for TIs, i.e., the function f(x,y,z) = (x · y)⊕ z, which is commonly called Toffoli gate.
The following equation represents a Threshold Implementation at 1st-order of such f
with only 3 shares:
c1 = (x2 ·y2)⊕ (x2 ·y3)⊕ (x3 ·y2)⊕z2,
c2 = (x3 ·y3)⊕ (x3 ·y1)⊕ (x1 ·y3)⊕z3,
c3 = (x1 ·y1)⊕ (x1 ·y2)⊕ (x2 ·y1)⊕z1.
(5.1)
At first sight, we can notice that the addition of the third variable z to the non-linear
part x ·y ensures the uniformity of the output shares. Such a gadget is 1−probing secure
since the output shares ci’s are independent of x,y and z. However, in a single clock cycle
(i.e., intermediate computations such as x2 · y2, x2 · y3, . . . do not leak and no probes
are allowed on them), it is interesting to remark that it is not 1− SNI, nor 1− NI. As
an example, let us suppose to have a single probe on an output share, say on c1. Since
its computation requires two shares of x and two shares of y, and there is no internal
randomness in the gadget, the simulation requires two shares of each input, in contrast
to Definition 2.5.
In order to intuitively connect TIs and composable masking schemes, we propose the
following variation of existing NI and SNI definitions.
Definition 5.1 (Pseudo-randomized gadgets). The pseudo-randomization g′ of a gadget g
is the gadget g modified such that any input share coming from a uniform encoding and
appearing only once and as a monomial of degree one in the algebraic circuit description
of the gadget g is removed from the gadget inputs and replaced by internal uniform
randomness in g′. We denote these monomials as pseudo-randomized monomials.
Definition 5.2 (Pseudo−t− NI/SNI). A gadget g is said pseudo−t− NI (respectively,
pseudo−t− SNI) if and only if the pseudo-randomization g′ of this gadget g is t− NI
(resp., t− SNI).
The new definitions have mainly explanatory purpose at the end of underlining the
important conceptual differences between TIs and standard composable masking schemes.
Clearly, pseudo−SNI is a weaker notion than SNI and it does not ensure the same
composability properties. Its composability guarantees are limited to the case the pseudo-
randomized monomials are used carefully, which is indeed what happens in state-of-the-art
(1st-order) TIs.
We remark that the gadget of Equation 5.1 is pseudo−1− SNI, since the outputs ci’s can
be simulated thanks to uniform randomness. More formally, we will prove in Section 5.4.1
that this gadget is in reality pseudo−2− SNI.
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(x,y,z)
(c1, c2, c3) 000 011 101 110 001 010 100 111
000 16 16 16 16 0 0 0 0
010 16 16 16 16 0 0 0 0
100 16 16 16 16 0 0 0 0
111 16 16 16 16 0 0 0 0
001 0 0 0 0 16 16 16 16
011 0 0 0 0 16 16 16 16
101 0 0 0 0 16 16 16 16
110 0 0 0 0 16 16 16 16
Table 5.1.: Number of times that the output shares (c1, c2, c3) occur for a given input
(x,y,z) in a 3-share Toffoli TI gate (as given in [Bil15], Section 3.3, Figure 3.1)
For the moment, we show why the gadget of Equation 5.1 fulfills the uniformity
property by considering Table 5.1, built according to the techniques used in [Bil15],
i.e., by calculating the number of times that the output shares (c1, c2, c3) occur for a
given input (x,y,z). The uniformity property holds if each non-zero entry of the table
equals 2nin·(n−1)2nout·(n−1) with nin = 3 and nout = 1 the function’s input and output bit-sizes,
respectively, and n the number of shares.
Using the same technique just described, let us now analyze the case of two func-
tions f1(x,y,z) = ((x · y)⊕ z,x,y) and f2(x,y,z) = ((x · y)⊕ z,x,z), built using f. By
computing similar tables to Table 5.1 for f1 and f2, we can see that the non-zero entries
equal 1 (as required by the uniformity property) for f1, and 2 for f2. This means that the
first function’s output shares can directly serve as a uniform input sharing for another
function, and being safely composed. On the other hand, the second function’s output
shares are not uniform, and cannot be safely composed. Intuitively, such a result should
be expected by observing that f2 forwards the pseudo-randomized monomial z, which
should be used once according to Definition 5.2.
5.1.2. The tradeoff between the number of shares and the cycle count
We complete our investigation on TIs by examining the natural tradeoff between the
number of shares and the cycle count. Typically, in order to obtain function decom-
positions that satisfy the properties of non-completeness and uniformity, TIs mask the
inputs with more than t+1 shares, which instead are commonly used in Boolean masking.
As an example, in the Toffoli gate presented above, the 1st-order security is obtained
104
5.2. The robust probing model
with three shares rather than two. We start our analysis with two main remarks, which
allow us to show an implementation of the Toffoli gate in only two shares. First, we
notice that the TIs of complex circuits, e.g., S-boxes, are generally constructed by the
composition of simpler stages of gadgets. Such stages are divided by memory elements,
which prevent the propagation of glitches. Our idea is trying to split the gadgets in
more cycles than needed for glitch-freeness. Using this technique, we can, for instance,
implement the previous Toffoli gate in two cycles, rather than one. Secondly, we notice
that the intermediate stages of the computation do not need to satisfy the correctness
property as well. However, it is sufficient that the final result is correct.
In the light of these observations, one possible alternative to the implementation
















where the [.] parentheses are used to denote the clock cycles.
In the new implementation, the correctness property is satisfied only by the result in
the second stage, while the intermediate stage is not correct. However, each stage of
this decomposition is non-complete and uniform, as required by TI properties. As in the
previous example, this is given by the remark that each stage of the decomposition is
pseudo−1− SNI, and the pseudo-randomized monomials are only used once in the circuit.
The implementation of Equation 5.2 is depicted in Figure 5.2, where the circled
boxes indicates functions and the rectangles memory elements. We remark how the
gate resembles the ISW multiplication [ISW03], where the XOR with z replaces the
randomness and makes the gadget pseudo-composable, rather than composable.
5.2. The robust probing model
In the previous section, we saw as first-order TIs are valid means for building first-
order glitch-resistant circuits. Unfortunately, the method does not easily scale to higher
security orders. Specifically, even though higher-order TIs preserve security against
glitches [Bil+14], they do not keep composability properties as well [Rep15].
Let us, for instance, take the following gadget, with inputs x and y, and r1, r2, r3
random elements summing up to 0:
c1 = (x2 ·y2)⊕ (x2 ·y3)⊕ (x3 ·y2)⊕ r1,
c2 = (x3 ·y3)⊕ (x3 ·y1)⊕ (x1 ·y3)⊕ r2,
c3 = (x1 ·y1)⊕ (x1 ·y2)⊕ (x2 ·y1)⊕ r3.
(5.3)
The gadget represents a variant of Equation 5.1, with the difference that random elements
substitute the shares of z. If we do not consider the possibility of physical defaults, the
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Figure 5.2.: Example of 2-share/2-cycle decomposition of a Toffoli gate [Fau+18]
gadget design implies that the adversary cannot get any information about the internal
values xi ·yj and their intermediate sums. In this setting, this implementation is 2− SNI.
It is not our scope at this moment focusing on the proof, but the arguments of the proof
in Section 5.4.1, Proposition 5.5 for the gadget of Equation 5.1 are essentially identical.
If we consider the gadget in a concrete hardware implementation, the assumptions
made above are unrealistic, as the computation can leak about intermediate values via
glitches or other physical defaults. In this case, the gadget is still probing secure in the
presence of glitches thanks to the non-completeness property. However, it is not SNI, since
the intermediate randomness can be leaked due to glitches, preventing any simulation
according to Definition 2.5.
This example shows that the properties of non-completeness and uniformity are alone
not sufficient to ensure composability in the presence of glitches, and it confirms that,
with such tools, it is not straightforward to obtain higher-order masked implementations
in hardware. The authors in [Rep+15] already pointed out that the addition of resfreshing
gadgets is essential for guaranteeing composability.
Such a difficulty is not surprising, considering the discussion in the previous section
on first-order TIs and pseudo-composability. Univariate attacks in first-order TIs, i.e.,
attacks with a single probe or targeting a single point in time of the leakage traces, can
be prevented by the uniformity property. On the other hand, such a property does not
capture multivariate attacks, exploiting multiple probes or targeting multiple points in
time of the leakage traces, which are the threat of higher-order security.
At this point, our goal is to provide new tools that can ensure both composability and
protection from physical defaults. We could take two main directions. The first one is to
exploit the potentials of TIs in preserving security against shares’ recombinations and try
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Figure 5.3.: Physical defaults in an example of TI [Bar+17]
to generalize the notion of uniformity in order to scale at high-order. The second option
is to base our alternative on the probing model, since the notion of SNI already provides
a way to argue about composability, and try to generalize the adversarial model such that
it covers a wide class of physical defaults. The first option would imply requiring a more
global and computationally hard condition to the implementations with the increase of t.
We chose to focus on the second one, and in the following, we show that there is a natural
generalization of the probing model meeting our security needs.
Modeling physical defaults
In order to describe our new model, we first need to specify how the adversary’s power
changes when considering hardware implementations. We define in the following three
principal physical defaults, which we include in the classical probing model.
We use the example of TI in Figure 5.3 in order to visually represent such physical de-
faults. First, combinatorial recombinations (e.g., glitches) possibly mix, and consequently
recombine, the inputs of the component functions fi. Second, memory recombinations
(e.g., transitions) possibly mix, and consequently recombine, the content of the memory
elements in consecutive invocations/cycles. Following the example in Figure 5.3, this can
happen if the same memory gate is employed to store the yi’s by erasing the xi’s. Third,
routing recombinations (i.e., couplings) possibly mix, and consequently recombine, the
shares manipulated by adjacent wires.
Our core idea for the generalization of the probing model is to represent adversarial
observations as specifically or generically ε-extended probes. Generic extensions indicate
that the model is independent of the circuit topology, while specific extensions depend
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on it. We use such extended probes to define three specific models corresponding to each
physical default.
Specific model for glitches. For any ε-input circuit gadget g, combinatorial recombina-
tions (aka glitches) can be modeled with specifically ε-extended probes so that probing any
output of the gadget allows the adversary to observe all its ε inputs.
The recombination described above is a worst-case scenario. Nevertheless, such a
situation occurs often in standard CMOS circuits, as pointed out in [FG05] and [BM16].
As a natural consequence on the topology of robust masked implementation, we need
to require to limit the shares fan-in of each gadget, i.e., the number of shares of a sensitive
variable at its inputs. Consequently, we additionally need that memory elements separate
any composition of gadgets with limited shares fan-in. Indeed, without the last condition,
we would risk that composing gadgets may further increase the shares fan-in. For the
reasons above, in the rest of the paper the two requirements just mentioned will be
regularly applied to masked circuits topologies.
We underline that the presence of memory elements between composed gadgets makes
the probes of some sensitive values looking different through the circuit. In particular,
the signal before storage in a register is glitchy and described by extended probes, while
the signal stored in a register is stable and represented by standard probes. For instance,
this is what happens in output shares, which are typically stored in registers. In this
case, the probes on the stable output are counted as output probes, while the ones on
their glitchy counterpart are considered internal probes.
Specific model for transitions. For a memory cell m, memory recombinations (aka
transitions) can be modeled with specifically 2-extended probes so that probing m allows
the adversary to observe any pair of values stored in 2 of its consecutive invocations.
This model precisely corresponds to the transition-based leakages given in [Bal+14].
Specific model for couplings. For any set of adjacent wires W = (w1, . . . ,wd), routing
recombinations (aka couplings) can be modeled with specifically γ-extended probes so that
probing one wire wi allows the adversary to observe γ wires adjacent to wi.
Note that when the parameter γ is set to 0, we are in a situation where no couplings
happen. This physical default is the most challenging to deal with, as it is not easy
evaluating in practice the parameter γ.
As a last remark, we underline that the models presented above are not assumed to
reflect the reality of physical defaults perfectly. Our main goal is instead to capture such
defaults in a sufficiently valuable way, in order to help algorithmic designs to achieve
better robustness against them. As an example of how the models above translate in
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terms of extended-probes on a masked implementation, we can consider a circuit with
maximum shares fan-in f . According to the model for glitches, for any standard probe,
we have f probes; in the case of transitions, any probe translates into two probes; finally,
generic couplings translate any probe into γ+1 probes (independently of whether they
observe adjacent wires of the circuit).
In the light of the observations above, we say that a gadget is secure in the (λ,τ,γ)-
robust t-probing model if:
- the probes are extended with glitches (iff λ= 1),
- the probes are extended with transitions (iff τ = 1),
- the probes are extended with γ-couplings (for an integer γ ≥ 1),
and we use the same probe extensions in order to define (λ,τ,γ)-robust t−NI/SNI security.
The classical t−probing model is thus the (0,0,0)-robust t−probing model.
5.3. Physical defaults combination
The physical defaults that we just mentioned can appear simultaneously and combine.
For instance, couplings can be combined with transitions if the adversary probes adjacent
memory cells. In the same way, couplings can be combined with glitches. Following the
example in Figure 5.3, we can imagine that an adversary probes y1 with a glitch-extended
probe, which lets him observe x2 and x3, and that the wire carrying x2 is coupled with x1
in Figure 5.3.
Due to the possible combinations just mentioned, the previous model directly implies
the following worst-case bound.
Proposition 5.3 (Worst-case generic bound). Any 2f(γ+ 1)t-probing secure masked
circuit with maximum shares fan-in f is (1,1,γ)-robust t-probing secure with generically
extended probes.
The proof of the proposition is trivial, and it merely exploits the fact that any standard
probe needs to be “multiplied” by f (because of glitches), by 2 (because of transitions)
and by γ+ 1 (because of couplings). This means that one needs 2f(γ+ 1)t+ 1 shares to
obtain robust t-probing secure circuits.
We underline that this proposition only holds for probing security, and not for the
stronger properties of NI/SNI. As hinted in Section 5.1.1, and further clarified in the
subsequent Section 5.4.2, achieving robust composability requires a more careful analysis
of the extended probes’ positions. Moreover, we point out that, by exploiting an
appropriate circuit topology, we can reach better results.
Coming back to our example, we can observe for f = 2 a loss by a factor 2(γ+1), as in
Proposition 5.3. Let us try to understand if a factor 2, due the combination of transitions
and glitches, should appear as well in the leakage factor.
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Figure 5.4.: Exemplary combinations of transitions and glitches [Fau+18]
In order to understand better the combinations of transitions and glitches, we consider
the circuit examples given in Figure 5.4, where Lt(.) denotes transition-based leakages
and Lg(.) glitch-based leakages.
We first notice that glitches can simulate certain transitions. As an example, we consider
the upper circuit of the figure, where in the second storage cycle, a transition x1⇒ y
happens in the top memory cell. Still, a glitch-extended probe on y, permitting an
adversary to observe x1 and x2, can simulate this transition, as y = f(x1,x2). Therefore,
in this case, transitions and glitches do not combine. However, if we consider the lower
circuit in the figure, this positive result does not hold anymore, since the x3⇒ y transition
cannot be simulated by a glitch-extended probe.
As a second remark, we point out that transitions and glitches cannot be combined
when the leakage samples corresponding to the storage and computation in a circuit are
independent of each other. Such independent leakage samples would correspond to the
oversimplified model of the top figure. If that model were perfect, the adversary would
have the option to have a glitch-extension or a transition-extension of his probes (giving
a factor 2(γ+ 1) rather than 4(γ+ 1) in Proposition 5.3).
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In the light of these two observations, we can state that the combination of transitions
and glitches in masked implementations is strongly linked to their dependency. Therefore,
we can conclude that, in practice, computations within gadgets happen very quickly after
the storage, leading these two steps to overlap, as at the bottom of Figure 5.4. Moreover,
since the leakage samples given by the combinatorial gates are combined with those of
the memory gates, such an overlap can be viewed as a type of parallel implementation,
which are usually hard to capture with the probing model and are better considered by
the bounded moment model [Bar+17].
At this point, we further notice that the algebraic degree of the combination function
between transition-based leakages and glitch-based leakages influences the reduction of
the security order in the bounded moment model differently. The authors in [Bar+17],
Lemma 1, already showed that a linear combination of Lt(.) and Lg(.) (e.g., a sum in R)
does not decrease this security order. However, a non-linear combination does. In our
context, such a non-linear combination of Lt(.) and Lg(.) exactly corresponds to the
couplings of Section 5.2. Specifically, couplings typically combine the leakage of adjacent
wires (or combinatorial gadgets, memory gates) non-linearly. This fact is shown by the
extension factor γ in the probing model and is captured by an algebraic degree γ+ 1 for
the combination function in the bounded moment model.
The discussion above leads to the following conjecture, which can guide cryptographic
hardware designers.
Conjecture 5.4 (informal). Any max(2,f)t-probing secure masked circuit with maximum
shares fan-in f is tth-order secure in the bounded moment model if it has transitions &
glitches but no non-linear combinations of transitions & glitches (i.e., couplings).
In other words, the conjecture hints that if couplings can be kept negligible within
an implementation (which depends on the noise level: see [DDF14], Section 4.2), then
combinations of glitches and transitions should not affect its concrete security level. In the
following, we show experiments that confirm that, in some context, this assumption holds.
5.3.1. Experimental validation
We report here the implementation of a first-order TI of the PRESENT S-box performed
in [Fau+18]. It uses two stages, similarly to Figure 5.3, and follows the guidelines
in [MW15], Figure 3, in a Xilinx Spartan-6 FPGA, measured on the SAKURA-G board.4
The authors tweaked the design in two different ways. First, in place of using six
distinct registers x1,x2,x3,y1,y2,y3 to store the input and output shares, the same register
is used to store x1 and y1. Indeed such a change should lead to first-order leakages due
to transitions. Second, the authors refreshed the output of f1 with uniform randomness
4 http://satoh.cs.uec.ac.jp/SAKURA/index.html
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Figure 5.5.: Non-specific t-test results for a first-order TI of the PRESENT S-box tweaked
such that the register storing x1 and y1 in Figure 5.3 is reused without
refreshing [Fau+18]
before storing it in the reused register storing x1. This refreshing is not supposed to
increase the security order if glitches and transitions combine, since a glitch-extended
probe on y1 provides such additional randomness to the adversary. However, the refreshing
should improve the security level in case glitches and transitions are not combined, since
the adversary can have a glitch-extended probe on y1 before this is stored in the register,
and a transition-extended probe on y1 after it is stored in the register.
The authors launched CRI’s non-specific t-test on such implementations to detect
differences between the traces corresponding to fixed and random inputs [Coo+13;
Goo+11]. The results of these experiments are depicted in Figures 5.5 and 5.6.
Figures 5.5 shows the presence of leakage, presumably due to transitions, which is
canceled when the refreshing is activated, as shown by Figure 5.6.
This confirms that certain types of transitions do not combine harmfully with glitches,
as stated before in this section.
5.4. Concrete constructions
Finally, we now examine a couple of popular constructions from the literature and discuss
their security properties in the robust-probing model and how they perform in relation
to the previous worst-case predictions.
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Figure 5.6.: Non-specific t-test results for a first-order TI of the PRESENT S-box tweaked
so that the register storing x1 and y1 in Figure 5.3 is reused with refresh-
ing [Fau+18]
5.4.1. The Toffoli gate leads to pseudo−(1,0,0)−robust 1−probing security
We start by analyzing the Toffoli gate construction in Section 5.1.1, which is a 1st-order
TI gadget typically used in many TI of block cipher S-boxes. We design a hardware
implementation example, selecting the registers in order to avoid transition issues so
that τ = 0 in the robust probing model. Concretely, the Toffoli gadget is computed in one
cycle, and its outputs are stored in memory gates. We first show with Proposition 5.5
that, if we ideally exclude the presence of glitches, the scheme is pseudo-2-SNI.
Proposition 5.5. The TI implementation in 1 cycle of Equation 5.1 is pseudo- 2− SNI.
Proof. According to Definition 5.2, in order to prove that the gadget in Equation 5.1 is
pseudo-2-SNI, we need to prove that its pseudo-randomization, called g′, is 2-SNI. The
algorithm g′ corresponds to Equation 5.1, with the difference that the inputs are only
the shares x1,x2,x3,y1,y2,y3 and the values z1,z2,z3 are assigned uniformly at random.
Let Ω = {w1,w2} be a set of 2 adversarial observations on the pseudo-randomized
gadget g′. Since the implementation of the scheme is only in one cycle, there is no
intermediate computation and therefore the probes can only lie in one of the following
two groups:
(1) the input shares xi and yj with i, j ∈ {1,2,3};
(2) the output shares c1, c2, c3.
Let t1 (resp., t2) be the number of observations on the input (resp., output) values
(with t1 + t2 ≤ 2). We first define two sets of indices I and J such that |I| ≤ t1 and |J | ≤ t1
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and the values of the probes can be perfectly simulated given only the knowledge of (xi)i∈I
and (yj)j∈J . The sets are constructed as follows:
• Initially I and J are empty.
• For every probe as in group (1), add i to I and j to J .
Since the adversary is allowed to make at most t1 probes on the input values, it holds
that |I| ≤ t1 and |J | ≤ t1. In order to prove the SNI property, we next show the simulation
phase, by distinguishing the three different cases listed below.
1. If t1 = 2, then the probes w1 and w2 are both in group (1) and, by definition of the
set I, the simulator has access to the observed shares xi and yi.
2. If t1 = 1 and t2 = 1, then w.l.o.g. w1 is in group (1) and w2 is in group (2). By
definition of the sets I and J , the simulator has access to the observed shares, therefore
w1 can be perfectly simulated. As for w2, thanks to the random value zh with h ∈
{1,2,3}, the probe can be simulated by assigning a random and independent value.
3. Finally, if t2 = 2, then w1 and w2 are both in group (2) and they are of the
form xiyi+xiyj +xjyi+zi with i ∈ {1,2,3}. Since the (pseudo-randomized) shares
of z appearing in their computation are different in each output share, the simulator
can also assign w1 and w2 to a random and independent value.
In all the cases listed above, the probes w1 and w2 can be perfectly simulated with t1
shares of the input. We finally note that if |Ω| = 1, then the simulation of the probe
trivially follows the procedure of one of the previous cases. Therefore we conclude that
the gadget g′ is 2-SNI, completing the proof.
By combining this result and Proposition 5.3, it directly follows that this TI gadget
is pseudo-(1,0,0)-robust 1-probing secure with 3 shares. In other words, it uses an
additional share to prevent glitches, precisely as we anticipated in the worst-case analysis.
Once again we underline that the gadget is not pseudo-(1,0,0)-robust 1-SNI, since glitch-
extended probes cannot be simulated with one share per input. However, for first order
of security, when the uniformity condition in Section 5.1.1 is fulfilled, it is sufficient to
have the security of TIs for arguing that a full cipher is pseudo-2-SNI without glitches.
By using Proposition 5.3, we achieve that they are also (1,0,0)-robust 1-probing secure.
5.4.2. The ISW is (1,0,0)−robust t− SNI with t+1 shares in 2 cycles
We now move our analysis to the ISW multiplication algorithm, which has been the
first probing secure multiplication algorithm, introduced in the seminal work of Ishai et
al. [ISW03]. The algorithm was proved to be (0,0,0)-robust t−SNI in [Bar+16] using t+1
shares. The authors in [RP10] generalizes the original algorithm to larger fields, given
that the refreshing is adjusted to make it composable, as discussed in [Cor+13]. In the
following, we use a slight variation of the algorithm, which is represented in Algorithm 5.1.
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Algorithm 5.1 Modified ISW multiplication algorithm with n≥ 2 shares
Input: shares (ai)1≤i≤n and (bi)1≤i≤n, such that
⊕
iai = a and
⊕
i bi = b.
Output: shares (ci)1≤i≤n, such that
⊕
i ci = a · b.
1: for i= 1 to n do
2: for j = i+ 1 to n do
3: ri,j
$←− F2n ;
4: ui,j ← ri,j⊕ai · bj ;
5: uj,i← ri,j⊕aj · bi;
6: for i= 1 to n do
7: ci← ai · bi⊕
⊕n
j=1,j 6=iui,j ;
Essentially, we organize the intermediate results slightly differently than originally, in
order to have a scheme better suited to prevent physical defaults.
We show in the following that, when moving to higher-orders, the ISW multiplication
beats the worst-case bound, and consequently provides an excellent solution for robust
and composable gadgets. In particular, we formally prove that the scheme is secure
also in the presence of glitches, i.e., it is (1,0,0)-robust t−SNI, if we precisely follow the
guidelines of Section 5.2 and limits the shares fan-in to 1.
To this end, we consider an implementation of the ISW multiplication in two cycles,
depicted in Figure 5.1 for the case with 3 shares and security order 2. A description of
the algorithm at any order can be obtained by using the notations of Section 5.1.2 and
adding one level of brackets around the uj,i and ui,j variables of Algorithm 5.1, indicating
the operations performed in the first cycle, and a second level of brackets around the ci
variables, indicating the operations performed in the second cycle.
Our proof uses the specific model for glitches, that exploits this particular circuit
topology. Concretely, it means that for the implementation illustrated in Figure 5.1, the
adversary can access the three types of probes listed in the following:
• Internal (3-extended) probes pi,j on the ui,j ’s giving access to three shares, i.e., ai, bj
and the corresponding value of the randomness matrix.
• Internal (3-extended) probes pi on the ci’s giving access to ui,1, ui,2, ui,3.
• Output (non-extended) probes on the ci’s giving only access to one share.
Note that in this model, if an adversary wants to obtain a single internal value (e.g.,
an ri,j) he will need to use an extended probe including this value. Note also that, despite
giving 3-extended probes to the adversary, we do not break the shares fan-in limit of 1.
Moreover, the ci shares appear twice in the list: either as internal probes, which can be
glitch-extended, or as external probes, which are not glitchy since stored in an additional
memory element. We underline that, despite not being necessary for probing security,
the additional output memory elements storing the ci shares are strictly necessary in
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order to ensure composability. In the following, we formalize the security proof.
Proposition 5.6. The multiplication gadget in Algorithm 5.1 implemented in two cycles
(one for the ui,j values, a second one for the ci values) is (1,0,0)-robust t−SNI.
Proof. Let Ω = (I,O) be a set of t adversary’s observations respectively on the internal
and on the output values, where |I|= t1 and in particular t1 + |O| ≤ q. We construct a
perfect simulator of the adversary’s probes, which makes use of at most t1 shares of the
secrets x and y.
Let w1, . . . ,wq be the probed values. According to the specific model for glitches
presented in Section 5.2, the possible internal extended probes can be classified in the
following groups:
(1) pi,j := (ai, bj , ri,j) with i, j = 1, . . . , t+ 1
(2) pi := (ui,1, . . . ,ui,t+1) with i= 1, . . . , t+ 1 .
On the other hand, since the output shares are stored in registers, glitches do not affect
them and so the possible probes on the output shares are, as in the non-robust probing
model, the ci with i= 1, . . . , t+ 1, as in Algorithm 5.1.
We define two sets of indices I and J such that |I| ≤ t1, |J | ≤ t1 and the values of the
probes can be perfectly simulated given only the knowledge of (xi)i∈I and (yi)i∈J . The
sets are constructed as follows.
• Initially I and J are empty.
• For every probe as in group (1) add i to I and j to J .
• For every probe as in group (2) add i to I and moreover for every probe of the
form pj,i add j to J .
Since the adversary is allowed to make at most t1 internal probes, it holds that |I| ≤ t1
and |J | ≤ t1.
We now show the simulation phase. First of all, the simulator assigns a random value
to every ri,j entering in the computation of any probe. Then we consider an observed
value wh in group (1). In this case, by definition of I and J the simulator has access
to ai and bj and we distinguish three cases:
• If i = j, the simulator assigns ri,i to 0 and then perfectly simulates wh using ai
and bi.
• If j ∈ I and i ∈ J , then by definition the adversary has probed also pj,i or pi and pj .
Therefore, in any case, the adversary has already probed a value containing in its
computation the random bit ri,j . The simulator then perfectly simulates wh using ai,
bj and the ri,j assigned previously.
• In all the other cases, ri,j does not enter in the computation of any other probe, and
therefore the simulator can assign wh to a random and independent value.
As for a probe wh in group (2), by definition i ∈ I,J . So the simulator can perfectly
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compute the ith-component of the probe using ai, bi. For each of the remaining jth-
components of pi we distinguish the following cases.
• If j ∈ J and j /∈ I, then the adversary has already probed pi,j , which can be simulated
as in the first phase and entirely used as jth-component of wh.
• If j ∈ J and j ∈ I, then the adversary has already probed pi,j or pj or pj,i. In
the first case the simulator follows the previous step. In both the latter cases, ri,j
was assigned in the preliminary phase and can be used with ai and bj to simulate
the jth-component of wh.
• If j /∈ J , the simulator assigns to the jth-component of pi a random and independent
value: indeed, the bit ri,j involved in the computation of such a component is not
used in any other probe.
We conclude the proof by showing how to simulate a probe wh in the output values. We
notice that since in this case the probes are as in the traditional probing model, the proof
is really similar to the one of Proposition 2 in [Bar+15b]. We have to take into account
the following two cases:
• If the attacker has observed also some of the internal values, then the partial sums
previously probed are already simulated. As for the remaining terms, we note that,
by definition of the scheme, there always exists one random bit rk,l in wh, which
does not appear in the computation of any other observed element. Therefore the
simulator can assign to wh a random and independent value.
• If the attacker has only observed output shares, then we point out that by definition
each of them is composed by t random bits and at most one of them can enter in
the computation of each other output variable ci. Since the adversary may has
previously probed at most t−1 of them, there exist one random bit rk,l in wh, which
does not appear in the computation of any other observed value. Thus the simulator
can assign to wh a random and independent element, completing the proof.
We insist that, despite our 2-cycle implementation is directly inspired by the ISW
construction, the previous proofs of ISW-like multiplications do not imply the new proof.
Indeed, the extended probes provide additional information to the adversary per time,
compared to the software setting analyzed by [RP10] and follow-up works.
We underline that the simulation for the output values profits the careful distribution
of the random bits in the different registers. In particular, each output share depends
on a number of distinct random bits equal to the security order, and these random bits
appear a second time in the computation of only one different output share each. This
fact allows us to simulate the output probes with a random and independent value, and
therefore to use the required number of input shares in order to satisfy the definition of
SNI. The main overhead of this glitch-robust and composable multiplication is the need
117
5. Masking hardware oriented implementations: the robust probing model
of n2 +n registers, to store the partial products in a first cycle and compress the output
in a second cycle.
It is an interesting open problem to determine whether robust and composable gadgets
could be obtained in two cycles with fewer registers and/or randomness than in this
section, e.g., by arranging the operations differently, or if such optimizations can only be
obtained by increasing the number of cycles.
5.4.3. Glitch locality principle
As we pointed out in the discussion above, robust and composable implementations of the
ISW multiplication require to store their outputs ci’s in memory gates, in order to stop
the propagation of glitches in the circuit. This remark leads to the following formalization.
Proposition 5.7. If a gadget g storing its outputs in registers is (1,0,0)−robust t− NI
and t− SNI (without glitches), then it is also (1,0,0)−robust t−SNI.
Proof. By separating the probes between t1 internal and t2 output ones, we have that:
(i) the internal probes can be simulated with t1 shares per input since the gadget
is (1,0,0)−robust t1−probing secure (with t1 ≤ q), and (ii) the t2 probes can be simulated
with t1 input shares since the gadget is t− SNI without glitches.
This proposition shows that if registers are inserted after each (1,0,0)−robust t− NI
gadget, the problem of glitches represents an issue only at the level of the internal
computation. In this case, a designer can deal with composability separately. However,
we underline that glitches and composability are not independent issues since glitch-
robust t-probing security is not enough for proving the lemma. As shown in [Moo+19],
some form of simulatability, captured by the glitch-robust NI notion, is needed.
5.5. Practical security evaluation
We report here the practical security evaluations performed in [Fau+18]. The authors
implemented the 2-cycle architecture of Figure 5.1 in a Xilinx Spartan-6 FPGA for n= 2
and 3 shares, using the same setup as in Section 5.3.1. Based on such a setup, and
since the only interest is the security order of our designs, the authors launched CRI’s
non-specific t-test to recognize differences between the traces corresponding to fixed
inputs and random inputs [Coo+13; Goo+11]. When n= 2, the experiments show second-
order leakages with 1 million measurements, as reported in Figure 5.7. When n= 3, 10
millions measurements are performed and it is exploited the tweak proposed in [Sta17],
Section 3.2, which consists in reproducing 50 times the measurement of 250,000 traces
and averaged them in order to mitigate the noise amplification due to masking, and
to speed up the detection. This permitted to detect third-order leakages, as reported
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Figure 5.7.: Non-specific t-test results of PRESENT S-box for n= 2 shares [Fau+18]
in Figure 5.8. Therefore, since our implementations are composable, we can conclude
that a combination of such higher-order hardware gadgets will still be robust against
glitches and maintain their security for complete, e.g., block cipher, implementations, as
confirmed experimentally for the cipher SIMON in [Roy+15].
Figure 5.8.: Tweaked non-specific t-test results of PRESENT S-box for n = 3
shares [Fau+18]
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5.6. Conclusions
While software-oriented masked implementations already benefit from many leakage
models and the use of formal proofs for analyzing their security, such tools are not yet
well established for hardware-oriented masked implementations. The lack of a suitable
model that formally treats the local security and composability of masked gadgets in
the presence of physical defaults is one of the causes of such a difference. Consequently,
many security claims of proposed masked circuits in hardware have been, before this
work, mainly supported by engineering considerations and informal reasoning of probing
security in the presence of glitches.
The robust probing model that we introduced in this chapter has the goal of filling this
gap. Not only it provides formal guidelines to implementation designers when dealing
with physical defaults. Additionally, it presents arguments in order to produce combined
robustness against physical defaults and composability guarantees. We underline that
robust and composable gadgets are sufficient for designing higher-order secure masked
circuits. However, it is not always required that all gadgets in an implementation satisfy
both properties [Bel+16]. In this context, our results are open to optimization, by
exploiting, for instance, formal methods to analyze full algorithms [Bar+15b]
Our new model makes it also possible to analyze and demonstrate security guarantees
of masked implementations in a versatile way, by differently choosing the parameters λ,τ
and γ. By tuning such parameters, indeed, an implementer can decide the level of security
he wants to achieve, reducing implementation surprises and performance overheads.
The extensive analysis conducted in [Moo+19] on hardware-oriented masking schemes
shows that many gadgets in the literature, which are not proven secure in the robust
probing model, present flaws of security at a local and compositional level for arbitrary
orders, confirming the need of our model.
Lastly, we point out that the introduction of the robust probing model is also helpful
when one cannot leverage the local security order analysis of single gadgets, and instead
has to deal directly with the complexity of full implementations. Indeed, the model
facilitates the analysis of physical defaults in masking schemes with automated tools, as
discussed in [Blo+18]. Moreover, its incorporation in the other existing formal tools, such
as [Bar+15b], to analyze large implementations, is another interesting research direction.
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primitives
With this chapter, we complete our studies with a focus on the protection of algo-
rithms employed in lattice-based constructions, which are considered in the field of
post-quantum cryptography.
Motivation
The field of post-quantum cryptography is increasingly growing in response to the rising
threat of quantum computers, which would make most contemporary cryptography obso-
lete. The NIST post-quantum standardization process has reached its second round [ST17],
and explicitly mentioned the simplicity of ensuring side-channel security guarantees of
the schemes as one evaluation metric [NIS16]. Lattice-based cryptography represents the
largest share among the submissions thanks to its advantages, such as the reasonable
parameter sizes, the simple implementations, and the strong security guarantees given by
advanced constructions, like identity-based encryption and homomorphic encryption.
In this context, studying the security of the practical implementation of lattice-
based cryptosystems is becoming an increasingly interesting research direction, however
still rather understudied. Indeed, in contrast to standard symmetric and asymmetric
cryptography, where the application of masking schemes has been widely examined and
achieves reasonable levels of security and efficiency, most lattice-based cryptosystems
received less attention in these regards.
In the field of lattice-based cryptography, the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem is
at the core of numerous encryption and key exchange schemes. Many of such LWE-based
schemes require sampling from a discrete Gaussian distribution. Several works propose
methods for generating and implementing discrete Gaussian samplers. For small standard
deviations, the binomial sampler introduced in [Alk+] and implemented in [AJS16] is the
best option. Its design allows constant run time and easy implementation, and it does
not require to precompute tables. On the other hand, the side-channel protection of such
a sampler is still subject of on-going research, and, in particular, only few publications
address the resistance against power analysis attacks. An example is the work in [Ode+18],
where the authors provide a binomial sampler protected against a first-order adversary.
However, the scheme provided is not easily extendable to higher security orders, and, in
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the case study of [Ode+18], it represents the bottleneck of the implementation, causing a
performance overhead of more than 400%.
Such reduced performances derive mainly from the use of different masking schemes. A
binomial sampler commonly works by taking the difference between the Hamming weight
of two uniformly random bit vectors. Such initial uniform randomness is usually generated
by a pseudo random number generator (PRNG). Since many PRNGs rely on Boolean
operations, in the initial stage it is convenient to adopt the Boolean masking. However,
the subsequent operations in the lattice scheme are mostly linear arithmetic operations,
for which the Arithmetic masking is more suited. In order to connect these two steps,
a crucial algorithm of a protected sampler is a Boolean-to-arithmetic (B2A) masking
conversion. Previous works, as [Ode+18] and [Bar+18a], recognized the development of
such a conversion algorithm as a significant challenge for ensuring efficient protection of
lattice-based cryptography.
In the light of the observations above, our primary goal in this chapter is to study the
integration of physical countermeasures to a binomial sampler for an arbitrary security
order. To reach this scope efficiently, we aim at providing new conversion algorithms
from Boolean to Arithmetic masking, which, for the parameters adopted in lattice-based
cryptography, outperform previous algorithms.
Contribution
In this chapter, we propose two masked binomial samplers for lattice-based encryption
and key exchange schemes, protected for arbitrary orders. Both samplers support
arbitrary moduli, therefore they can be used by a wide set of NIST submissions, e.g.,
NewHope [Alk+], LIMA [Sma+17], Saber [D’A+17], Kyber [Ava+17], HILA5 [Saa17],
or Ding Key Exchange [Din+17]. The first sampler is a higher-order extension of the
method from [Ode+18]. The second one is a variant that uses bit-slicing, which increases
the throughput additionally.
We give an intuitive explanation of the contribution, by quickly describing the bit-sliced
sampler. The algorithm takes in inputs two κ-bit vectors, x and y, which are masked
pseudo-random bits, output of a Boolean-masked SHAKE. Then, the algorithm performs
the difference between the Hamming weights of such vectors, and finally a conversion
algorithm B2Aq transforms the result into an Arithmetic masked output modulo a prime q.
More precisely, the sampler is structured as in Figure 6.1. First, the routine HW computes
the Hamming weight of x using bit-slicing. Successively, SubHW directly subtracts from
the result the Hamming weight of y and ConstAdd adds the constant κ to correctly map
the sign of the difference. After the B2Aq conversion, κ is subtracted to recover correctly
the result.
Most existing B2A conversion algorithms consider a modulo power of two, i.e., of
the form 2k. However, lattice-based schemes often require the modulo to be a prime
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Figure 6.1.: Structure of the new bit-sliced sampler
which can be arbitrarily chosen. For this reason, we also investigate the conversion
algorithms for prime moduli. First, we revise the quadratic B2A algorithm of [CGV14], by
exploiting some of the ideas defined in [Bar+18a]. This leads to A2Bq and B2Aq algorithms
providing the best asymptotic run time complexity to date, i.e., O(n2 logk), where k
denotes the bit size of the operands and n the number of shares. Second, we introduce a
new B2Aq conversion scheme with run time complexity O(n2 ·k). While its asymptotic
complexity is worse than our quadratic adaptation of [Bar+18a], it still significantly
decreases the conversion time for relevant values of k. Moreover, for certain parameters
(e.g., n≥ 11 for k = 32), the new algorithm outperforms the common B2A algorithms for
power-of-two moduli.
Our new B2Aq conversion works with a recursive approach. We give in the following an
example for security order t= 2 and shares n= 3. First, the subroutine B2A(2)q−Bit takes as
inputs the first two shares x1,x2 of the input x and produces the shares Sh1,Sh2 defined
as follows:
Sh1 = (x1− rnd1)−2((x1− rnd1) ·x2) +x2
Sh2 = rnd1−2(rnd1 ·x2)
where rnd1 $← Fq. Such shares are injected in the subroutine B2A(3)q−Bit, along with the





Figure 6.2.: Structure of the new B2Aq, for q prime and t= 2
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A′1 = (Sh1− rnd2)−2(Sh1− rnd2) ·x3 +x3
A′2 = (Sh2− rnd2)−2(Sh2− rnd2) ·x3
A′3 = rnd2−2 · rnd2 ·x3
where rnd2 $← Fq. It is easy to see the correctness of the approach. The sum of the
shares, after canceling out the randomness, gives the following result:
A′1 +A′2 +A′3 = x1⊕x2−2 ·x1x3⊕2 ·x2x3
= x1⊕x2⊕x3 = x
Since B2A(i)q−Bit, for i ∈ N, is a t− NI gadget, in order to obtain an overall t− SNI
conversion, the outputs (A′1,A′2,A′3) need to be further processed by a t− SNI re-
freshing scheme Refresh, which produces the final output shares of the conversion algo-
rithm (A1,A2,A3).
In the chapter, we provide formal proofs that all our proposed algorithms are t− SNI,
with n= t+ 1 shares.
The implementation of our constructions on an ARM Cortex-M4F micro-controller
given in [Sch+19]shows that our new B2Aq conversion increases the performance of the
samplers respect to the adaptation of [Bar+18a] up to a factor of 46. Additionally,
our new bit-sliced sampler improves the performance over a generalized version of the
approach of [Ode+18] up to a factor of 15. The combination of both methods results in
the currently most efficient masked binomial sampler.
Related Work
Barthe et al. in [Bar+18a] proposed, for the first time, a provably-secure uniform sampler
for arbitrary orders. However, compared to binomial samplers, their sampler requires
different implementation difficulties. Therefore such a result is challenging to use in the
protection of a binomial sampler. In the same year, Oder et al. in [Ode+18] developed a
protected implementation of NewHope [Alk+], which is one of the submissions to the
NIST post-quantum standardization process. In their construction, the authors make use
of a masked binomial sampler highly optimized for first-order probing security. Interest-
ingly, their results show that the protection of the binomial sampler can heavily influence
the performance of the whole scheme, leaving as an open problem the investigation of a
more efficient masked binomial sampler.
As we already underlined, to achieve this goal, the conversion algorithms from Boolean
to Arithmetic masking assume a crucial role. Many works in the literature study this type
of conversion schemes [BCZ18; Bir+17; CGV14; Cor+15; Cor17; Deb12; HT19; KRJ14;
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SMG15; WH17]. However, these schemes focus uniquely on power-of-two moduli, since
they mostly target symmetric cryptosystems, and they are, therefore, not convenient to
adopt in lattice-based schemes.
Oder et al. in [Ode+18] gave some basic solutions for A2B and B2A conversions modulo
a generic q. However, the authors did not rigorously formalize the algorithms, and
the security of their approach is restricted to only a first-order adversary. The first
conversion algorithm for arbitrary moduli and high-order probing security was introduced
in [Bar+18a], and it is based on the cubic conversion of [CGV14].
The authors introduced a new Boolean-masked addition algorithm that works modulo
a prime q with 2k ≥ 2q. According to this scheme, they modified both the A2B and
B2A algorithms from [CGV14] to deal with moduli different than a power-of-two. The
security proof that the authors provide refers only to an adaptation of the A2B algorithm
from [CGV14] with cubic complexity.
Notation
In the rest of the chapter, q represents a prime number, k the bit size of the conversion,
κ the bit size of the input vectors of the samplers, and, as in the rest of this thesis,
n is the number of shares and t the security order. Conventionally, we denote with
B2A the standard conversion from Boolean to arithmetic masking and with B2Aq the
same transformation for prime moduli. Moreover, Boolean encoding is represented in
the lower case, while the upper one is adopted for Arithmetic encoding. Operations
on the whole encoding, i.e., vector of shares, are denoted in bold and performed share-








= xi, i.e., the
least-significant bit (LSB) of xi is written as x(1)i (resp. x(1) denotes the LSB of x).
6.1. New Conversion Algorithms from Boolean to
Arithmetic masking
In the following sections we first present our techniques to improve the previous con-
version algorithms from Boolean to Arithmetic masking, which are used in the masked
implementation of binomial samplers.
6.1.1. Improved higher-order B2Aq from [Bar+18b]
We start by analyzing how it is possible to adjust the B2Aq conversion algorithm with
quadratic complexity from [CGV14] to work with prime moduli. The idea that we discuss
in this section was already proposed in [Bar+18b] and it is represented in Algorithm 6.1,
but it lacked a formal security analysis.
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First of all, we recall how the conversion in [CGV14] works. The algorithm starts
by initializing the shares (Ai)1≤i≤n−1 with random samples in F2k . Such shares are
then used to produce a random encoding A′, with shares ∑ni=1A′i =−∑n−1i=1 Ai mod 2k.
Then, using an Arithmetic-to-Boolean (A2B) conversion algorithm, such an encoding
is converted into a Boolean one, with shares ⊕i yi =∑iA′i mod 2k. The shares yi are













At this point, the function FullXOR : Fn2k 7→ F2k [CGV14] securely decodes z and the last









Ai) = x mod 2k.
In the same paper [CGV14] it is presented an improved version of the aforementioned
algorithm as well. Its core idea is to use recursion. The n input shares Ai are divided
into two halves of bn2 c and d
n
2 e. Then the algorithm recursively calls itself for the two
halves and the resulting encodings are then added together as
x=
(
















We now give the algorithmic representation of the modified conversion, and we prove
its t− SNI property. This improvement facilitates a fair comparison with our new
algorithms. Algorithm 6.2 represents the original scheme from [Bar+18b]. We refer to
Appendix A for the routines used in the algorithms. The shares are added sequentially
using SecArithBoolModp, leading to run-time complexity O(n3 · logk).
Algorithm 6.1 SecBoolArithModp [Bar+18b]
Input: x = (xi)1≤i≤n ∈ Fk2 such that
⊕
ixi = x ∈ Fk2
Output: A = (Ai)1≤i≤n ∈ Fq such that
∑
iAi = x mod q
1: (Ai)1≤i≤n−1 $← Fq
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Algorithm 6.2 SecArithBoolModp (cubic) [Bar+18b]
Input: A = (Ai)1≤i≤n ∈ Fq such that
∑
iAi = x mod q ∈ Fq




2: for j = 1 to n do
3: (yi)1≤i≤n← (Aj ,0, . . . ,0)
4: y← RefreshXOR(y,k)
5: x← SecAddModp(x,y,k)
Algorithm 6.3 SecArithBoolModp (quadratic)
Input: A = (Ai)1≤i≤n ∈ Fq such that
∑
iAi = x mod q ∈ Fq
Output: x = (xi)1≤i≤n ∈ Fk2 with 2k > 2q such that
⊕
ixi = x
















(z1, . . . ,zdn/2e,0, . . . ,0),k
)
7: x← SecAddModp(y,z)
To improve this, we make use of the recursive construction explained above in Equa-
tion (6.1). More precisely, we split the input encoding of SecArithBoolModp into two sets
of bn/2c and dn/2e elements. For each subset, we execute a new call of SecArithBoolModp,
and we add up the results. This strategy provides the advantage that each subroutine
processes a smaller number of shares, and consequently the complexity of the refresh and
of the addition are reduced. The overall complexity of the conversion is O(n2 · logk).
To derive an analogous quadratic B2Aq conversion, we replace the call of the routine
SecArithBoolModp with the A2Bq algorithm with quadratic complexity, given in Algo-
rithm 6.3. The t− SNI refresh RefreshXOR from [Bar+18b] is used in place of the Expand
function from [CGV14] in order to map the bn/2c (resp. dn/2e) Boolean shares to the n
shares needed for the secure masked addition. We first pad with zeros the Boolean
encodings and then we refresh the resulting n shares. An exemplary structure for the
case n= 4 is depicted in Figure 6.4.
Security analysis
The t− SNI security of SecBoolArithModp in Algorithm 6.1, when using the quadratic
version of SecArithBoolModp, relies on the fact that SecArithBoolModp itself is t− SNI.
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Before proceeding with proving that Algorithm 6.3 is t− SNI, we give the following lemma.
Lemma 6.1. Given a circuit C as in Figure 6.3, where f,g are t− SNI gadgets and h
is t− NI, the circuit C is t− SNI.
Proof. Let Ω = (I,O) be the set of adversarial observations on C, where I are the probes
on the internal values and O the ones on the output values, with |I|+ |O| ≤ t. In
particular, let If be the set of probes on f, Ig the set of probes on g and Ih be the set of
probes on h, with |If∪Ig∪Ih| ≤ |I|.
We prove the existence of a simulator which can simulate the adversary’s view by using
at most |I| input shares, analyzing the circuit from right to left.
Gadget h: Since h is t− NI and |Ih∪O|≤ t, then there exist two observation sets Sh1 ,Sh2
such that |Sh1 | ≤ |Ih∪O|, |Sh2 | ≤ |Ih∪O| and the gadget can be simulated using at most
|Sh1 |+ |Sh2 | shares of the inputs.
Gadget f: Since f is t− SNI and |If ∪Sh1 | ≤ t, then there exists an observation
set Sf such that |Sf| ≤ |If| and the gadget can be simulated using at most |Sf| shares of
the inputs.
Gadget g: Since g is t− SNI and |Ig ∪Sh2 | ≤ t, then there exists an observation
set Sg such that |Sg| ≤ |Ig| and the gadget can be simulated using at most |Sg| shares of
the inputs.
Combining the previous steps of the simulation, we can claim that C can be simulated
by using at most |Sf∪Sg| ≤ |If|+ |Ig| ≤ |I| shares of the inputs, completing the proof.
Proposition 6.2. SecArithBoolModp in Algorithm 6.3 is t− SNI, for t= n−1.
Proof. In order to prove SecArithBoolModp to be t− SNI we iteratively split the circuit
in sub-circuits Ci, for i= 2, . . . ,n, where Cn := SecArithBoolModp, as in Figure 6.4, and
we prove the statement by induction on i ∈ N.
We remark that C2 is of the form of the circuit in Figure 6.3. Indeed RefreshXOR
is t− SNI and SecAddModp is t− NI, as proven in [Bar+18b]. Therefore thanks to











Figure 6.3.: Recurrent scheme in Algorithm 6.3
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Figure 6.4.: Structure of SecArithBoolModp in Algorithm 6.3 for n= 4
Let us suppose now that Cn−2 is t− SNI and we prove the statement for Cn.
Since the composition of t− SNI gadgets is still t− SNI, as pointed out in [Bar+15a],
we know that both Cn−2((Ai)1≤i≤bn/2c) and Cn−2((Ai)bn/2c+1≤i≤n) composed with the
gadget RefreshXOR are t− SNI. Therefore the circuit Cn can be represented as the
circuit in Figure 6.3, where f is substituted by RefreshXOR(Cn−2((Ai)1≤i≤bn/2c)), g
by RefreshXOR(Cn−2((Ai)bn/2c+1≤i≤n)), and h by SecAddModp. From Lemma 6.1 we
conclude therefore that Cn is t− SNI, completing the proof.
6.1.2. A new B2Aq conversion algorithm for x ∈ F2
In this section, we present our work on a new B2Aq conversion algorithm for x ∈ F2.
The core idea of the new scheme is to exploit the following arithmetic property that
Boolean-masked bits (x1,x2) with x1⊕x2 = x provide:
x= x1 +x2−2 ·x1 ·x2. (6.2)
We use such a relation to transform these Boolean-masked bits to an Arithmetic encoding
modulo q.
When the variables are in F2, our goal is to securely transform the Boolean shares
(x1,x2) ∈ F2 with x1⊕x2 = x into Arithmetic shares (A1,A2) with A1 +A2 = x mod q,
for some arbitrary modulo q. For this purpose, the Boolean shares are transformed
to the Arithmetic encodings B1 + B2 = x1 and C1 +C2 = x2. This results in the
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Algorithm 6.4 SecB2Aq−Bit (simple)
Input: x = (xi)1≤i≤n ∈ F2 such that
⊕
ixi = x
Output: A = (Ai)1≤i≤n ∈ Fq such that
∑
iAi = x mod q
1: (Ai)1≤i≤n← 0
2: for j = 1 to n do
3: (Bi)1≤i≤n← (xj ,0, . . . ,0)




x= x1⊕x2 = (B1 +B2)⊕ (C1 +C2)
= (B1 +B2) + (C1 +C2)−2 · (B1 +B2) · (C1 +C2).
Before deriving the final Arithmetic encoding A, we have to sample a fresh random
element R ∈ Fq to secure the shared multiplication (B1 +B2) · (C1 +C2). Now, it is easily
possible to compute the shares as:
A1 =B1 +C1 +R−2 ·B1 ·C1−2 ·B1 ·C2
A2 =B2 +C2−R−2 ·B2 ·C1−2 ·B2 ·C2.
In order to extend this simple first-order method to arbitrary orders, we need to adopt a
suited refresh and multiplication algorithm, as represented in Algorithm 6.4.
This straightforward method has the drawback to be really expensive and inefficient
for increasing security orders. Indeed the algorithm has a run time complexity of O(n3),
i.e., cubic in the number of shares. In order to increase the performance of such
simple algorithm, we apply the following improvements. First, we notice that using
the t− SNI refresh RefreshADD for every iteration round is not necessary. Instead, it
is sufficient to use a t− NI refresh per round and a single t− SNI refresh at the end of
the algorithm. Such a change decreases the complexity of the refresh for every iteration
from O(n2) to O(n). As a second improvement, in place of multiplying two complete
encodings as SecMul(A,B), we do not refresh xj and instead compute the component-wise
multiplication A ·xj . At this point, we underline that this option is possible only thanks
to the aforementioned t− NI refresh, which ensures that the encoding A is independent
of xj . Such a second change allows saving another operation with O(n2) and reducing
it to O(n). Moreover, we can save n− 1 operations of the addition A +xj . Our last
improvement consists of varying the number of considered shares in each iteration, e.g.,
for j = 2, the operations are done on two shares.
We give the optimized conversion in Algorithm 6.5, which now has a run time com-
plexity O(n2). Its structure is depicted in Figure 6.5.
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Algorithm 6.5 SecB2Aq−Bit (optimized)
Input: x = (xi)1≤i≤n ∈ F2 such that
⊕
ixi = x ∈ F2
Output: A = (Ai)1≤i≤n ∈ Fq such that
∑




Input: x = (xi)1≤i≤n ∈ F2 such that
⊕
ixi = x ∈ F2
Output: A = (Ai)1≤i≤n ∈ Fq such that
∑
iAi = x mod q
1: A← x1
2: for j = 2 to n do
3: A← B2A(j)q−Bit(A,xj)
Correctness
We prove the correctness of B2Aq−Bit, since the refreshing afterwards does not change
the decoded output. The proof is based on the following property, already mentioned
in Equation (6.2). Given x1,x2 ∈ F2, the XOR between the two bits can be written
as x1⊕x2 = x1 +x2−2 ·x1 ·x2. Generalizing to the case of n values, it is easy to see that
n⊕
i=1






























which, for Equation 6.3, is exactly ⊕ni=1xi.
Security analysis
In the following propositions we show that our conversion scheme SecB2Aq−Bit in Algo-
rithm 6.5 satisfies the t− SNI property, when t = n−1.
Proposition 6.3. B2A(2)q−Bit in Algorithm 6.7 is 1−NI.
Proof. Let us suppose that the adversary has exactly 1 probe w in Algorithm 6.7. This
belongs to one of the following possible groups:
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Algorithm 6.7 B2A(n)q−Bit
Input: A = (Ai)1≤i≤n−1 ∈ Fq such that
∑
iAi = x; xn ∈ F2
Output: C = (Ci)1≤i≤n ∈ Fq such that
∑
iCi = (x⊕xn) mod q
1: Bn
$← Fq
2: B1←A1−Bn mod q
3: for j = 2 to n−1 do
4: R $← Fq
5: Bj ←Aj−R mod q
6: Bn←Bn+R mod q
7: for j = 1 to n do
8: Cj ←Bj−2 · (Bj ·xn) mod q









Figure 6.5.: Structure of SecB2Aq−Bit in Algorithm 6.5
(1) x1,x2
(2) B2
(3) B1 :=A1−B2 = x1−B2
(4) B1 ·x2 = (x1−B2) ·x2, b :=B1−2(B1 ·x2)
(5) B2 ·x2, B2−2(B2 ·x2)
(6) b+x2 = (B1−2(B1 ·x2)) +x2
The simulation of the probe w, by using at most 1 share of the inputs, is straightforward.
• If the probe w is in group (1)the values can be simulated as x1 (resp. x2) as in the
real algorithm.
• If the probe w is in one of the groups from (2) to (6), thanks to the presence in the
computation of w of the random values B1 or B2, it is simulated by assigning it to a
random and independent value in Fq.
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We remark that the algorithm is not t−SNI. Indeed, if an adversary probes the output
share (B1−2(B1 ·x2))+x2 = ((x1−B2)−2((x1−B2) ·x2))+x2 and the internal value B2,
then the adversary gets the knowledge of two inputs shares, contradicting the definition
of t− SNI.
In the following proposition we prove that the algorithm B2Aq−Bit is t− NI.
Proposition 6.4. B2Aq−Bit in Algorithm 6.6 is t−NI.
Proof. In the following, we denote with Ci the execution of Algorithm 6.6 until the ith
iteration of the for, for i= 2, . . . ,n, as indicated in Figure 6.5. Note that Cn := B2Aq−Bit.
We prove the statement by induction on the value i. From Proposition 6.3 the condition
is satisfied for the case of i= 2.
Let now assume that Ci is (i−1)−NI for all i ≤ n−1 and we show that under this
condition Cn is t−NI as well. First of all, let us denote with A(i)j the output shares of Ci
for all i ≤ n−1 and with j = 1, . . . ,n. We can classify the internal and output values
of Cn in the following groups:
(1) Bj for j = 2, . . . ,n, r
(2) An−11
(3) b1 :=An−11 −B2−·· ·−Bj , with j = 2, . . . ,n
(4) A(n−1)j − rj =: bj , with j = 2, . . . ,n
(5) A(n)1 = (An−11 −B2−·· ·−Bn) +xn = b1 +xn




j − rj) ·xn) = bj−2(bj ·xn)
(7) xn
Let us suppose w.l.o.g. that an adversary has Ω probes on Cn with |Ω|= t= t1 + · · ·+ tn,
where t1 + · · ·+ ti are the probes on Ci. We show that the adversary’s observation on Cn
can be simulated by using at most t shares of the input.
We first construct a set of indexes I. For each probe in group (5) or group (6), we
add n to I. The simulation follows the steps below.
• Step 1. The probes in group (1) are simulated by assigning them to a random and
independent value in Fq.
• Step 2. Since by hypothesis B2A(n−1)q−Bit is t−NI, the probes in group (2) can be
simulated by using at most t1 + · · ·+ tn−1 shares.
• Step 3. If a probe is in group (3) and at least one of the B2, . . . ,Bj is not in Ω,
then the values can be assigned to a random and independent value. Otherwise,
if B2, . . . ,Bj ∈Ω, then since B2A(n−1)q−Bit is t−NI the probes can be simulated by using at
most t1 + · · ·+ tn−1 shares of the input and the assigned values of B2, . . . ,Bj in Step 1.
Otherwise, if a sum An−11 −B2−·· ·−Bk ∈Ω, with k < j, and Bk+1, . . . ,Bj ∈Ω, then
the values can be computed as in the real execution of the algorithm, by using the
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values Bk+1, . . . ,Bj assigned in Step 1 and the simulated sum An−11 −B2−·· ·−Bk
in one of the phases of this Step.
• Step 4. If a probe is in group (4) and rj /∈ Ω, then the values can be assigned to a
random and independent value. Otherwise, if rj ∈ Ω, then since B2A(n−1)q−Bit is t−NI
the probes can be simulated by using at most t1 + · · ·+ tn−1 shares and the value rj
assigned in Step 1.
• Step 5. If a probe is in group (5) and b1 ∈Ω, then by construction n ∈ I and we can
compute the value as in the algorithm, by using the b1 simulated at Step 3 and xn.
Otherwise, if b1 /∈ Ω, we can simulate b1 as in Step 3, by using at most t1 + · · ·+ tn+1
input shares and xn, since n ∈ I.
• Step 6. If a probe is in group (6) and bj ∈Ω, then by construction n ∈ I and we can
compute the value as in the algorithm, by using the bj simulated in Step 4 and xn.
Otherwise, if bj /∈ Ω, we can simulate bj as in Step 4, by using at most t1 + · · ·+ tn+1
input shares and xn, since n ∈ I.
• Step 7. If a probe is in group (7), by construction n ∈ I and we can trivially
simulate xn.
In all the steps listed above, we showed that the simulation uses at most t input shares,
as required from Definition 2.4, completing the proof.
Before proceeding with the next proposition, we remind that the refreshing scheme
added at the end of SecB2Aq−Bit is an algorithm presented in [Bar+18b] and proven
to be t− SNI. The t− SNI security of SecB2Aq−Bit relies exactly on the introduction
of this gadget after the computation of SecB2Aq−Bit. We see below a more detailed
security proof.
Proposition 6.5. SecB2Aq−Bit in Algorithm 6.5 is t−SNI.
Proof. The t− SNI security of SecB2Aq−Bit easily follows from the fact that B2Aq−Bit
is t− NI and RefreshADD is t− SNI.
Let Ω = (I,O) be the set of probes on SecB2Aq−Bit, where I1 are the probes on the
internal wires of B2Aq−Bit and I2 are the probes on the internal wires of RefreshADD,
with |I|= |I1|+ |I2| ≤ t1 and |I|+ |O| ≤ t.
Since RefreshADD is t− SNI and |I2∪O| ≤ t, then there exists an observation set S2
such that |S2| ≤ |I2| and the gadget can be simulated from its input shares corresponding
to the indexes in S2.
Since SecB2Aq−Bit is t− NI and |I1∪S2| ≤ |I1∪ I2| ≤ t, then it exists an observation
set S1 such that |S1| ≤ |I1∪S2| and the gadget can be simulated from its input shares
corresponding to the indexes in S1.
Now, by composing the simulators that we have for the two gadgets RefreshADD
and SecB2Aq−Bit, all the probes of the circuit can be simulated from |S1| ≤ |I1|+ |I2| ≤ t1
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Algorithm 6.8 RefreshADD (based on RefreshXOR [Bar+18b])
Input: A = (Ai)1≤i≤n ∈ Fq such that
∑
iAi = x mod q, modulo q
Output: B = (Bi)1≤i≤n ∈ Fq such that
∑
iBi = x mod q
1: B←A
2: for i= 1 to n−1 do
3: for j = 1 + i to n do
4: R $← Fq
5: Bi←Bi+ r
6: Bj ←Bj− r
Algorithm 6.9 SecB2Aq
Input: x = (xi)1≤i≤n ∈ F2k such that
⊕
ixi = x ∈ F2k
Output: A = (Ai)1≤i≤n ∈ Fq such that
∑
iAi = x mod q
1: A← SecB2Aq−Bit ((x>> (k−1))∧1)
2: for j = 2 to k do
3: B← SecB2Aq−Bit ((x>> (k− j))∧1)
4: A← 2 ·A+B mod q
shares of the input x and therefore, according to Definition 2.5, the circuit in Figure 6.5
is t− SNI.
6.1.3. A new B2Aq conversion algorithm for x ∈ F2k
The approach presented in the previous section, despite being efficient and simple, has
the disadvantage of computing the right results only for Boolean encodings of bit values.
If we consider arbitrary bit sizes, the arithmetic property in Equation 6.2 does not hold
anymore, since it is specific for case of 2− bit sized values. We generalize the approach
by applying the previous conversion distinctly to each input bit and combine with
component-wise addition. This approach results in a complexity O(n2 ·k), as we have k
calls to SecB2Aq−Bit. The complete conversion algorithm is represented in Algorithm 6.9
and its basic structure for k = 3 is depicted in Figure 6.6.
Correctness
Let us assume that 2k ≤ q. It is easy to see that for each i = 1, . . . ,n the output shares
are of the following form
Ai = 20 ·B2Aq−Bit(x(1)i ) + 21 ·B2Aq−Bit(x
(2)




6. Masking lattice-based cryptographic primitives
Figure 6.6.: Structure of SecB2Aq in Algorithm 6.9 for k = 3
and therefore ∑ni=1Ai = x mod q.
Security analysis
As done for the previous algorithms, we give in the following the proof of security
according to the t− SNI property, for t≤ n−1.
Proposition 6.6. SecB2Aq in Algorithm 6.9 is t− SNI, with t≤ n−1.
Proof. The proof that Algorithm 6.9 is t− SNI follows from the fact that SecB2Aq−Bit
is t− SNI and from the structure of the algorithm itself, depicted in Figure 6.6.
First, we define Ci, for i= 1, . . . ,k, represented in Figure 6.6, where C1 := SecB2Aq−Bit
and Cn := SecB2Aq. We prove the statement by induction on i ∈ N.
Thanks to Proposition 6.5, C1 is t− SNI.
We suppose now that Ci is t− SNI for all i= 1, . . . ,n−1 and we prove that Cn is t− SNI.
Let Ω = (I,O) be the set of adversarial observations on Cn, where I are the ones on the
internal values and O the ones on the output values, with |I|+ |O| ≤ t. In particular,
let I1 be the set of probes on +, I2 the set of probes on 2·, I3 be the set of probes
on Cn−1 and I4 be the set of probes on SecB2Aq−Bit, with
∑
j |Ij | ≤ |I|.
We prove the existence of a simulator which can simulate the adversary’s view by using
at most |I| input shares. We proceed with the analysis of the circuit from right to left.
Since + is a linear operation and |I1∪O| ≤ t, there exist two observation sets S11 ,S12
such that |S11 | ≤ |I1 ∪O|, |S12 | ≤ |I1 ∪O| and the gadget can be simulated using at
most |S11 |+ |S12 | shares of the inputs.
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Since 2· is a linear operation and |I2∪S12 | ≤ t, then there exists an observation set S2
such that |S2| ≤ |I2∪S12 | and the gadget can be simulated using at most |S2|+ |S12 | shares
of the inputs.
Since, for the assumption step, Cn−1 is t− SNI and moreover |I3∪S2| ≤ t, there exists
an observation set S3 such that |S3| ≤ |I3| and the gadget can be simulated using at
most |S3| shares of the inputs.
Since SecB2Aq−Bit is t− SNI and moreover |I4∪S11 | ≤ t, there exists an observation
set S4 such that |S4| ≤ |I4| and the gadget can be simulated using at most |S4| shares of
the inputs.
By combining the steps above, we see that Cn can be simulated by using a total
of |S3∪S4| ≤ |I3|+ |I4| ≤ |I| input shares, completing the proof.
6.1.4. Performance analysis
We report in the following the performance analysis conducted in [Sch+19]. Our new
conversion algorithms are compared to the cubic conversion from [Bar+18b] for a prime
modulo q = 12289 as used in NewHope. Additionally, SecB2Aq is compared to the
conversions from [CGV14] and [BCZ18], since they are currently the fastest algorithms
for power-of-two moduli secure at arbitrary orders
Number of operations
For comparison, the authors estimated the number of operations of the different Boolean-
to-arithmetic conversions.
For the comparison of B2Aq conversions, it is considered the prime modulo from
the NIST submission NewHope q = 12289. Since the modular addition SecAddModp
requires 2k > 2q, the authors always call SecBoolArithModp with k′ = dlog2 2qe= 15 in
this evaluation. The results are summarized in Table 6.1.
Additionally, we compare our new algorithms with the state-of-the-art B2A conversions
assuming a modulo of 2k for different values of k. The resulting performances are given
in Table 6.2. As expected, the algorithm of [BCZ18] outperforms all other solutions for
small n. Surprisingly, however, our new conversion SecB2Aq outperforms the approach
of [CGV14] for the considered values of k.
Randomness complexity
As for the randomness complexity, the authors estimated the number of required random
bits for the different Boolean-to-arithmetic conversions.
As before, B2Aq conversions are initially compared considering the prime modulo from
the NIST submission NewHope q = 12289. The results are reported in Table 6.3 and
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n 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 16
k = 4 (A) 76 174 308 478 684 926 1,204 1,518 1,868 2,254 4,724
k = 8 (A) 156 354 624 966 1,380 1,866 2,424 3,054 3,756 4,530 9,480
k = 15
(A) 296 669 1,177 1,820 2,598 3,511 4,559 5,742 7,060 8,513 17,803
(B) 765 2,451 5,617 10,722 18,225 28,585 42,261 59,712 81,397 107,775 326,125
(C) 695 1,948 3,513 5,842 8,483 11,592 15,013 19,354 24,007 29,128 60,973
Table 6.1.: Operation count for B2A conversions with prime modulo q = 12289
for (A) SecB2Aq, (B) SecBoolArithModp (cubic) [Bar+18b], and
(C) SecArithBoolModp (quadratic) [Sch+19]
again SecB2Aq outperforms SecBoolArithModp. However, the authors underline that all
random samples for SecB2Aq are from Fq, while SecBoolArithModp only requires (n−1)
random values from Fq and the remaining are sampled from F2k1 , which can be more
efficient depending on the RNG.
As for the cases of a power-of-two modulo, the authors estimate the number of RNG
calls. Table 6.4 summarizes the resulting performances. We can see again that the
algorithm of [BCZ18] outperforms all other algorithms for small n, while SecB2Aq gives
the best performance for specific values of k and n.
6.2. Masked implementation for higher-order binomial samplers
In this section, we present two new masked binomial samplers: the first one is a general-
ization over the work in [Ode+18], and the second is a new bit-sliced sampler.
According to several schemes that rely on a Boolean-masked PRNG to produce uniform
pseudorandomness, the inputs of the sampler algorithm are two variables (x,y) of length
κ bits. We indicate with (x,y) their Boolean encoding. The goal of the sampler is
to securely compute the difference between the Hamming weights of such encodings
HW(x)− HW(y) and, in line to the modulo q of the subsequent lattice operations, to
produce arithmetic shares A such that ∑iAi = HW(x)−HW(y) mod q. The last step can
be performed employing any B2Aq scheme.
Our contribution is divided into two parts. We start by presenting a generalization
of the first-order sampler in [Ode+18]. Then, we introduce a more efficient sampling
algorithm based on bitslicing. The performances of both algorithms are compared using
NewHope as a case study.
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n 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 16
∀k (D) 15 49 123 277 591 1,225 2,499 5,053 10,167 20,401 655,251
k = 1
(A) 12 33 63 102 150 207 273 348 432 525 1,125
(E) 56 135 234 374 534 721 928 1,183 1,458 1,760 3,640
k = 4
(A) 76 174 308 478 684 926 1,204 1,518 1,868 2,254 4,724
(E) 134 354 636 1,052 1,530 2,098 2,728 3,520 4,374 5,318 11,248
k = 8
(A) 156 354 624 966 1,380 1,866 2,424 3,054 3,756 4,530 9,480
(E) 238 646 1,172 1,956 2,858 3,934 5,128 6,636 8,262 10,062 21,392
k = 32
(A) 636 1,434 2,520 3,894 5,556 7,506 9,744 12,270 15,084 18,186 38,016
(E) 862 2,398 4,388 7,380 10,826 14,950 19,528 25,332 31,590 38,526 82,256
Table 6.2.: Operation count for B2A conversions modulo 2k for (A) SecB2Aq, (D) Bettale
et al. [BCZ18], and (E) Coron et al. [CGV14]. The bold indicates where our
new algorithm provides the best performance [Sch+19]
n 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 16
k =4 (A) 112 336 672 1,120 1,680 2,352 3,136 4,032 5,040 6,160 13,440
k =8 (A) 224 672 1,344 2,240 3,360 4,704 6,272 8,064 10,080 12,320 26,880
k =15
(A) 420 1,260 2,520 4,200 6,300 8,820 11,760 15,120 18,900 23,100 50,400
(B) 1,244 4,933 12,282 24,506 42,820 68,439 102,578 146,452 201,276 268,265 828,210
(C) 854 2,968 5,922 10,556 16,030 22,764 30,338 40,012 50,526 62,300 137,970
Table 6.3.: Required random bits for B2A conversions with q = 12289 for
(A) SecB2Aq, (B) SecBoolArithModp (cubic) [Bar+18b], and (C)
SecArithBoolModp (quadratic). Note that sampling from Fq is estimated
with dlog2 qe bits [Sch+19]
6.2.1. Generalization at high-order of [Ode+18]
Before giving our improved algorithm, we first recap the construction from [Ode+18].
The sampler uses a Boolean-masked SHAKE core [Dwo15], i.e., an algorithm that
takes an arbitrarily long input string and it returns an arbitrarily long pseudorandom
output string, to generate masked pseudorandom bits uniformly distributed. The inputs
of the sampler are two 8-bit vectors (x,y) produced by the SHAKE, and the algorithm
calculates the difference of their Hamming weights. At this point, the sampler needs to
convert from Boolean masking to Arithmetic masking modulo the prime q of the lattice
scheme where it is used. To this end, the authors exploit the relation in Equation 6.2.
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n 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 16
∀k (D) 2 7 18 41 88 183 374 757 1,524 3,059 98,286
k = 1
(A) 2 6 12 20 30 42 56 72 90 110 240
(E) 9 23 41 66 95 129 167 213 263 318 663
k = 4
(A) 8 24 48 80 120 168 224 288 360 440 960
(E) 15 44 83 141 209 291 383 498 623 762 1,647
k = 8
(A) 16 48 96 160 240 336 448 576 720 880 1,920
(E) 23 72 139 241 361 507 671 878 1,103 1,354 2,959
k = 32
(A) 64 192 384 640 960 1,344 1,792 2,304 2,880 3,520 7,680
(E) 71 240 475 841 1,273 1,803 2,399 3,158 3,983 4,906 10,831
Table 6.4.: Number of RNG calls for Boolean-to-arithmetic conversions modulo 2k for
(A) SecB2Aq, (D) Bettale et al. [BCZ18], and (E) Coron et al. [CGV14].
The bold indicates where our new algorithm provides the best perfor-
mance [Sch+19]
The resulting masked sampler is in Algorithm 4 from [Ode+18], provided in Appendix A.
The approach mentioned above is our starting point for the construction of a generalized
sampler at high-order for any modulo q, and length of the bit-vectors κ, which we give in
Algorithm 6.10. Our main idea consists of first transforming each of the 2κ bits individually
to an Arithmetic encoding modulo q and then summing component-wise to calculate the
Hamming weight of each variable. The results are subtracted again component-wise.
Correctness
The correctness of SecSampler1 follows directly by the construction of the algorithm.
Indeed, since at every iteration of the loop
A =B2Aq ((x>> 0)∧1)−B2Aq ((y>> 0)∧1)







B2Aq ((xi >> 0)∧1)−B2Aq ((yi >> 0)∧1) + . . .




6.2. Masked implementation for higher-order binomial samplers
Algorithm 6.10 SecSampler1




i yi = y
Output: A = (Ai)1≤i≤n ∈ Fq such that
∑
iAi = HW(x)−HW(y) mod q
1: (Ai)1≤i≤n← 0
2: for j = 0 to κ−1 do
3: B← B2Aq ((x>> j)∧1)
4: C← B2Aq ((y>> j)∧1)
5: A←A+B mod q
6: A←A−C mod q
Security analysis
The security of the sampler described in Algorithm 6.10 can be easily derived from its
basic structure and use of t− SNI gadgets.
Proposition 6.7. Sampler1 in Algorithm 6.10 is t− SNI, with t≤ n−1.
Proof. The t− SNI security of both considered B2Aq algorithms, i.e., SecB2Aq−Bit proven
in Proposition 6.5 and SecArithBoolModp in Proposition 6.2, receiving independent
inputs, guarantees that every loop of Algorithm 6.10 represents a t− SNI gadget and
therefore the output A can be securely injected in the sum of the following loop.
6.2.2. New bit-sliced masked binomial sampler
As a first step, in our improved sampler SecSampler2 we compute the Hamming weight
of x on the Boolean encodings using bit-slicing. This allows us to significantly increase
the throughput. Secondly, we directly subtract the Hamming weight of y from the result,
again using bit-slicing. This strategy additionally permits to improve the performance,
as the sampler only needs a single conversion algorithm. Before converting the difference
and giving the final result, the sampler needs to add κ, as depicted in Algorithm 6.13.
This step guarantees to correctly map the sign of the difference and to avoid that negative
values are wrongly transformed. We underline that, in some cases, this operation can be
significantly optimized. For instance, when κ= 8, as in NewHope, the addition can be
performed with only component-wise XOR, as described in Algorithm 6.14. Lastly, after
the B2Aq conversion, we need to subtract the additional κ, in order to recover the correct
result. This operation is performed component-wise on the Arithmetic shares. The full
procedure is given in Algorithm 6.15. Note that, since the input variables are bit-sliced,
we indicate the jth bit of the lth share of x as x(j)l .
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Algorithm 6.11 SecBitAdd
Input: x = (xi)1≤i≤n ∈ F2κ such that
⊕
ixi = x, λ= dlog2(κ+ 1)e+ 1
Output: z = (zi)1≤i≤n ∈ F2λ such that
⊕
i zi = HW(x)
1: (ti)1≤i≤n← 0
2: (zi)1≤i≤n← 0
3: for j = 1 to κ do
4: t(1)← z(1)⊕x(j)
5: w← x(j)


















Figure 6.7.: Structure of SecSampler2 in Algorithm 6.15 (lines 1-4)
Correctness





= B2Aq(HW(x)−HW(y) +κ)−κ= HW(x)−HW(y) mod q.
Security analysis
Before proving the security of SecSampler2 in Algorithm 6.15, we briefly summarize the
security properties which its subroutines satisfy.
First we show that SecBitAdd in Algorithm 6.11 is t− NI and we start the analysis
by focusing on its structure. We recall that SecAnd [CGV14] is t− SNI and it receives at
every iteration independent inputs (line 7). The output of each SecAnd is added with
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Algorithm 6.12 SecBitSub
Input: z = (zi)1≤i≤n ∈ F2λ ,y = (yi)1≤i≤n ∈ F2κ such that
⊕
i zi = z and
⊕
i yi = y, λ=
dlog2(κ+ 1)e+ 1
Output: z = (zi)1≤i≤n ∈ F2λ such that
⊕
i zi = z−HW(y)
1: (ti)1≤i≤n← 0
2: for j = 1 to κ do
3: t(1)← z(1)⊕y(j)
4: w← y(j)







Input: x = (xi)1≤i≤n ∈ F2λ , λ= dlog2(κ+ 1)e+ 1
Output: y = (yi)1≤i≤n ∈ F2λ such that
⊕
i yi = x+κ
1: (ti)1≤i≤n← (κ,0, . . . ,0)
2: t← RefreshXOR(t,λ)
3: y← SecAdd(x,t)
a XOR to a value independent from its inputs (line 8), therefore the entire inner loop
(lines 6-9) represents a t− SNI gadget. This is recursively composed in the outer loop
(lines 3-11) providing the outputs (t(2), . . . ,t(λ)) and preserving the t− SNI property.
Additionally, at every iteration of the outer loop, x(j) is added with a XOR to z(1) (line 4),
resulting in the output t(1) = x(1) + . . . + x(κ). Let us suppose an attacker probes a
set of t1 values P1 on the shares (t(2), . . . ,t(λ)) or on the internal values produced during
the concatenation of the inner loop, and a set of t2 values P2 on the computation of t(1),
with t1 + t2 ≤ t. In particular let tO1 , tO2 be the probes on the output values and tI1, tI2
the ones on the internals, with tO1 + tI1 = t1 and tI2 + tO2 = t2. The t− SNI of the inner
loop guarantees that every value in P1 can be simulated by using at most tI1 shares of
the inputs. On the other hand, because of the linearity of the computation of t(1), the
probes in P2 can be simulated using at most tI2 + tO2 shares of the input. Therefore, by
Definition 2.4, SecBitAdd is t− NI.
Now, since SecBitSub in Algorithm 6.12 follows the same procedure as Algorithm 6.11,
with the exception of Lines 6 and 7, which simply add a negation to the interested value,
then it is t− NI as well.
As for SecConstAdd in Algorithm 6.13, from [Bar+18b] we know that RefreshXOR
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Algorithm 6.14 SecConstAdd (optimized for κ= 8)
Input: x = (xi)1≤i≤n ∈ F2λ
Output: y = (yi)1≤i≤n ∈ F2λ such that
⊕
i yi = x+ 8
1: y← x
2: y(5)← y(5)⊕y(4)








i yi = y
Output: A = (Ai)1≤i≤n ∈ Fq such that
∑




4: A← B2Aq (z)
5: A1←A1−κ mod q
is t− SNI and SecAdd is t− NI. Therefore it is easy to see that the composition of
them, as it appears in Algorithm 6.13, is t− NI. Regarding the optimized version of
SecConstAdd in Algorithm 6.14, here the security comes directly from the fact that the
algorithm is linear.
Proposition 6.8. SecSampler2 in Algorithm 6.15 is t− SNI, with t≤ n−1.
Proof. Before proceeding with the proof, we point out that SecSampler2 is given by the
circuit in Figure 6.7 with the addition of a share-wise sum between the output share A1
and the public value −κ (line 5 of Algorithm 6.15). Since the simulation of this value
depends only on the simulation of A1, the security of SecSampler2 is not influenced by
this additional operation and it corresponds to the one of the algorithm in Figure 6.7.
Let Ω = (I,O) be the set of adversarial observations on the circuit in Figure 6.7,
where I are the ones on the internal values and O on the output shares, with |I|+ |O| ≤ t.
In particular, let I1 be the set of probes on B2Aq, I2 on SecConstAdd, I3 on SecBitSub
and I4 on SecBitAdd, with
∑
j |Ij | ≤ |I|.
We prove the existence of a simulator which simulates the adversary’s view by using
at most |I| input shares, analyzing the circuit from right to left.
Since B2Aq is t− SNI, there exists an observation set S1 such that |S1| ≤ |I1| and the
gadget can be simulated using at most |S1| shares of its input.
Since SecConstAdd is t− NI and |I2∪S1| ≤ t, then there exists an observation set S2
such that |S2| ≤ |I2∪S1| and the gadget can be simulated using at most |S2| shares of
the inputs.
144
6.3. Case study: NewHope
Since SecBitSub is t− NI and |I3∪S2| ≤ t, then there exist two observation sets S31 ,S32
such that |S31 | ≤ |I3 ∪S2|, |S32 | ≤ |I3 ∪S2| and the gadget can be simulated using at
most |S31 |+ |S32 | shares of the inputs.
Since SecBitAdd is t− NI and |I4∪S31 | ≤ t, then there exists an observation set S4
such that |S4| ≤ |I4∪S31 | and the gadget can be simulated using at most |S4| shares of
the inputs.
By combining the steps above, we see that SecSampler2 can be simulated by using
|S4| ≤ |I4|+ |S31 | ≤ |I4|+ |I3|+ |S2| ≤ |I4|+ |I3|+ |I2|+ |S1| ≤ |I4|+ |I3|+ |I2|+ |I1| ≤ |I|
input shares, proving that it is t− SNI.
6.3. Case study: NewHope
To have a concrete idea of the performance of our new samplers, we report the performance
evaluations provided in [Sch+19], where the authors conducted a case study using the
parameters of the NIST submission NewHope. The length of the bit-vectors is set
to κ= 8 and the prime to q = 12289.
Both sampling approaches are evaluated with the B2Aq conversion algorithms SecB2Aq
and SecArithBoolModp (quadratic), presented in Section 6.1. The latter is instantiated
with k′ = dlog2 2qe= 15.
The implementations are performed on a 32-bit ARM Cortex-M4F microcontroller
embedded in an STM32F4 DISCOVERY board with 1 Mbyte of flash memory, 192 kbyte
of RAM, a floating-point unit (FPU), and a true random number generator (TRNG).
The results can be seen in Table 6.5.
We point out that our new sampler SecSampler2 significantly improves SecSampler1
regardless the conversion algorithm adopted and it additionally outperforms the first-order
scheme from Oder et al. [Ode+18].
6.4. Conclusions
In this chapter, we presented the first masked binomial sampler provable secure at
high-order against a power analysis attacker. Additionally, we showed a masked bit-sliced
sampler, which provides secure and efficient sampling even at large protection orders.
The algorithms rely on new conversion algorithms from Boolean to Arithmetic masking
schemes for prime moduli, which improve previous algorithms significantly for the relevant
parameters. In particular, we presented two new conversion schemes that transform
Boolean shares to Arithmetic shares with arbitrary moduli and security orders. The
first one has asymptotic complexity O(n2 logk), where n is the number of shares and k
the bit-size of the conversion, outperforming the algorithms in its category. The second
conversion, instead, shows a notable performance improvement for relevant bit sizes.
145
6. Masking lattice-based cryptographic primitives
n 2 3 4 5
[Ode+18] 3,637 - - -
SecSampler1
(C) 271,423 638,315 1,076,155 1,758,184
(A) 6,145 13,913 24,397 37,880
SecSampler2
(C) 17,564 40,977 68,914 112,402
(A) 2,649 5,573 9,462 14,587
Table 6.5.: Cycle counts for masked sampling of one binomial distributed coefficient using
the B2A conversions (A) SecB2Aq and (C) SecBoolArithModp (quadratic).
We excluded the generation of the input bit vectors for better comparison as
this is a constant overhead for all approaches [Sch+19]
For specific parameters, e.g., n ≥ 11 for k = 32, it also improves previous works for
power-of-two moduli, and it is, therefore, suitable for the use in symmetric cryptography
as well.
Since our proposed schemes support arbitrary moduli, they can be applied to a broad
class of lattice-based constructions, like NewHope, LIMA, Saber, Kyber, HILA5, or Ding
Key Exchange. While the NIST standardization process is ongoing, this peculiarity
makes them an essential contribution in order to compare the submitted schemes and to
have a more precise analysis of them. In a more general picture, our study advances the
understanding of the cost that masking post-quantum cryptography requires.
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Finally, we conclude our work by summarizing our advancements in the field of provable
countermeasures against power analysis attacks and discussing some future research pos-
sibilities.
The first two chapters presenting the new contributions of this thesis focused on the
challenge of improving efficiency in masking schemes, which we carried out by proposing
strategies to reduce the randomness cost in masked implementations. We developed
improvements for Boolean masking and Inner Product masking. In the first case, we
proposed a method to recycle part of the internal randomness used among gadgets.
We proposed new notions that formalize security for gadgets that share part of their
randomness, and we explicitly provided a method to design multiplication schemes
fulfilling such security requirements. In the second case, we improved the efficiency of
prior multiplication schemes proposing new algorithms that are conceptually close to the
schemes of Ishai et al. [ISW03] and show a reduced randomness cost. Additionally, we
optimized a specific composition pattern common in the AES S-box, which limits further
the use of random elements in some masked implementations.
By studying both Boolean and Inner Product masking, we remarked that there is a
trade-off between efficiency and security level in masked implementations. The simple
Boolean masking provides easy algorithmic design and relatively high performance. On
the other hand, the Inner Product masking, characterized by a more complicated algebraic
structure, shows less evidence of leakage in practice, and, in some cases, a security order
amplification, but at the cost of higher performance overhead. The reduction in the
performance overhead that we provided for the Inner Product masking contributes to
reduce this gap and shows that Inner Product masking could be a valid alternative to
Boolean masking.
In the subsequent chapter, we considered the problem of defining a suitable model
that formally represents the local security and composability of masked gadgets in the
presence of physical defaults. The most popular model to prove the security of masked
algorithms is currently the probing model [ISW03]. While it provides a simple way to
examine the security of algorithms, this model is based on idealistic assumptions and
does not capture physical peculiarities, like glitches or transitional leakages, leading to
inconsistency between the theoretical security of an algorithm and the practical security
of its implementation. To fill this gap, we defined the robust probing model, which allows
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a designer to analyze and demonstrate security guarantees against different kinds of
physical defaults, and we used it to prove that the ISW multiplication gadget is probing
secure in the presence of glitches in 2 cycles, and it shows composability guarantees.
As a last contribution, we worked more concretely on building masked implementations
of algorithms used in lattice-based cryptosystems. In this context, we gave two main
contributions. The first one is a new algorithm for the conversion from Boolean to
Arithmetic masking at arbitrary moduli. The second one is the first masked binomial
sampler provable secure at high-order against a power analysis attacker. Both schemes
can be applied to a wide class of lattice-based constructions, like NewHope, LIMA,
Saber, Kyber, HILA5, or Ding Key Exchange, which are part of the submissions to the
NIST post-quantum standardization process. This broad applicability to lattice-based
constructions makes our work fundamental for a comprehensive understanding of their
differences because it contributes to estimate the overhead cost that masking requires.
Future directions
This work offers several future research directions and raises many interesting open prob-
lems.
In the field of randomness reuse, it could be interesting analyzing different security
requirements that allow the construction of multiplication schemes with shared random-
ness for order higher than 3. Another direction in which it would be worth investigating
is a randomness reusing strategy following a different logic than the one proposed in this
work. For instance, an alternative could be to cyclically reuse part of the encoding of
one gadget as randomness of another gadget.
With the development of the robust probing model, we did the first step in closing
the gap between theoretic and practical security. Still, our model can be improved to
capture more realistic adversarial strategies. For instance, a possibility of improvement
could be considering not only the scenario of passive attackers but also the one of active
attackers. Such a model could also be used to study a randomness reusing strategy that
exhibits security in a setting closer to reality.
In the field of masking lattice-based cryptography, a lot can still be done. This thesis
mainly covers a high-order masked implementation of the binomial sampler, which is
common in lattice-based constructions. However, many other components lack a protected
implementation, for example, in order to mask the whole NewHope key exchange, we
still need to design a masked version of the encoding and decoding algorithms.
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A.1. Additional algorithms used in Chapter 6
Algorithm A.1 SecAddModp [Bar+18b]




i yi = y
Output: z = (zi)1≤i≤n ∈ F2k with 2k > 2q such that
⊕
i zi = x+y mod q
1: (pi)1≤i≤n← (2k−p,0, . . . ,0)
2: s← SecAdd(x,y)
3: s′← SecAdd(s,p)
4: b← s>> (k−1)
5: c← RefreshXOR(b,1)





Algorithm A.2 SecAdd [Bar+18b]




i yi = y
Output: z = (zi)1≤i≤n ∈ F2k such that
⊕
i zi = x+y mod 2k
1: p← x⊕y
2: g← SecAnd(x,y)
3: for j = 1 to W = dlog2(k−1)e−1 do
4: pow← 2j−1
5: a← g << (pow)
6: a← SecAnd(a,p)
7: g← g⊕a
8: a′← p<< (pow)
9: a′← RefreshXOR(a′,k)
10: p← SecAnd(p,a′)
11: a← g << (2W )
12: a← SecAnd(a,p)
13: g← g⊕a
14: z← x⊕y⊕ (g << 1)
Algorithm A.3 SecAnd [CGV14]




i yi = y
Output: z = (zi)1≤i≤n ∈ F2k such that
⊕
i zi = x∧y
1: z← x∧y
2: for i= 1 to n−1 do
3: for j = 1 + i to n do
4: ri,j
$← F2k
5: rj,i← (xi∧yj)⊕ ri,j
6: rj,i← rj,i⊕ (xj ∧yi)
7: zi← zi⊕ ri,j
8: zj ← zj⊕ rj,i
Algorithm A.4 FullXOR [CGV14]






3: for i= 2 to n do
4: x← x⊕yi
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Algorithm A.5 RefreshXOR [Bar+18b]
Input: x = (xi)1≤i≤n ∈ F2k1 such that
⊕
ixi = x, bit size k2
Output: y = (yi)1≤i≤n ∈ F2k2 such that
⊕
i yi = x
1: y← x
2: for i= 1 to n−1 do
3: for j = 1 + i to n do
4: r $← F2k2
5: yi← yi⊕ r
6: yj ← yj⊕ r
Algorithm A.6 FullRefreshXOR [Bar+18b]
Input: x = (xi)1≤i≤n ∈ F2k1 such that
⊕
ixi = x, bit size k2
Output: y = (yi)1≤i≤n ∈ F2k2 such that
⊕
i yi = x
1: y← x
2: for i= 1 to n do
3: for j = 2 to n do
4: r $← F2k2
5: y1← y1⊕ r
6: yj ← yj⊕ r
Algorithm A.7 SecMul (based on SecAnd)
Input: A = (Ai)1≤i≤n ∈ Fq, B = (Bi)1≤i≤n ∈ Fq such that
∑




Output: C = (Ci)1≤i≤n ∈ Fq such that
∑
iCi = x+y mod q
1: C = A ·B mod q
2: for i= 1 to n−1 do
3: for j = 1 + i to n do
4: Ri,j
$← Fq
5: Rj,i← (Ai ·Bj) +Ri,j mod q
6: Rj,i←Rj,i+ (Aj ·Bi) mod q
7: Ci← Ci−Ri,j mod q
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